The Jingshan Report by China Finance 40 Forum Research Group,
THE JINGSHAN REPORT: 
OPENING CHINA’S 
FINANCIAL SECTOR
CHINA FINANCE 40 FORUM  
RESEARCH GROUP

THE JINGSHAN REPORT: 
OPENING CHINA’S 
FINANCIAL SECTOR
CHINA FINANCE 40 FORUM  
RESEARCH GROUP
TRANSLATORS: HU BING, GAO ZHENG, TAO MENGYING,  
WANG MENGHAN, XIE YUELAN, YE FENG, ZANG ZIMING,  
SHAO SUYA, ZHAO CHUNMEI, LI SHUANGSHAN
Published by ANU Press
The Australian National University
Acton ACT 2601, Australia
Email: anupress@anu.edu.au






This title is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
The full licence terms are available at  
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode
Cover design and layout by ANU Press
This edition © 2020 ANU Press
Contents
Abbreviations  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . vii
Introduction: Proactively and Steadily Advancing China’s  
Financial Opening  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1
Huang Yiping
1 . China’s International Strategic Environment   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .25
Zhang Yuyan, Feng Weijiang and Liu Wei
2 . China’s Financial Development: A Global Perspective  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .51
Zhu Min, Chen Weidong, Zhou Jingtong, Gai Xinzhe  
and Xiong Qiyue
3 . Further Expanding the Opening Up of China’s Financial  
Industry   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .109
Zhu Jun, Guo Kai, Ai Ming, Zhao Yue and Bai Xuefei
4 . RMB Exchange Rate: Moving Towards a Floating Regime   .  .  .  .145
Zhang Bin
5 . China’s Cross-Border Capital Flow Management  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .175
Guan Tao, Zhang Antian, Xie Yaxuan, Gao Zheng and Ma Yun
6 . Promoting China’s Financial Market Reform and Innovation  
with Opening Policies  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .229
Xu Zhong, Zhang Xuechun, Cao Yuanyuan, Tang Yingwei  
and Wan Tailei
7 . Building China’s Overseas Investment and Financing  
Cooperation  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .261




ABC Agricultural Bank of China
AGBI Asian Government Bond Index
AMC asset management company
BBVA Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria
BOC Bank of China
BOCOM Bank of Communications
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CBRC China Banking Regulatory Commission
CCB China Construction Bank
CDB China Development Bank
CFETS China Foreign Exchange Trade System
CIRC China Insurance Regulatory Commission
CIRR commercial interest reference rate
COFER currency composition of official foreign exchange 
reserves
CPC Communist Party of China
CRCC China Railway Construction Corporation
CSRC China Securities Regulatory Commission
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIBC Export-Import Bank of China
EM Emerging Market




FDI foreign direct investment
GDP gross domestic product
GEM Growth Enterprises Market
GFC global financial crisis
G-SIB global systemically important bank
ICBC Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
IFFO Infrastructure Financing Facilitation Office
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPO initial public offering
M&As mergers and acquisitions
MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce
MPA macroprudential assessment
MRF Mutual Recognition of Funds
NBS National Bureau of Statistics
NEEQ national equities exchange and quotations
NPL non-performing loans
ODI outward foreign direct investment
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development
OTC over-the-counter
PBC People’s Bank of China
QDII Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor
QFII Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor
ROA return on assets
ROE return on equity
RQDII RMB Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor
RQFII RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor
SAFE State Administration of Foreign Exchange
SDR special drawing right
SFC Securities and Futures Commission




SPDB Shanghai Pudong Development Bank
SSE Shanghai Stock Exchange
SSVB SPD Silicon Valley Bank
STRI Services Trade Restrictiveness Index
SZSE Shenzhen Stock Exchange
UK United Kingdom
URR unremunerated reserve requirement
US United States
USD United States dollars
WTO World Trade Organization

1
Introduction: Proactively and 
Steadily Advancing China’s 
Financial Opening1
Huang Yiping2
China has consistently pursued the opening of its financial sector over 
the past four decades. In the 1980s, the Chinese Government tried to 
improve economic relations with foreign countries by reforming the 
exchange rate regime, establishing special economic zones to pilot 
the market economy system and implementing an opening policy. In the 
1990s, the government actively employed a ‘market-for-technology’ 
strategy to attract foreign direct investment. It also adopted a managed 
floating exchange rate regime after aligning official and market exchange 
rates in 1994. When entering the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001, the Chinese Government promised to open the domestic 
financial sector and provide foreign-owned financial institutions with 
pre-establishment national treatment. After the global financial crisis, the 
government took the initiative to accelerate RMB internationalisation, 
established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and launched the 
Belt and Road Initiative.
1  This article is the overview of the 2017 China Finance 40 Forum Jingshan Report. Authors of 
the report include Huang Yiping, Zhang Yuyan, Zhu Min, Zhang Bin, Xu Zhong, Guan Tao and 
Zhu Jun. All the experts participated in their personal capacity. Huang Yiping authored the overview, 
which combines the main analysis and conclusions from seven sub-reports. Not all of the views 
expressed in the overview are identical to those held by the authors of the sub-reports. Guan Tao, 
Zhang Bin, Xu Zhong and Zhu Jun provided valuable comments on the overview. Huang Yiping 
takes full responsibility for any errors or oversights found in this overview.
2  Chairman of China Finance 40 Forum Academic Committee and Deputy Dean of the National 
School of Development, Peking University.
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China’s financial opening over the last 40 years has several notable 
characteristics. First, progress has been slow, with several reversals; second, 
the government has shown great determination, but implementation has 
been difficult; third, policy coordination has been insufficient. These 
characteristics are related to China’s gradual approach to reform. Our 
overall assessment of China’s financial opening up policy is that much 
has been achieved, but many problems remain. The exchange rate regime 
reform has moved consistently in the direction of allowing two-way 
fluctuations of the currency value and letting market forces decide the 
exchange rate. However, to this day, the exchange rate still lacks flexibility. 
Liberalisation of the capital account and internationalisation of the RMB 
have also made substantial progress, but some reversals have occurred over 
the past two years. Granting market access to foreign-owned financial 
institutions remains ‘long on talk but short on action’—little progress has 
been achieved, and to some degree retrogression is apparent. Opening 
of the financial market is severely restricted by the differences between 
domestic and international market rules and systems, as well as China’s 
‘channelised’ mode of opening. China has just started to engage in foreign 
investment and financing cooperation. China’s financial institutions 
are far behind the enterprises in going global, and their capabilities for 
providing cross-border financial services are rather limited.
Despite all these problems, financial opening has not affected China’s 
economic growth and financial stability as yet, although many emerging 
economies have experienced financial crises after instituting opening 
policies. Should China further open up the financial sector? Currently, 
China’s financial openness lags behind that of other emerging economies; 
it is also below the degree of openness in the real economy. In addition, 
there are at least three reasons for China to further open up its financial 
sector. First, financial opening is essential to sustainable economic 
growth. Economic growth requires economic innovation, and economic 
innovation is dependent on financial innovation, which can be boosted 
by financial opening. Second, financial opening is an important way to 
prevent and control systemic risks. Expanding financial openness can not 
only instigate advanced managerial concepts, skills and rules, but also 
strengthen market discipline and reduce financial risks. Third, financial 
opening is an important way for China to participate in international 
economic governance. China must align itself with the international 
financial system to uphold economic globalisation and promote 
internationalisation of the RMB and the Belt and Road Initiative.
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The Chinese and global economies have undergone many changes in the 
past 40 years. It is necessary for the Chinese Government to consider ideas 
and strategies that align with today’s economic realities when formulating 
financial opening policies. First, as a major economy, China should 
consider fully the spill-over effect of opening policies on other economies 
and the international market. Second, while actively liberalising the 
capital account, authorities should consider establishing a moderate 
and temporary cross-border capital flow management mechanism to 
ensure financial stability and monetary policy independence. Third, the 
exchange rate can influence the real economy through both trade and 
financial channels, with the latter becoming increasingly important. 
Fourth, reform and opening complement and reinforce each other. China 
should promote progress on both fronts.
To proactively and prudently open up China’s financial sector, we propose 
the following policy recommendations.
First, the Financial Stability and Development Committee under the 
State Council should coordinate financial reform and opening policies. 
‘Promoting reform through opening’ is vital, but ‘facilitating opening with 
reform’ is also indispensable. Coordination of financial and non-financial 
reforms is essential. For example, reform of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) is an important condition for interest rate marketisation and 
capital account liberalisation. Additionally, coordinating domestic and 
foreign financial policies is required. For example, the opening of financial 
institutions to the outside world depends on whether foreign-owned 
financial institutions can truly enjoy pre-establishment national treatment 
in China. Finally, the coordination of various financial opening policies, 
especially the ‘troika’ of financial sector opening, exchange rate regime 
reform and financial deregulation must occur.
Second, the exchange rate should be more flexible and market forces 
should play a bigger role in determining the exchange rate. Since the 
end of 2016, RMB depreciation expectations have subdued, and the 
real economy has remained relatively stable, providing an important 
opportunity for the long-expected reform of increasing exchange rate 
flexibility. If China allows the exchange rate to be determined by market 
forces in due time, it will provide an important foundation for China to 
expand financial opening and improve financial regulation. It will also 
send a very positive signal to the international community, giving China 
more status in international financial affairs.
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Third, China should establish a management framework for cross-
border  capital flows at both the macro and micro levels, while steadily 
accelerating RMB internationalisation. At the micro level, it is important 
to promote capital account convertibility and facilitate trade and 
investment. The focus of regulation should shift from ex-post regulation 
to ex-ante and concurrent regulation. At the macro level, a two-
dimensional management framework—one on capital control and one 
on macroprudential management—should be established. Regulatory 
tools such as the macroprudential monitoring mechanism and stress test 
should be improved, and capital control measures such as the Tobin tax 
should be maintained as counter-cyclical instruments. However, capital 
controls should only be temporary measures to buy time for further reform.
Fourth, China should fully implement the pre-establishment national 
treatment towards foreign financial institutions and relax the cap on shares 
owned by foreign investors. When foreign-owned financial institutions 
enter China, they become resident business entities and are subject to the 
supervision of Chinese regulators. Their influence on financial stability is 
completely different from that of short-term capital flows. The Chinese 
authorities should treat local and foreign institutions equally in terms of 
ownership percentage, forms of incorporation, shareholder qualifications, 
business scope and the number of licences allowed, to provide a level 
playing ground for foreign investors.
Fifth, China should respect international rules and practices to achieve 
a  higher level of financial opening. Opening the domestic market 
is essential to enhancing China’s international competitiveness and 
achieving RMB internationalisation. A substantial gap exists between 
the openness stipulated by policies and those that are achieved. This is 
mainly due to misalignments between domestic and international rules 
and regulations. China should open up the credit rating market and 
foreign issuers should be given more flexibility in choosing auditing and 
accounting standards. Taxation issues faced by foreign investors in the 
Chinese bond market should be clarified as soon as possible. In addition, 
the financial infrastructure should be based on Chinese conditions, but 
should adapt to international practices.
Sixth, the opportunities presented by the Belt and Road Initiative and 
domestic industry upgrading and restructuring should be seized. This 
could help construct a framework for outbound investment and financing. 
In addition to development finance and policy, China should also create 
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a comprehensive commercial financial services system. Regulators could 
guide Chinese financial institutions to plan their overseas presence 
rationally and encourage financial institutions to expand the scope and 
depth of their cross-border financial business. Overseas investment and 
financing services can be improved by using the correspondent banks, 
syndicated loans, assistance provided by host countries and multilateral 
development banks, capital markets in developed economies and 
international financial centres.
Finally, a macroprudential regulatory framework that matches an open 
financial system should be established. This will prevent and mitigate risks 
that could occur in the opening process. An open financial system can 
enhance efficiency, but may also increase risk. The regulatory framework 
should be expanded based on rules regarding cross-border financing risks 
in the People’s Bank of China’s (PBC) macroprudential assessment (MPA) 
system. Consideration should be given to the roadmap, timetable and 
coordination of financial opening policies. The authorities should adjust 
policies to adapt to different stages of development, reduce the volatility 
of capital flows, maintain external debt at a reasonable level and optimise 
its structure.
Overview
Four decades of financial opening
When the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Communist Party of 
China Central Committee decided to shift the government’s focus to 
economic development in late 1978, China had only one formal financial 
institution—the PBC. The PBC performed the functions of both the 
central bank and commercial banks. The distribution of funds was based 
on central government planning, while the role of commercial financial 
institutions was almost negligible. However, the government established 
three specialised commercial banks in 1978: the Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank and Agricultural Bank of China.
For nearly four decades since 1978, the reform and opening up policy has 
brought tremendous changes to China’s financial sector. China’s financial 
reforms have not followed a simple linear process; they have been successful 
in increasing the quantity of financial services provided, but the quality 
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has not improved much (Huang, Wang, Wang & Lin, 2013). The types 
and quantity of financial institutions have increased significantly, and 
the scale of financial assets has also expanded dramatically. All types of 
financial institutions can now be found in China. China now ranks first 
in the world in terms of commercial bank assets, second in terms of stock 
market capitalisation and third in terms of private sector bond market 
capitalisation, although most derivatives markets are still at an early stage 
of development, except for commodities futures. Judged only by these 
quantitative indicators, China’s financial system is already a leader in the 
world (Zhu, Zhang et al., 2017).
In contrast, market mechanisms for the pricing and allocation of funds 
are faced with many constraints (Huang & Wang, 2017). The government 
intervenes in many areas. Some examples that challenge market discipline 
include the rules for benchmark deposit and lending rates, intervention 
in the foreign exchange market, guidance on fund allocation in the credit 
and capital markets, control over cross-border capital flows, government 
holdings in large financial institutions, soft budget constraints of SOEs 
and  guaranteed payment on financial products. Economists at the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) used 2005 data to create a financial 
repression index measuring the degree of government intervention 
in the financial system; China ranked fourth out of 91 countries 
(Abiad, Detragiache & Tressel, 2010).
Since the beginning of China’s economic reform, financial opening has 
become increasingly important in policy considerations. China’s financial 
opening can be divided into four stages.
The period from 1978–1991 was an exploratory stage for financial 
opening, and the most important move during this period was the launch 
of ‘special economic zones’ and adjustment to the exchange rate system. 
The focus of economic reform at this stage was first on rural regions. 
It gradually shifted to urban areas after 1984. In 1979, Japan Export-
Import Bank became the first foreign bank to set up an office in Beijing. 
In 1982, CITIC Bank issued the first foreign bond since 1978 in Japan’s 
financial market, with help from Nomura Securities. In 1979, Deng 
Xiaoping called forth establishment of ‘special economic zones’. The first 
one was set up in Shenzhen in 1980. These special economic zones rolled 
out favourable policies like tariff exemption, aiming to create a beneficial 
environment to attract foreign investment. Meanwhile, the authorities 
tried to increase the proportion of market allocation of foreign exchanges 
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by adopting a dual exchange rate system, where both an official exchange 
rate and a market rate existed. To support export growth, the government 
gradually devalued the RMB exchange rate against the USD from 1.498 
in 1980 to 5.323 in 1991.
The period 1992–2000 was the foundation stage for financial opening, 
and the most important move during this period was the implementation 
of a managed floating exchange rate system and the effort to attract 
foreign direct investment. Deng Xiaoping’s visit to South China in early 
1992 opened a new era for economic reform. In October 1992, the 14th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China made it clear that 
the objective of China’s economic reform was to establish a socialist 
market  economy. In 1993, the government introduced the ‘market-
for-technology’ policy to attract foreign investment. In the following 
22  years,  China attracted more foreign investment than any other 
developing country. In  early 1994, the central bank cancelled the dual 
exchange rate system and unified the official exchange rate with  the 
market rate to establish a single managed floating exchange rate system 
based on market demand and supply. Current account convertibility was 
achieved in December 1996. When the Asian financial crisis broke out 
in 1997, the government tried to maintain the stability of the RMB and 
adopted a temporary exchange rate policy that pegged the RMB to the 
USD. In the meantime, the government accelerated reform of state-owned 
commercial banks.
The period 2001–2008 was an expansion stage for financial opening. 
The most important move at this stage was to open the domestic market 
to foreign-owned financial institutions. China’s official accession to the 
WTO at the end of 2001 prompted the government to increase its efforts 
at economic reform. The government promised to open RMB business 
to foreign banks completely within five years, and similar commitments 
were made to foreign securities and insurance companies. To open up 
channels for investment in domestic and foreign capital markets, Chinese 
regulators set up the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) 
scheme in 2003 and the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) 
scheme in 2006. In 2004, the government began to encourage Chinese 
enterprises to ‘go global’. Soon, China became one of the world’s largest 
home countries of direct investment. In July 2005, the central bank 
dropped the RMB’s peg to the USD. At the end of 2003, the central bank 
issued a notice on providing clearing arrangements for personal RMB 
business in Hong Kong, and then expanded such arrangements to Macau 
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in 2004. By then, the cross-border circulation and use of the RMB entered 
a new stage. In October 2005, the International Finance Corporation and 
the Asian Development Bank issued the first RMB-denominated bonds 
(commonly known as ‘Panda bonds’) in China; in June 2007, the first 
RMB bond was issued in Hong Kong (commonly known as ‘Dim Sum 
Bonds’). At this point, although the internationalisation of the RMB was 
not yet a national strategy, China had been quietly testing the waters.
The period 2009–2017 saw steady advancement of financial opening, and 
the most important move was accelerating RMB internationalisation 
and introducing the Belt and Road Initiative. Since early 2009, the central 
bank has actively expanded the offshore RMB market and supported 
RMB settlement for cross-border trade and investment. In July 2015, the 
central bank opened the interbank bond market to foreign central banks, 
international financial institutions and sovereign wealth funds; schemes 
such as the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect, Shenzhen–Hong Kong 
Stock Connect and Bond Connect were established to bridge the domestic 
and foreign capital markets. On 1 October 2016, the RMB was officially 
included in the IMF’s special drawing right (SDR) basket. However, 
reform of the RMB central parity formation mechanism on 11 August 
2015 led to prevalent depreciation expectations. President Xi Jinping 
proposed the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, and the first multilateral 
development institution initiated by China—the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank—was established in Beijing in December 2015.
Great achievements but many problems
From the perspectives of economic growth and financial stability, 
China’s financial reform and opening up in the past four decades have 
undoubtedly been successful. Notably, China’s gross domestic product 
grew at an average annual rate of nearly 10 per cent in the first three 
decades. Additionally, China is the only country of the major emerging 
market economies that has not experienced a serious financial crisis. 
However, if a thorough analysis is conducted on China’s financial opening 
policies, many problems can be identified, despite the evident progress. 
Understanding regarding the appropriate degree of openness in areas like 
financial institutions is also lacking. Regarding exchange rate policies, 
although a certain consensus has been reached on the objective of a more 
flexible exchange rate, it has been difficult to put such policies into practice. 
9
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In some areas, such as foreign investment and financing cooperation, the 
opening process is still at a very preliminary stage. The following presents 
a brief assessment of the financial opening policies in a few major areas.
First, the problem with the exchange rate policy is that the authorities 
have tried to let market forces play a bigger role in determining the 
exchange rate  level, but the flexibility of the exchange rate is still 
inadequate (B. Zhang, 2017). The RMB exchange rate policies (including 
the exchange rate regime) have undergone many changes, from consistent 
devaluation in the early days to gradual appreciation, from pegging 
the RMB to the USD to pegging it to a basket of currencies, and from 
the once fixed regime to a managed floating system. A lasting theme can 
be found in the process over the past four decades, which is the desire to 
increase the flexibility of the exchange rate and gradually move towards 
a market-determined exchange rate system. In fact, China’s exchange 
rate policies have achieved much. The exchange rate is moving towards 
equilibrium level without wild fluctuations. The exchange rate has also 
effectively supported export growth, helping China maintain a healthy 
balance of payments and accumulate massive foreign exchange reserves.
However, China’s exchange rate policy seems to have fallen into a dilemma 
of ‘hate to fix but fear to float’ since 2005. A managed floating exchange 
rate regime that lacks flexibility is rarely adopted by large economies. 
While the Chinese authorities have long claimed that market factors 
should play a bigger role in determining the value of the currency, they 
took measures to stabilise the exchange rate quickly whenever fluctuations 
were apparent. Over the past decade, the central bank either tried to 
reverse the expectations of unilateral RMB appreciation or eradicate 
unilateral depreciation expectations, except for some rare periods. The 
lack of flexibility not only affects monetary policy independence and 
macroeconomic stability, but also impedes economic restructuring, RMB 
internationalisation and the ‘going global’ efforts of Chinese enterprises.
Second, despite considerable progress in capital account liberalisation and 
RMB internationalisation, the past two years have seen some reversals 
(Guan, Zhang, Xie, Gao & Ma, 2017). The Third Plenary Session of the 
16th Communist Party of China Central Committee proposed a policy 
objective of ‘gradually achieving capital account convertibility’. Since 
then, capital account liberalisation started to accelerate and expanded 
from direct investment to external debt and credit, securities investments 
and other cross-border capital and financial transactions. The regulation of 
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the capital account also shifted from ‘lax on inflows and strict on outflows’ 
to ‘balanced management on bidirectional flows’. The number of items 
more than partially convertible on the capital account increased from 34 
in 2012 to 37 by the end of 2016, and the share in total transactions by 
these items increased from 85 per cent to 92.5 per cent, while only three 
items were left unconvertible. A traditional puzzle with capital account 
liberalisation is how to balance the benefits and risks, including how to 
open up the account and to what degree.
Policies on RMB internationalisation were introduced in 2003. In late 
2003, the central bank began to provide clearing arrangements for Hong 
Kong banks with individual RMB business. In 2009, cross-border RMB 
use for current account transactions was expanded to the whole country, 
while cross-border RMB use for capital account transactions was also 
greatly liberalised. Meanwhile, RMB offshore centres, represented by 
Hong Kong, developed rapidly. On 1 October 2016, the IMF officially 
announced the inclusion of RMB in the SDR basket. According to the 
IMF’s data on the currency composition of official foreign exchange 
reserves, the RMB accounted for 1.1 per cent of the total reserves by the end 
of 2016. However, since mid-2015, part of the RMB internationalisation 
effort was reversed to encourage stability in the foreign exchange market. 
SWIFT data shows that the RMB’s ranking in international payment fell 
from fifth in 2015 to sixth by the end of 2016, and its share declined from 
2.31 per cent to 1.67 per cent.
Third, the opening of the financial services sector—especially to foreign-
owned financial institutions—is basically ‘long on talk and short on 
action’ (Zhu, Guo, Ai, Bai & Zhao, 2017). After China joined the 
WTO in 2001, the country gradually relaxed restrictions on the form of 
incorporation, location and business scope, allowing for foreign-owned 
financial institutions. By the end of 2016, the assets of foreign banks 
accounted for 1.3 per cent of the total assets of banking institutions in 
China; joint-venture securities companies accounted for 10 per cent of 
securities companies, and their assets accounted for 4.5 per cent of the 
total; foreign-owned property insurance companies and joint-venture life 
insurance companies accounted for 30.4 per cent of the total. Meanwhile, 
Chinese financial institutions were ‘going global’ proactively, with 
networks covering the Asia-Pacific, North America and Europe. They also 
collaborated with an increasing number of banks globally in providing 
financial services, using various approaches.
11
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However, China’s openness with regard to foreign-owned financial 
institutions lags significantly behind the international average. Regarding 
the banking sector, the share of foreign bank assets in China is much lower 
than the average level of OECD countries (above 10 per cent), and is 
lower than the level of 2 per cent when China joined the WTO. The share 
of foreign assets in the insurance sector also fell to 5.6 per cent in 2016 
after reaching a peak of 8.9 per cent in 2005. The decline of foreign shares 
is an indication of China’s poor business environment and multiple policy 
barriers faced by foreign institutions. China is one of the few countries 
that impose restrictions on foreign ownership in the banking, securities 
and insurance sectors. Restrictions on business scope and licensing rules 
also constrain the development of foreign-owned financial institutions in 
China. For example, foreign securities firms can only enter China as joint 
ventures, and can only conduct very limited types of business, such as 
underwriting and the brokerage of foreign shares and bonds. Foreign-
owned financial institutions are not really given pre-establishment 
national treatment.
Fourth, the opening of China’s financial market is restrained by 
regulatory and institutional differences at home and abroad, and by 
China’s ‘channelised’ mode of opening (Xu, Zhang, Cao, Tang & Wan, 
2017). The bond market opened up by allowing foreign institutions to 
issue RMB bonds or invest in the interbank market; the stock market 
opened up by introducing a series of schemes such as QFII, QDII, the 
Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect and the Shenzhen–Hong Kong 
Stock Connect to encourage two-way investment; the interbank foreign 
exchange market opened up by introducing 66 foreign institutions. 
However, the openness of these markets is generally limited. For example, 
total foreign shareholdings through schemes like QFII, RMB Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investor, the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect 
and the Shenzhen–Hong Kong Stock Connect account for no more 
than 5 per cent of the stock market, much lower than 30 per cent in 
South Korea. Foreign holdings in China’s bond market account for less 
than 2 per cent, while 10 per cent of Japan’s treasury bonds are held by 
foreign entities. In China, transactions by foreign investors account for 
less than 1 per cent of the total trading volume in the interbank foreign 
exchange market.
The relatively low degree of openness in China’s financial market can be 
largely attributed to regulatory and institutional differences between the 
domestic and international markets. This difference has caused much 
THE JInGSHAn REPORT
12
inconvenience to foreign issuers and investors and has dampened their 
enthusiasm to participate in the Chinese market. China’s stock market 
opened up in a ‘channelised’ approach and the foreign exchange market is 
a managed market based on demand. Such practices have suppressed the 
degree of openness. The bond market is even more problematic, as foreign 
institutions struggle with different accounting and auditing requirements. 
China’s bond market differs from the international market in that it 
requires filing for market access and adopts approaches such as single-
tiered custody and centralised trading. Moreover, China’s rating agencies 
generally lack credibility, and the variety of bond-related foreign exchange 
and derivative products is quite limited.
Finally, China has just started to establish a framework for overseas 
investment and financing cooperation. China’s financial institutions 
clearly lag behind the enterprises in their ‘going global’ efforts, and their 
capabilities to provide cross-border financial services remain quite limited 
(Zhu, 2017). While China remains a large recipient of capital inflows, it 
has gradually become an equally powerful exporter of direct investment. 
The focus of overseas investment and financing cooperation has gradually 
expanded from Asian economies to advanced economies in Europe and 
North America, and the sectoral distribution has also shifted from the 
mining industry to business services, financial services and manufacturing. 
Investments made by non-SOEs rose from 19 per cent of total investment 
in 2006 to 49.6 per cent in 2015. However, Chinese enterprises investing 
overseas face substantial financing difficulties, as their investment projects 
are often long term, large scale and involve high risks. Moreover, many 
host countries are short of funds themselves. Chinese enterprises lack 
sufficient credit in foreign countries, and the overseas presence of Chinese 
financial institutions is mainly concentrated in developed economies, 
rather than in the developing and emerging economies where Chinese 
companies are investing heavily.
Many problems have surfaced as Chinese financial institutions have 
‘gone global’ to conduct investment and financing cooperation. Some 
financial institutions have ‘rushed forward’ to seize new projects, 
resulting in distorted market competition. Some companies are ignorant 
of the host country’s environmental and social norms, but invest in the 
country despite possible significant risks. It is also quite common that 
responsibilities, rights and interests are not properly aligned among 
stakeholders, especially in relation to public and concessional funding, 
as an ongoing tracking and accountability mechanism is missing. 
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The overseas distribution of domestic financial institutions does not match 
that of Chinese enterprises, and the overseas branches of Chinese financial 
institutions lack the strength and capability to provide sufficient service 
to companies investing overseas. Although the size of cross-border merger 
and acquisitions activities initiated by Chinese investors has increased 
rapidly, Chinese companies have a relatively high ratio of debt financing. 
The median ratio of debt to EBITDA for Chinese cross-border merger 
and acquisition deals is 5.4, while the global median is 3.
Government policies aiming to open up the financial sector over the 
past four decades have several prominent features. First, they are slow 
with reversals. China has been trying to open up its capital account for 
more than 20 years since the RMB became convertible under the current 
account in 1996. For more than a decade, the authorities repeatedly 
proposed a more flexible exchange rate, but the tolerance for exchange 
rate fluctuations remained low. The Chinese Government made a strong 
commitment to financial opening when China entered the WTO, but has 
been slow in fulfilling its promises.
Second, the government has shown great determination, but 
implementation has been difficult. When China joined the WTO, 
people in the domestic financial sector were largely pessimistic about the 
impact of foreign competition. However, it seems that foreign shares in 
the domestic banking and insurance sectors have declined rather than 
increased. In more recent years, the PBC has opened up the interbank 
bond market vigorously to international organisations, sovereign funds 
and commercial financial institutions. However, the actual degree of 
openness is still surprisingly low, due to gaps between domestic and 
international rules, systems and infrastructures.
Third, policy coordination is insufficient. China’s financial reforms are 
ahead of its economic reforms, and RMB internationalisation is ahead 
of the financial reform. This lack of coordination has often reduced the 
effectiveness of opening policies for the financial sector. Financial policies 
and institutions are intrinsically related. They should be coordinated 
in the process of reform, or they will hinder each other and possibly 
trigger new risks. In the last two years, the authorities have suppressed 
the implementation of some existing policies for capital account 




The aforementioned characteristics of financial opening policies can be 
attributed to many factors, including sectoral interests and policy ideas. 
The slow progress or even retrogression of financial opening may be 
explained by concerns over the perceived harm to the vested interests of 
domestic financial institutions. It is also obvious that policies discriminate 
against foreign-owned financial institutions in terms of shareholdings 
and business scope. Many people worry that financial opening may be 
detrimental to China’s financial security and stability. Some of these 
worries are unnecessary, but some make sense. For example, massive 
short-term capital flows can easily trigger financial risks or even financial 
crises. If China is to further open up, it needs to put in place an efficient 
mechanism to prevent and respond to these potential risks.
Policy ideas and strategies should evolve 
with the times
Should China continue opening up the financial sector and, if so, how 
should the country achieve this? Once no doubts existed, but now 
this is a pressing question. Although China’s financial openness is still 
relatively low, its economic and financial performance is highly regarded 
globally. If China’s policies are working, why should they be changed? 
Conversely, China has taken developed countries in Europe and North 
America as a model for its financial reforms, but these economies have 
experienced serious financial crises in the past, and the progress of 
economic globalisation has slowed down or even reversed. Moreover, some 
developing countries, such as Indonesia and Mexico, have experienced 
financial crises after opening up their financial sectors. All these indicate 
that China needs to balance efficiency and stability when formulating 
financial opening policies.
However, China should continue to open its financial sector for at least 
three reasons.
First, further opening of the financial sector is an important condition 
for achieving sustainable economic growth. Currently, the openness of 
China’s financial industry is not only far below the openness of the real 
economy, but is also significantly below the openness of the majority of 
emerging economies. While repressive financial policies, including capital 
account control, contributed to economic growth in the 1980s and 
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1990s, the impact of such policies has been negative since the turn of the 
century (Huang & Wang, 2011). China’s future economic growth needs 
innovation to obtain new momentum, and economic innovation needs 
support from financial innovation. As China’s WTO entry experience 
shows, the more developed, competitive and internationalised sectors are 
usually those that are opened up more thoroughly to the outside world 
and are more actively involved in global resource allocation. Financial 
progress also relies on further opening, even though problems in the 
financial sector are more complicated than in other sectors. At present, 
Chinese financial institutions are far behind Chinese enterprises in their 
‘going global’ efforts.
Second, financial opening is also an important means to prevent and 
control systemic financial risks. The recent increase of systemic financial 
risks can be attributed to many factors. The continued economic slowdown 
has caused the deterioration of corporate balance sheets, and government 
bailouts for financial products and enterprises have worsened the moral 
hazard problem. Government bailouts seem to stabilise the financial 
market in the short term but may instigate further financial crises. 
Further opening the financial sector can not only introduce advanced 
management concepts, technologies and rules; raise economic efficiency; 
and strengthen competition and market discipline (thus lowering financial 
risks), but can also facilitate the diversification of risks. Clearly, financial 
opening measures should not be implemented all at once, but need 
a carefully designed roadmap and a prudential regulatory framework.
Finally, financial opening is also crucial for China to participate actively 
in international economic governance. Since 2008, some ‘black swan’ 
events have occurred in the international political and economic arena. 
However, peace and development remain the major theme of our time, 
and China is expected to see an extended period of strategic opportunities 
for reform and development (Y. Zhang, 2017). Over the past four decades, 
China has been a major beneficiary of economic globalisation, and it is 
in the country’s interest to maintain an open global economic order. 
China today can hardly assume the role of a rule maker for international 
economic affairs, but it can be active as a key participant. The new 
initiatives recently launched by the Chinese Government—including 
the Belt and Road Initiative, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and 
RMB internationalisation—should be progressed on the premise of closer 
integration with the international economic and financial system.
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The Chinese and global economies have undergone many changes 
compared with the early days of reform and opening up almost 40 years 
ago. It is necessary for the Chinese Government to consider ideas and 
strategies that are adapted to today’s new economic realities when 
formulating financial opening policies.
First, as a major economy, China should take full account of the spill-
over effect of its financial opening policies on other economies and the 
international market. A few years ago, it was quite common for experts 
to regard RMB exchange rate policies as China’s internal affairs that did 
not involve other countries. This argument was incorrect then and is even 
more so in today’s context. The exchange rate is the relative price between 
currencies, and an undervalued or overvalued yuan will affect other 
countries. More importantly, China has evolved from a small economy 
to the world’s second largest. The international economic environment 
has changed from an exogenous variable to an endogenous variable of the 
Chinese economy, and its economic policy has become an important part 
of the international system. Studies have found that China’s monetary 
policy can have a significant impact on the Asian economy through the 
real economy and financial channels (Cho, Huang & Kim, 2017). This 
was not so 40 or even 20 years ago.
Second, on the premise of further liberalising cross-border capital flows, 
moderate and temporary management of cross-border capital flows can 
maintain financial stability and enhance monetary policy independence. 
After the establishment of the Bretton Woods system in 1944, the IMF 
supported capital account control. When the US removed the gold 
standard in 1971, the IMF supported the free flow of cross-border capital. 
After 2009, the IMF’s stance on the free flow of capital shifted again 
towards allowing governments to take appropriate management policies 
for financial stability (IMF, 2011). Recent studies have found that many 
developing countries only have the dilemma between free flow of capital 
and independent monetary policy. Therefore, appropriate management 
of cross-border capital flows could also enhance monetary policy 
independence (Rey, 2013). However, the IMF believes that China’s capital 
flow management is stricter than that of most developed economies. The 
future direction would be for China to gradually lift capital controls, 
shifting from quantitative control and a quota system to price control, 
from residence-based administrative control to currency-based regulatory 
measures, and from ex-ante approval to ex-post reporting and supervision.
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Third, exchange rates used to affect the real economy through trade 
channels, but now the financial channel is becoming increasingly 
important. Undervalued currencies usually increase exports and reduce 
imports, thereby improving trade balance and supporting economic 
growth. Recent studies have determined that exchange rates can affect 
the economy through financial channels in addition to trade channels 
(Hofmann, Shim & Shin, 2016). Since mid-2015, the depreciation of the 
RMB forced many Chinese enterprises to accelerate repayments of their 
foreign debt; this is equivalent to capital outflows and is detrimental to 
economic growth. In the past, China’s economic activities with foreign 
countries mainly involved trade. Now, with a more open financial sector, 
an undervalued currency may not stimulate economic growth. Neither 
can an overvalued currency be assumed to support economic growth. 
Instead, China should aim for exchange rates that align with its economic 
fundamentals, while maintaining adequate flexibility.
Fourth, China should combine ‘promoting reform through opening’ 
and  ‘facilitating opening with reform’ to promote both financial 
reform  and opening up. One of the most important lessons from 
China’s experience in joining the WTO is to ‘promote reform through 
opening’. For over a  decade, China’s policymakers have often applied 
this concept of governance  to the financial sector and made much 
progress. As the links between various elements of the financial sector 
are very important, policymaking should pay particular attention to the 
sequencing issue 9 (McKinnon, 1993). For example, the Chinese central 
bank removed restrictions on the floating range of deposit and lending 
interest rates at the end of 2015, but the problems with risk pricing 
and interest rate transmission mechanism have not yet been resolved 
so interest rate marketisation has barely been accomplished. Another 
example is the internationalisation of the RMB. After the global financial 
crisis, the international community became more sceptical about the 
USD-dominated international monetary system, and expectations for 
the  RMB  rose. The Chinese central bank seized the momentum and 
propelled RMB internationalisation to a new level. However, supporting 
reforms, such as exchange rate regime reform, lag far behind, which 
has seriously restricted the progress of RMB internationalisation. The 
troika of financial sector opening, reform of the exchange rate formation 




Promoting reform through opening; 
facilitating opening with reform
Throughout the process of economic reform and opening, the Chinese 
Government has actively advanced financial opening, but the degree of 
openness still lags behind that of China’s real economy and the financial 
sectors in most countries. Historically, this would not have had much 
of a negative effect on China’s economic growth or financial stability. 
However, now it is constraining further growth. From the perspective of 
maintaining economic growth, controlling financial risks and participating 
in international financial governance, China should further open up its 
financial sector. New policy ideas should be considered in formulating and 
implementing policies. Here, we propose seven policy recommendations.
First, the Financial Stability and Development Committee under the 
State Council should coordinate financial opening policy, design the 
roadmap, and implement the policy proactively and steadily. ‘Promoting 
reform through opening’ is very important, but ‘facilitating opening up 
with reform’ is also indispensable—a one-sided financial opening policy 
should be avoided. Of course, this does not mean reform policies cannot 
be advanced concurrently. However, the success of reform policies in 
certain areas depends on the completion of reforms in other areas. China 
has accumulated some experience and has also learned lessons from 
bringing in foreign banks, opening up the bond market and advancing 
RMB internationalisation. Now that a high-level committee has been 
established, it should aim for strengthened coordination. Financial and 
non-financial reforms should be coordinated. For example, solving the 
issue of soft budget constraints of SOEs is an important condition for 
interest rate marketisation and capital account liberalisation. Domestic 
and foreign financial policies should also be coordinated. For example, the 
opening of financial institutions to the outside world depends on whether 
foreign-owned financial institutions can enjoy pre-establishment national 
treatment and fair competition. Additionally, the promotion of financial 
opening policies should be coordinated. For example, opening financial 
institutions and financial markets, reforming the exchange rate formation 
mechanism and reducing capital controls are highly interconnected. 
The top priority now is to have a more flexible exchange rate.
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Second, exchange rates should be more flexible and market factors should 
play a bigger role in determining the exchange rate levels. The RMB is 
still not flexible enough. Once the market shows signs of trouble, the 
authorities will act to fix it. Government intervention has become a key 
source of financial instability. However, since the end of 2016, RMB 
depreciation expectations have almost disappeared, and the real economy 
has remained relatively stable, providing an important opportunity for the 
long-expected reform of increasing exchange rate flexibility. Both domestic 
and international practices show that if China is to let the market decide 
the exchange rate and achieve a ‘clean’ float of the yuan, China should 
do so in favourable conditions when risks are low. China should seize the 
current opportunity to push forward reform decisively. Missing a good 
opportunity once again is inadvisable. In the meantime, China should 
have response plans ready for all sorts of possibilities: prepare for the worst 
and strive for the best. If China can achieve the leap of exchange rate 
reform in good time, it will provide an important mechanism for China 
to expand financial opening and improve financial regulation. It will also 
send a very positive signal to the international community, giving China 
a stronger voice in international financial affairs (Y. Zhang, 2017).
Third, China should establish a management framework for cross-border 
capital flows at both the macro and micro level and steadily accelerate 
the process of RMB internationalisation. China’s 13th Five-Year Plan 
has promised to ‘expand two-way opening of the financial sector, achieve 
RMB capital account convertibility in an orderly manner, and increase 
the convertibility and free use of the RMB’. The macro-control function 
of capital flow management will continue to decline in importance. 
The micro-supervision function will decouple from the macro-control 
function. The future reform of capital flow management will be 
characterised by decentralisation and diversification. The establishment 
of a dual-pillar framework for cross-border capital flow management is 
proposed. At the micro level, it is important to promote capital account 
convertibility and trade and investment facilitation; the focus should shift 
from ex-ante supervision to concurrent and ex-post supervision, while 
emphasising authenticity and compliance checks. At the macro level, 
a  two-dimensional management framework—one on capital control 
and the other on macroprudential supervision—should be established. 
Upgrading the policy toolkit and improving the macroprudential 
assessment mechanism and stress tests is urgently required. Capital 
control measures such as the Tobin tax should be retained as instruments 
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for counter-cyclical control and ex-post regulation. However, cross-
border capital controls should only be temporary measures, as they will 
cause market distortions and increase transaction costs. China should 
use cross-border capital flow management to buy time for other reforms 
such as improving monetary policy independence and boosting economic 
growth. China should take immediate action to manage financial risks 
and support the orderly adjustment of the balance sheets of the private 
sector so that they can become better adapted to a more flexible exchange 
rate. At the same time, measures regarding RMB internationalisation 
should be steadily promoted. Such measures include providing more 
RMB liquidity in offshore markets, promoting RMB settlement in 
international trade and  investment, expanding the proportion of RMB 
in international payments and reserves, and promoting the use of RMB in 
pricing products in the international market (Guan et al., 2017).
Fourth, China should fully put into practice pre-establishment national 
treatment of foreign financial institutions and liberalise the restrictions 
on foreign holdings of financial institutions. When a foreign financial 
institution enters China, it becomes a domestic business entity and is 
subject to the supervision of Chinese regulators. This is equivalent to 
foreign institutions conducting direct investments in China. Their impact 
on financial stability is completely different from that of short-term cross-
border capital flows. In this sense, the Chinese authorities should treat 
local and foreign financial institutions equally in terms of ownership 
percentages, forms of incorporation, shareholder qualifications, business 
scope and the number of licences allowed. This would provide a fair 
competitive environment for foreign investors in the Chinese market. 
China could relax restrictions on foreign ownership in the banking, 
securities and insurance sectors and allow the establishment of wholly 
foreign-owned securities companies and insurance companies. China 
could cancel the requirement on total assets for foreign bank shareholders, 
the requirement for minimum years of operation for foreign banks to start 
RMB business, and the requirement that at least one Chinese shareholder 
of a joint-venture securities company should be a securities company. 
China should no longer restrict the development of joint-venture life 
insurance companies by limiting the number of licences granted and 
could consider giving new regional operation licences to wholly foreign-
owned life insurance companies. At the same time, to encourage Chinese 
financial institutions to ‘go global’, China should remove restrictions on 
the overseas locations of commercial banks. It is suggested that newly 
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established branches be subject to filing procedures only, rather than 
review and approval procedures. Moreover, applications to incorporate 
should be allowed to proceed simultaneously in the home country and 
host country to increase efficiency (Zhu, Guo et al., 2017).
Fifth, China should respect the rules and practices in the international 
market to achieve a higher level of financial opening. Opening of the 
financial market is a necessary requirement for China to enhance 
its international competitiveness and achieve the goal of RMB 
internationalisation. China should establish an orderly and open credit 
rating market as well as a uniform registration management system that 
covers international rating agencies. The specific market management 
requirements should be clarified and take into account the conditions of 
international rating agencies. Foreign rating agencies should be allowed 
to either establish a commercial presence in China or conduct business 
as foreign corporate entities. Moreover, international rating agencies can 
be permitted to gradually engage in the domestic bond rating business 
(beginning with Panda bonds) and foreign issuers should be given more 
flexibility in auditing and accounting. For private placement bonds 
issued to institutional investors, it is recommended that a regulatory 
cooperation agreement between China and the home country of the 
accounting firm not be a prerequisite. Otherwise, it should be sufficient 
for the accounting firm hired by the issuer to submit a regulatory 
confirmation letter to the Ministry of Finance. Accounting firms formed 
in European Union countries and Hong Kong may be exempt from filing 
with Chinese regulators. Uniform management measures, including 
relevant auditing and accounting policies and higher transparency and 
standardisation requirements, should be released as soon as possible for 
foreign governments, international developmental agencies and foreign 
commercial institutions issuing RMB bonds in the interbank market. 
Finally, tax issues concerning foreign investors in the Chinese bond 
market should be clarified as soon as possible. At the same time, financial 
infrastructure construction should take into account both China’s 
conditions and international practices (Xu et al., 2017).
Sixth, China should take the opportunity presented by domestic industry 
upgrade and restructuring, as well as the Belt and Road Initiative, to 
construct a comprehensive foreign investment and financing framework. 
The basic principle is to reduce uncertainties and increase economic 
returns of overseas investment through reasonable financing arrangements, 
appropriate risk-sharing mechanisms and proper financial instruments. 
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China should promote development finance vigorously. Development 
finance emphasises the commercial viability and financial sustainability 
of projects rather than maximising profits. It emphasises support for 
infrastructure investment and other long-term investment projects. China 
is already a world leader in this field. China should continue improving 
the export credit mechanism for policy finance. China’s export credits 
lean more towards ‘South-South cooperation’, rather than ‘concessional 
loans’ in the traditional sense. Therefore, China should promote the 
reform and improvement of international rules on export credit. Finally, 
China should establish a comprehensive commercial financial service 
system. Regulators could take the opportunity to guide Chinese financial 
institutions with planning their overseas presence rationally. They can 
also encourage financial institutions to expand the breadth and depth 
of their cross-border financial business, such as experimenting bank-
enterprise cost-sharing mechanisms, improving exchange rate risk 
hedging tools for long-term investment, and relaxing sovereign guarantee 
requirements for host country project financing. They could also make 
use of correspondent banking operations, syndicated loans, assistance 
provided by host countries, multilateral development banks, the capital 
market in developed economies and international financial centres and 
employ a variety of investment and financing arrangements, such as 
equity investments, to improve overseas investment and financing services 
(Zhu, Guo et al., 2017).
Seventh, a macroprudential regulation framework that matches an open 
financial system should be improved to effectively prevent and mitigate 
risks that could occur in the opening process. Financial opening can 
enhance efficiency; it can also cause more instability to the financial 
market. Therefore, a key point for financial opening policy is to find 
a balance between efficiency and stability. Establishing a macroprudential 
regulation framework is an important way to achieve this balance. 
The Chinese central bank has proposed an MPA system that monitors 
seven categories of indicators. One category is cross-border financing risks, 
indicated by the weighted average of cross-border financing risk exposures. 
Macroprudential regulation on financial opening can follow this system, 
but it should include more assessments. For example, financial opening 
policies should be coordinated to avoid progress on a single front. The 
opening process should follow a well-designed roadmap and timetable to 
achieve a balance among opening, development and stability. Opening 
policies should be adjusted to adapt to different stages of development, 
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and special attention should be paid to the potential risks brought about 
by opening up, especially the risks of cross-border capital flows. Finally, 
external debt should be kept at a reasonable size, and its structure should 
be optimised (Guan et al., 2017).
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Introduction
The international strategic environment refers to the external environment 
in which a country designs and implements its national strategies. 
The international strategic environment determines China’s medium- and 
long-term development strategy and foreign policy and constitutes the 
background of financial reform and opening up. This chapter analyses 
the international strategic environment from three perspectives: peace, 
development and governance. These three perspectives cover a wide 
range of issues including new approaches, factors with a sustained 
influence, material, ideological and institutional factors, and the tactical 
characteristics of actors. Moreover, with China’s increasing role in the 
global system, China’s own development and behaviour is affecting the 
external environment more significantly. As a result, examining variations 
in the external restrictions China is facing and evaluating the external 
response to China’s influence are equally important in judging and 
analysing the international strategic environment.
1  Director of the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences.
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Part 1: Although overall global peace 
can be maintained, the international 
security environment is becoming 
increasingly complicated
Peace and war are both closely related to a country’s survival. They also lie 
at the centre of a national strategy. A revolutionary change in international 
relations has significantly decreased the possibility of war between major 
powers. As a result, overall global peace can be maintained. However, 
local security risks and unconventional security threats are increasing 
and have become an important source of threats to national stability and 
prosperity. In particular, the continuous extension of people’s activities 
and communication has a spill-over effect in various realms, including the 
economy, society, culture, healthcare and information. This is seen across 
different countries and appears to be increasing.
Normalisation of peace among major countries
Since the first half of the twentieth century, four revolutionary changes 
have weakened the motives for major powers to resort to war and have 
restrained many indirect or accidental causes of war. They provide a basis 
for long-term group values that make lasting peace among the major 
powers possible. These four changes are outlined below.
First, with the advent of nuclear deterrence and other new-type weapons 
(e.g. long-range, precision munitions), wars among major powers are no 
longer a reasonable option to gain war benefits such as annexation of 
land and securing of resources. Second, wars among major powers are no 
longer the only way to secure a country’s war interests, as countries are 
more effectively using their economic and social means to enhance their 
influence. Third, the decision-making systems and processes of modern 
foreign policy have progressed rapidly, inhibiting the incentives for wars 
among major powers. Fourth, information technology, globalisation and 
consumerism enhance anti-war values in the populations of major powers.
For China, the ‘new normal’ of long-term peace among major powers has 
the following strategic implications.
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First, the long-term judgement is that World War III will never happen 
and peace and development is the theme of the time. Specifically, the 
overall external environment for China’s reform and development will 
remain stable. China must also consolidate its foundations, coordinate the 
domestic and international situations, promote the stable development of 
its economy and a society driven by reform and innovation, and advance 
modernisation in the national governance capacity. On this basis, China 
will steadily enhance its influence on the world stage, while avoiding 
aggressive strategies.
Second, competition between major powers under the ‘peaceful new 
norm’ will be enduring and complex. Specifically, in the next five to 10 
years, hegemonic states will increase the structures around China and 
across the world to improve their influence and increase their involvement 
in regional issues. China’s situation in relation to global and peripheral 
affairs may worsen, crises may break out more frequently and pressures 
on safety will increase. China may be placed in a disadvantaged position 
in relation to longstanding and multidirectional enemies. This requires 
more sophisticated forecasting and assessment capabilities in the short to 
medium term, and the comprehensive use of diplomatic, economic and 
other responses.
Neighbouring regions are ‘disordered without battle, 
fighting without splitting up’
Despite overall peace among the major powers being maintained, China 
still faces increasing uncertainty from its neighbouring regions, along with 
a more diversified and dispersed security risk. Non-traditional security 
threats have become prominent. China’s neighbouring countries and the 
Asia-Pacific region are regarded as a key battlefield for shaping future 
international patterns. Strategic mutual trust among major countries is 
reduced, and the security problem is highlighted. The region’s security 
issues seem more complicated with the involvement of foreign powers. 
Heated issues frequently and increasingly escalate into crises. However, 
the situation is generally controllable.
Although the United States (US) has abandoned the Asia-Pacific 
rebalancing strategy as such, the overall trend of concentrating US 
resources in the Asia-Pacific region will continue. In recent years, with 
its diminished comparative advantage in national strength, the US has 
continued to draw India, Australia and Singapore to its side, forming an 
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arc that encourages these three nations to take an active role in achieving 
‘shared responsibilities’. This makes the security threat faced by China 
even more complicated. Disputes over neighbouring territories and 
territorial waters will become more serious. Connections between the 
proliferating geopolitical issues of the South China Sea and South Asia 
will be significantly enhanced. In the future, the South China Sea and 
South Asia will represent a significant crisis for China. Fortunately, in the 
foreseeable future, South Asian countries will be greatly restricted by their 
internal affairs and resources, ensuring that their capacity for intervention 
is limited. They will be unable to affect the security environment of 
China’s neighbouring regions in a fundamental way. In the long term, 
the US’s deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system 
will significantly damage the strategic balance and mutual trust between 
China  and the US. In the meantime, North Korea has made many 
breakthroughs in its research and development of nuclear missiles and, 
in theory, has the ability to launch nuclear attacks on the contiguous 
US. Responding to and settling the North Korean nuclear issue requires 
all parties to focus on the long-term and comprehensive use of various 
policy instruments.
The comparative strengths of major powers are 
undergoing substantial change
Currently, global patterns are undergoing profound changes. With an 
increase in their strengths, developing countries and emerging economies 
are entering the global stage at a rapid pace. Conversely, the vested interest 
groups of developed countries have gradually lost absolute dominance in 
the global system due to a decrease in their relative national strengths. 
Despite this, the US will assume the position of a superpower in the long 
term. With its expanding economic scale, China’s economic strength is 
approaching that of the US. The gap between other countries and the US 
or China will be further widened.
The most important actors globally are the US and China. China’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) has grown rapidly from a volume equivalent to 
that of Japan to more than twice the GDP of that country, and as much 
as 60 per cent of the US’s GDP. Even if calculated using the ‘inclusive 
wealth’ concept, which includes human, physical and natural capital, the 
speed at which China is catching up with the US is amazing, despite 
the significant gap. Developed countries, led by the US, have already 
reached the plateau of their overall national strength. The growth of 
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the national strength of developed countries is generally slowing down. 
One explanation for this may be the financial difficulties that industrial 
countries generally face. Fiscal conditions not only influence people’s 
welfare and extend or restrict space for policy decisions, but also have 
a direct effect on the implementation of a country’s foreign policies, 
especially for major powers or groups of states. Fiscal pressure has, to 
some extent, influenced the strategic contraction of the US in the Middle 
East and other regions. The situation is similar in regard to challenges 
from Russia in relation to Syria, and influence from the Philippines and 
Malaysia in relation to China. US President Trump wants to renegotiate 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and North American Free Trade 
Agreement with the US’s allies because the US cannot afford to ‘play this 
game’ financially.
Although the US is experiencing stagnation or even a decline in power, 
it will remain the most important global player over the next decade. 
Having witnessed a rapid economic development for one-third of 
a century, China has risen to become the only country able to challenge 
the current and future global hegemony of the US. With the narrowing 
gap between China and the US, and the widening gap between these 
two and other countries, the global order is likely to become polarised. 
The rapid rise of China has worried the US, forcing it to treat China as 
a genuine competitor. As the US has a relative advantage, it may be the 
only country that can impede China’s modernisation process. Strategic 
competition between the countries is likely to fall into the ‘Thucydides 
Trap’. Fortunately, the existence of nuclear weapons has significantly 
decreased the possibility of a Sino–US war, because nuclear weapons 
change the rules of the games played by major powers. The nuclear 
deterrence strategy ensures that large-scale wars are less likely to develop. 
This means that the major global players have few choices for resolving 
disputes other than nonviolent means. The competition between nuclear 
states has, as a result, become even more complex.
Against this background, China is shifting from relying on exogenous 
strategic opportunities to creating endogenous opportunities. As the 
second-largest economy with a significant potential for development, 
China’s foreign policies reverberate internationally. When China 
proposed ‘a period of strategic opportunities’ a decade ago, it emphasised 
the exogeneity of strategic opportunities. The shift from exogeneity to 
endogeneity is, to some extent, a result and signal of the substantial 
changes in the relative strength of China and the US.
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The ‘double-edged sword phenomenon’ of cyber 
technology is becoming evident
Generally, people regard technological innovation as an indicator of 
human progress, because it can increase the productivity of labour, 
promote welfare and improve living conditions. However, the uncertainty 
(or even destruction) created by technology can be significant, at least in 
certain historical periods. This is the ‘double-edged sword phenomenon’ 
of technological progress.
Technological innovation is changing people’s way of production and 
lifestyle rapidly in the twenty-first century. The rapid development 
of information technology has expanded the way people acquire 
information, stimulated the spread of various values and ideologies and 
facilitated interaction and collective action among humans. Due to such 
characteristics as openness and anonymity, the internet has evolved into 
a major platform for groups to obtain information and express emotions. 
Some extreme or even distorted information has spread quickly through 
the internet. This situation could lead to accidental and violent mass 
incidents at any time.
The ‘double-edged sword phenomenon’ also applies to cyber technology. 
Due to the lack of relevant laws and the fact that users can remain 
anonymous, the general public has resorted to the internet more often to 
voice their concerns, which can gradually evolve into anti-establishment 
grassroots movements. These bottom-up movements question and 
challenge existing rules. Many extreme phenomena, such as trade 
protectionism among blue-collar workers in the US, the integration of 
ultra-nationalism and populism in Western society and the religious 
extremism represented by the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or 
ISIL) are not recent developments. However, the values related to these 
developments are now disseminated and exaggerated through the internet 
and have influenced the political orientations of larger groups. The world 
is now exposed to the danger of cyber war because of the global network.
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The rise of terrorist attacks signals the clash 
of civilisations
Terrorism was one of the most important unconventional security issues in 
the realm of international relations during the twentieth century. Despite 
the large amount of personnel and capital invested in international 
counter-terrorism alliances, terrorist activities are still on the rise and 
have evolved into new forms. Under pressure from international counter-
terrorism alliances, the Islamic State has begun to establish branches and 
alliances, leading to the spread of terrorist organisations to other countries 
such as Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Islamic State 
has also used new technology and social media to incite radicals to initiate 
terrorist strikes in several cities around the world. They mainly target train 
stations, ports, hotels, sports stadiums and other public facilities, causing 
considerable loss of life and property, as well as social panic.
The rise of terrorism reveals not only the conflict created by economic 
inequality, but also the conflict of values created by different civilisations. 
The ‘clash of civilisations’, coined by Huntington, states that the root of 
future international conflict will be related to culture instead of ideological 
or economic issues. The confrontations and conflicts between civilisations 
will become the major battle lines. The competitive coexistence and 
confrontation among different civilisations will become the dominant 
theme of international politics.
Demographic structures and the racial composition of a society can 
undergo substantial changes. With intensified religious beliefs, integration 
in multi-ethnic countries becomes increasingly difficult. This affects not 
only international relations, but has also led to the rise of nationalism in 
developed countries. Currently, there are more than 50 million Muslims 
in Europe. Half of all newborn babies in the Netherlands and Germany 
are from Muslim families. At the current growth rate, in 2050, Muslims 
will account for more than half of the population in France and Germany, 
and 50 million of the total population in the US. Currently, there are 
about 10 million Muslims in the US, along with 30 million Hispanics. 
This figure is still increasing. Demographic changes in the twenty-first 
century have made conventional ‘white’ elites in Europe and the US 
anxious. They attribute social crises and domestic challenges to the clash 
of civilisations, an approach that eventually strengthens the strain between 
mainstream Western society and Muslim immigrants. Thus, the ‘conflict 
of civilisations’ becomes a self-perpetuating prophecy.
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It is worth noting that religious nationalism is not exclusive to Islam. 
Racism in some forms of Christianity has long been a political 
undercurrent in Western society. This racism is restricted and concealed 
by political correctness. Trump’s rise to political power has revealed the 
religious conflict hidden in US society. With the rise of nationalism in 
developed countries, the pressure related to nationalism and populism 
that has accumulated over a long time is released in election cycles 
or social  movements. This may result in social unrest and terrorist 
activity, or  even international conflict due to the transfer of domestic 
problems abroad.
Part 2: International strategic environment: 
A development perspective
Development is a basic demand of human society, as well as the key to 
solving all problems. Only with development can we eradicate the roots 
of conflict, ensure people’s basic rights and meet citizens’ demands for 
a better life. However, lack of development is still a challenge faced by 
many. A number of problems, such as income inequality, either between 
or within nations, the energy and resource bottlenecks that developing 
countries face, and a lack of global economic growth are constraining 
economic and social development.
The global economy shows signs of short-term 
recovery, but long-term sustainable and balanced 
growth faces challenges
The prospect of global economic growth is an important condition for 
China’s economic development. China’s foreign trade and investment are 
dependent on strong, sustainable growth in the global economy. Recently, 
global economic growth has improved markedly, the labour market has 
continued to improve, the price level has risen moderately globally, and 
the growth of international trade has increased. However, long-term 
factors supporting the rapid growth of international trade have not yet 
been formed. The adjustment of the US’s fiscal and monetary policies will 
have a spill-over effect on the world economy; anti-globalisation, especially 
protectionist trade and investment policies, continues to strengthen; the 
debt problem has become more serious; and asset bubbles are rapidly 
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accumulating and may burst at any time. Geopolitical risks and terrorism 
remain, indicating the lack of a solid foundation for sustained, stable and 
balanced growth (Zhang & Yao, 2018).
During the decade before the global financial crisis (GFC) (1998–2007), 
the annual global GDP growth was 4.2 per cent. In the nine years 
following the GFC (2008–2016), the annual global GDP growth rate fell 
to 3.2 per cent (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2017). At present, 
global economic growth is dramatically variable. Since mid-2016, the 
global economy has entered an upward cycle, and this momentum has 
accelerated. According to the IMF (2017), forecasts for 2017 and 2018 
global economic growth rates have been raised by 0.1 percentage points 
to 3.6 per cent and 3.7 per cent respectively. However, economic recovery 
remains uncertain: ‘The short-term recovery is still fragile and robust 
growth may not be sustainable, and the medium and long-term prospects 
in many areas are not satisfactory’ (IMF, 2017). From a longer-term 
perspective, the medium-term growth rate of most developed countries 
is still below pre-GFC levels. As a result, the current economic recovery 
remains fragile, and uncertainties may be intensified. Sustainable growth 
faces long-term challenges.
One of the biggest problems faced by global economic growth is the 
slow increase in labour productivity. According to data released by 
the  Conference Board, the average annual labour productivity growth 
dropped from 3.2 per cent between 2003 and 2007 to 1.8 per cent 
between 2012 and 2016. In 2017, global labour productivity growth 
witnessed a  slight increase to 2.2 per cent. The slow or even stagnant 
growth is caused by a number of reasons, such as the slowdown of 
technological advances and investment growth, slow technology diffusion 
because of inadequate market competitiveness and institutional inertia, 
slowdown of human capital accumulation and population aging in major 
economies, and misallocation of resources resulted from the quantitative 
easing policies in many countries (Zhang & Yao, 2018).
The slow recovery of global direct investment is also an important factor 
affecting economic recovery. Global direct investment is an important 
force in promoting the international division of labour, as well as 
economic integration and prosperity. According to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, global foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows increased by 5 per cent to 1.8 trillion dollars in 2017, 
thus reversing the negative growth in 2016. However, while a series of 
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investment promotion policies have been introduced, some countries have 
strengthened restrictive policies for foreign investment, such as unilateral 
termination or reassessment of international investment agreements, 
so the increase of global transnational direct investment is likely to be 
small in 2018. The downturn in global direct investment activities has 
been associated with slow progress in promoting investment access and 
openness, as well as the policies of advanced economies that encourage 
manufacturing to go back to home countries.
Additionally, the continued rise of global debt levels has not only 
increased the vulnerability of financial markets, but also slowed recovery 
of consumption, hindering economic recovery. During the GFC, to 
eliminate liquidity panic in financial markets, central banks did not 
reduce their debts. Instead, they injected liquidity into the market and 
expanded the debt scale. After the GFC, central banks continued to use an 
expansionary monetary policy, including quantitative easing to stimulate 
economic recovery. Monetary expansion does not lead to a decline in debt 
levels. Rather, it created higher debt levels.
The uncertainty of global economic recovery and sustainable development 
will form the background of China’s participation in the international 
division of labour in the future. Over the past three decades, China has 
relied on the international competitiveness of its labour-intensive and 
export-oriented manufacturing industries to meet the growing demand 
in the global market. Consequently, China has developed into the world’s 
largest exporter. However, demand in the global market has been sluggish 
and the traditional comparative advantages of China are diminishing. 
Long-term structural problems with the Chinese economy have become 
prominent. Thus, China must adapt to the ‘new normal’ of slow global 
growth and vigorously promote technological innovation and structural 
reform. In the highly integrated global economy, national structural 
reform policies have significant spill-over effects. In addition to promoting 
supply-side reform, China should also actively promote coordinated 
reform among countries. At the G20 Hangzhou Summit in 2016, China 
proposed 48 guiding principles in nine priority areas, including boosting 
trade and investment liberalisation, promoting labour market reform, 
encouraging innovation and promoting fiscal reform. China provided the 
other G20 member states with guidance for these reforms.
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Income distribution inequality leads to the rise 
of anti-globalisation forces
Economic globalisation is the most obvious trend since the Cold War. 
Globalisation is conducive to expanding the world market and improving 
the efficiency of global resource allocation. It is also conducive to 
developing the international division of labour and global production 
capacity. Global prosperity and development depend largely on the 
advance of globalisation. China has become a significant beneficiary of 
globalisation through its reform and opening up policy by participating in 
the global division of labour. However, since the GFC, discussions about 
globalisation have changed direction. ‘Globalisation’, as a frequently used 
word after the Cold War, has begun to be replaced with ‘de-globalisation’ 
or ‘anti-globalisation’.
An important reason for the rise of anti-globalisation forces is the growing 
imbalance among countries and the widening gap between the rich and 
poor within countries. The imbalance between developed and developing 
countries is still an important issue that the international community must 
face. According to the IMF, the per capita GDP of developed countries 
based on purchasing power reached US$49,111 in 2017, equivalent to 
4.2 times the average level of developing countries (IMF, 2017).
Meanwhile, economic globalisation has widened the income gap 
between individuals within countries. The failure of governments 
to implement effective redistribution and social security policies has 
aggravated income inequality. Although the US has always been the 
largest beneficiary of globalisation, its domestic wealth distribution 
gap is expanding significantly. The net gainers and net losers in US 
society are highly divided. The richest families, which account for only 
0.1 per cent of the total population, have accumulated ever-increasing 
amounts of wealth. Today, they own 22 per cent of the total wealth in 
the US; that is, 0.1 per cent of the US population holds roughly the same 
amount of wealth as 90 per cent of the US population (Saez & Zucman, 
2016). In Capital in the Twenty-first Century (2014), French economist 
Thomas Piketty showed (through statistical data) that income inequality 
is evident in all nations that have participated in globalisation. The 
continual widening of the gap between rich and poor has become a global 
phenomenon. In developed countries, scepticism has emerged around 
economic globalisation, with some commentators complaining that their 
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country’s trading partners have taken local jobs. Calls have been made 
for governments to adopt protectionist trade policies. The inequality of 
wealth distribution caused by globalisation is eroding the domestic social 
basis of global economic integration.
It is natural that such dissatisfaction can result in attributing unemployment 
to economic opening. However, the idea of free trade will ultimately 
prevail, because the global division of labour brings massive trade benefits. 
No country can bear the cost of trade protectionism or achieve economic 
growth on its own; rather, countries must remain in an integrated global 
system. Although income inequality is not a sufficient reason to reverse 
economic globalisation, it has exposed problems with the current process. 
We need to make globalisation more inclusive.
Deepening economic interdependence continues 
to change the connotation of opening
Global economic integration can promote optimal allocation of 
production and increase in global, as well as national, welfare. Thus, 
along with intensified economic interdependence, the construction of 
an open and free international economic system has become a common 
interest of all states. As the core of economic globalisation, the free flow of 
goods, services and capital without discrimination demands institutional 
support. A free and open economic system should be based on 
international rules negotiated and agreed to by all states. At the domestic 
level, the market economy demands a system that protects property rights 
and ensures contracts are enforced. At the international level, a free and 
open international economy requires all states to negotiate, cooperate 
and forgo ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies, such as trade protectionism, 
competitive devaluation and lack of coordination of financial regulatory 
policies. In  the meantime, with globalisation, the spill-over effect of 
nations’ policies is enhanced, which necessitates increased coordination of 
macroeconomic policies. As a result, with increasing interdependence, all 
states must make a collective effort to protect a multilateral trade system, 
construct an open global economic system and promote the free flow of 
production factors globally.
Currently, with the development of information technology and 
deepening  of global value chains, mankind has entered a highly 
interdependent period. China’s dependence on the rest of the world is also 
at the highest level in history, especially in relation to technology, market 
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and resources. In the 1990s, global exports totalled US$5.7 trillion per 
year. This rose to US$14.6 trillion between 2000 and 2012. At the same 
time,  the scale and speed of global capital flows have increased. In the 
1990s, the global FDI outflow was about US$400 billion per year. This 
has increased to about US$1.5 trillion over the past 10 years. Against this 
background, economic integration has moved across borders, requiring 
countries to coordinate public policies and regulatory standards. In the 
current trade pattern, the global value chain has been normalised. 
Integrated transnational production needs all states to shift from 
conventional open measures, such as tariff concessions, to cross-border 
measures and regulatory coordination. The profound integration of the 
global economy has given opening up a new connotation. Some countries 
are trying to upgrade their systems, build up new competitive advantage, 
promote innovation and explore new approaches to opening. China 
should steadily press for reform through opening, build an open economy 
and push forward reform in ‘deep-water’ areas such as financial services 
and public services. China should enhance the level of opening of the 
financial industry; steadily promote RMB internationalisation; expand the 
scope, method and scale of cross-border RMB use; and accelerate RMB 
capital account convertibility with caution. Additionally, China’s opening 
strategy should not only focus on itself, but also coordinate with other 
countries through actively preserving and developing multilateralism. This 
will create a stable and open environment for its reform and development.
Emerging economies emulating the development 
patterns of developed countries are restricted by 
resources and environmental factors
Resources and environmental factors place constraints on long-term 
economic growth. Human beings have consumed too much and have 
begun to ‘pay’ for the excesses.
There are two types of emerging economies: resource importing and 
resource exporting. The former is represented by China and India, and the 
latter by Russia, Brazil and South Africa. Resource-importing countries 
do not have enough resources to meet their development needs, so they 
are very constrained by resource availability. Resource-exporting countries 
are rich in resources, but their economic development is seriously affected 
by international energy and resource prices; as such, they are prone to 
resource dependence or the ‘resource curse’.
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Resource-importing countries face two types of risks. One is availability; 
that is, whether the country can obtain the necessary energy and raw 
materials from the international market. The other is price; that is, the 
impact of energy and resource price fluctuations on the international 
market. Take China as an example. With a great demand for energy and 
resources, China possesses increasing bargaining power in the international 
market. However, China must work hard and maintain strategic patience 
to alleviate the energy and resource bottleneck when considering such 
factors as the rise of economic nationalism in resource-rich countries, 
obstruction from multinational corporations, containment by strategic 
competitors and lack of capacity to protect waterway safety.
For resource-exporting countries, an economic model that relies heavily 
on resource exports renders their domestic economies vulnerable to 
fluctuations in international commodity prices. In a time of declining 
prices, the economic growth of these countries is generally slower. Russia 
and Brazil even experienced negative growth between 2015 and 2016. 
Conversely, when domestic capital and technology are concentrated on 
resources, other industries develop slowly. Due to an overdependence on 
gold, coal, iron ore and other resources, the economies of Russia, Brazil 
and South Africa were significantly damaged when global commodity 
prices plummeted in 2013. This led to a sharp decline in government 
revenue, and some departments, such as education and energy, have 
become seriously underfunded as a result.
With global warming, environmental pollution, rapid population growth 
and other issues becoming global problems, environmental issues have 
become a common constraint on both resource-importing and resource-
exporting countries. China, Russia and South Africa are significant 
producers and users of coal, and China has the highest carbon dioxide 
emissions of any country. The key to reducing the proportion of coal 
consumption in emerging economies (and, thus, reducing carbon 
emissions and the irreversible damage caused by environmental pollution) 
is to promote the use of alternative renewable energy and clean energy; 
accelerate large-scale production of shale gas, nuclear and other new 
energy; and upgrade the energy industry’s structure. Emerging economies 
and developing countries remain at a stage of high population growth. 
This rapid growth places much pressure on economic development and 
the natural environment. In China and India, population growth rates 
have dropped significantly, but due to the large population base, tens of 
millions of people are still added each year.
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Resource and environmental constraints made it impossible for emerging 
economies to replicate the growth and consumption models of developed 
countries without regard to ecological factors. The development models 
of emerging economies have been adjusted, but the transformation will 
be difficult and take a long time. Development will still be a priority 
for China in the foreseeable future, but with the country’s development 
moving into a new stage, the goals are being upgraded. China should 
no longer simply pursue GDP growth, but should instead seek ‘green’, 
inclusive and sustainable development.
Part 3: International strategic environment: 
A global governance perspective
In an era where global interdependence has reached an unprecedented 
level, humanity is facing a series of increasingly pressing global issues. These 
issues are characterised by their cross-border nature, great externality and 
spill-over effects, among other things. During the process of economic 
globalisation, problems such as trade protectionism, turbulent financial 
systems, environmental pollution, infectious diseases and terrorism 
have had a stronger spill-over effect, threatening the interests of various 
global actors. Resolving these issues is beyond the capacity of one or 
even several countries. These problems must be solved through broad 
global cooperation. Since the end of World War II, with the joint efforts 
of the international community, the global governance system has been 
continuously improved and perfected. However, due to continuously 
emerging global issues and changes of national strengths, the existing 
system has encountered severe problems in relation to its legitimacy, 
validity and representativeness, showing a lack of ability to adapt to the 
ever-changing situations. Therefore, the international community must 
reform this system urgently.
The dilemma of collective action has aggravated 
the global governance deficit
In his speech at the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for 
International Cooperation in May 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping 
acknowledged that global governance deficit was one of the most serious 
challenges for humanity. The deficit is manifested mainly in the following 
two aspects. First, the contradiction between the growing demand for 
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global governance and the inadequate supply of global governance or 
global public goods is becoming increasingly prominent. Second, flaws 
in the current governance mechanism have become increasingly serious, 
while reform of the system is uncertain.
Global public goods have a non-exclusive feature. Maintaining world 
peace, global trade and financial stability and promoting sustainable 
development is costly, while all the countries can have access to these 
products. In other words, even if a country does not contribute to the 
provision of these products, it can still enjoy the benefits. This gives 
countries an incentive to let other countries bear the costs of providing 
public goods while becoming ‘free riders’ themselves. As a result, the 
supply of global public goods is impeded. Therefore, a core issue to be 
addressed is how to coordinate the different players in the international 
community to increase the supply of public goods as much as possible.
In addition to the inadequate supply of public goods, there are cases of 
ample or excessive supply of some other types of public goods, such as 
biased international trade and investment rules. This can be explained by 
Mancur Olson’s ‘logic of collective action’. With a lack of incentive and 
the absence of a global government, a small number of players who are 
willing, capable and highly concerned with their own interests will form 
small action groups operating according to cost–benefit calculations. 
These groups will participate actively in the supply of public goods 
that can bring the maximum interests or minimal loss. Once a narrow 
interest group driven by selective incentives gains a dominant position, 
the resulting global governance will be biased and non-neutral. Through 
using non-neutral global public goods, group leaders will enhance their 
own interests, even at the expense of most other stakeholders. In some 
ways, global public goods in the form of international organisations or 
global order have been ‘privatised’ and become the tools of certain interest 
groups to achieve their goals.
The current global governance mechanism was mainly established 
by developed countries after World War II. To a certain extent, this 
mechanism has maintained a peaceful and stable world and a free and open 
international economic order. However, it should be noted that conflicts 
in some ‘hot spots’ still arise. Various forms of trade, investment and 
financial protectionism remain prevalent. There are increasing challenges 
in new areas such as climate change, cyber security, polar region and space 
issues. In particular, the GFC in 2008 exposed, in a profound manner, 
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many weaknesses of the current global governance mechanism. Due to 
the lack of effective collective action, some traditional mechanisms have 
been unable to adapt to new situations.
Changing distribution of global power stimulates 
reform of global governance
As the comparative strengths of the world’s major players have changed 
drastically, it is increasingly necessary to engage emerging economies in 
solving global issues. They have become important stakeholders in the 
current system and their awareness about maintaining and expanding 
their  own interests through the global system is also growing. In this 
context, a need to adjust the existing order and make the global system 
more  unbiased has emerged. However, at the same time, countries 
with vested interests in the current system wish to maintain their 
dominant positions.
Emerging economies should enhance collaboration through platforms 
such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) 
cooperation mechanism and G20 to promote representation of the rights 
and voices of emerging market economies and developing countries in 
relation to global governance. However, the structures of some global 
governance mechanisms have not been improved for a long time and 
have been obstructed by countries (or groups of countries) with vested 
interests, especially the US and European countries. Even if a consensus 
on reform is achieved, it is often difficult to realise such consensus in 
a timely and effective manner due to the national interests of involved 
countries. For example, the US Congress did not approve the IMF’s 
2010 quota and governance reform program until December 2015, 
and further attached a condition of greater supervision over the IMF. 
Besides obstructing emerging economies from increasing their voices 
in international institutions, developed countries have begun to worry 
about the trend of developing countries catching up through multilateral 
rules and international division of labour. Some countries have used 
a  unilateral strategy to stimulate reform of the multilateral system to 
preserve their advantages.
China will play an active role in the historical process of global 
governance reform. First, development is the key that China will provide 
to the international community to solve various global problems. China’s 
greatest  contribution to global governance has been its exploration 
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of a  development path of reform and an opening with Chinese 
characteristics. The country has been a role model and led the world in 
development. Second, China will adhere to the principle of achieving 
shared growth through discussion and collaboration and strive to build 
a more inclusive international order. In the face of global governance 
reform, China should always retain its mission of maintaining world 
peace and promoting common development. China does not seek to 
overturn the current system, but will actively promote its reform and 
improvement. China will firmly uphold the international order with the 
United Nations Charter as its core. It will also promote the reform of 
unjust and unreasonable arrangements in the global governance system, 
striving to make the system more balanced, beneficial and reflective of the 
will of most countries.
The waning of ideology in global governance ideas
Globalisation has brought about significant economic and cultural shocks 
to countries. Trump’s populism highlights the division between income, 
social class, racial groups and cultures in US society. The social foundation 
for anti-globalisation is thus further strengthened. Trump’s campaign 
promises and policies are largely against multilateralism. Some researchers 
even claim that Trump has subverted the post-war values of the US and is 
likely to put an end to the ‘liberal international order’ created by the US. 
However, Trump’s hit on the multilateral system focuses on the idea of 
liberalism instead of the multilateral coordination system. Trump is trying 
to change the tradition of US liberalism and cultural pluralism in various 
realms such as immigration, climate, democracy and human rights; he is 
also challenging the basis of US foreign policy values.
The shock instigated by Trump’s election reveals that the norm of 
international order, which has long been dominated by Western countries, 
is being challenged. This challenge originates from the complex problems 
of Western countries and is related to the social split caused by economic 
globalisation. It is also caused by the competition of different development 
modes and paths in emerging economies.
The GFC in 2008 gave people a chance to reflect on the effectiveness 
of the  policy framework based on the ‘Washington Consensus’ and to 
appreciate the experiences of emerging economies. Under the leadership 
of the G20 Group and the Financial Stability Board, Basel III, which 
emphasises both macroprudential and microprudential measures, 
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replaced the Anglo-Saxon model that was centred on relaxing financial 
regulation.4 The IMF, an advocate of capital account liberalisation, has 
also begun to recognise the validity of capital flow management measures.5 
The principles advocated by emerging economies, such as sovereignty 
equality,  inclusive development, diversity of development models and 
culture, and ‘common but differentiated responsibility’, are becoming 
core values of the international community and mainstream norms of 
global governance. The success of the Chinese model, which discards 
ideological differences and concentrates on development, provides 
sharp contrast to the US model, which has become inflexible and less 
effective. The influence and appeal of China’s model has also significantly 
increased worldwide.
The world has expected and demanded China 
to participate in global governance
After 40 years of reform and opening up, China’s economy and society 
have undergone unprecedented changes. China has developed into the 
world’s largest trading nation, second-largest economy and second-largest 
investor. The biggest change has been the rapid growth of the Chinese 
economy and the substantial increase in China’s overall strength. In other 
words, China’s development has brought enormous shock and made the 
world order increasingly complex.
China’s impact on the international order is manifested mainly in the 
following four aspects. First, is the impact at the physical level. This 
mainly refers to the significant increase of China’s demand for energy 
and resources. Second, is the impact at the monetary level. The process 
of RMB internationalisation has already begun. In the next 30 years, 
the RMB is expected to become a currency for international trade and 
reserves, and a key currency in the international monetary system. If this 
goal is achieved, the international monetary and financial system will 
be significantly altered. Third, is the impact at the institutional level. 
Although a fundamental change in international rules is not possible in 
the short term, the rapid increase of China’s national strength will enable 
4  Basel III relies mainly on market discipline, self-regulatory hedge funds and financial derivative 
trade to join the international regulatory framework. See Helleiner and Pagliari (2010).
5  In February 2010, the IMF released a report on the regulation of international capital flow, 
recognising the appropriateness of capital account management and setting a guide for how to use it 
effectively. See Ostry et al. (2010).
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and require China to seek fairer international rules. Fourth, is the impact 
at the conceptual level. At this level, China’s impact on the contemporary 
world is reflected mainly in the country’s development mode. Therefore, 
the certainty of China’s future development is an important background 
for the interaction between China and the rest of the world.
The long-term rapid growth of China and other emerging economies has 
given the US and its Western allies a difficult choice. The latter wishes 
to place China and other emerging economies in an open trade and 
investment system with higher standards and stricter enforcement. As such, 
they will be able to use biased rules that are more favourable for them to 
constrain China. Additionally, they fear that China and other emerging 
economies will seek to establish a new set of international institutions in 
parallel to those dominated by the US and its allies. To prevent China 
from using its increasing influence to change the international order, 
Western countries—in particular, the US elite class—will more actively 
seek to have China accept the various international rules or institutions 
designed and dominated by developed countries. However, these rules are 
biased and favour developed countries.
When developed countries shift their focus to domestic issues, the 
international community raises its expectations for developing countries, 
especially China, in addressing global issues. Although quickly becoming 
a key player in the global arena, China is still a developing country. 
It should safeguard its own interests while taking on more international 
responsibilities. As the country’s reform and opening up enters their later 
stages, its goals are also changing significantly. This has a profound impact 
on China’s relations with the rest of the world. The Chinese economy 
is becoming increasingly dependent on the international system, while 
the US’s leadership and support for a free and open international 
economic order is diminishing. International economic and trade rules 
are being restructured, and an open economic system urgently needs 
new momentum. This calls for China to shoulder more responsibility in 
developing a free and open multilateral system.
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Part 4: China’s strategic options for shaping 
the future global landscape
Engage in cooperation to disperse external pressure
The pressure China currently faces mainly relates to international rules. 
China should establish new platforms to address this. For example, it could 
strengthen cooperation among the BRICS countries and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation, and promote negotiations on the  China–
Japan–South Korea Free Trade Agreement.
Shoulder appropriate responsibilities and participate 
in economic globalisation
Along with China’s rapid economic development and rising global 
impact,  there is a growing call for China to be a leader in the 
international  order. An emerging economy like China should take 
on international responsibility according to its own conditions. The 
responsibilities must be in proportion to its national strength and 
development level. In doing so, China should follow three principles. 
First, responsibilities must correspond to rights. The principle of parity 
of responsibility and authority is commonly recognised in international 
law. In the current system, global governance rules and mechanisms were 
established under the auspices of developed economies, which are the 
major beneficiaries of the system, while the majority of emerging and 
developing economies do not enjoy fair treatment, nor can they wield 
influence commensurate to their power. Although China became the 
world’s second-largest economy in 2010, its power of discourse is far 
weaker than that of the US and other developed economies. Second, China 
must take on responsibilities based on its own conditions, capabilities and 
needs. China will continue to be the world’s largest developing country 
for a long time. According to the IMF, China’s per capita GDP in 2017 
was US$8,677, ranking 75th in the world. The number rose to more than 
US$9,580 in 2018, ranking 72nd. Third, China should properly balance 




Strive for inclusive development
China should seek not only peaceful development, but also inclusive 
development, which means one country’s development will benefit the 
entire world, and all countries will share the opportunities for welfare 
improvement. Inclusiveness is an important part of China’s commitment 
to international responsibility. China’s development has both positive 
and negative externalities. Compared to peaceful development, inclusive 
development emphasises strengthening positive externalities while 
minimising negative externalities.
Inclusive development also means China participates in global 
governance  based on the principles of ‘extensive consultation, joint 
contribution and shared benefits’. Consultation means that all participants 
form consensus on the basic principles, key areas, mechanisms and 
development planning of global governance based on discussion and 
consultation. Joint contribution means all members of the international 
community give full play to their advantages and potential to jointly 
promote reform and innovation of the global governance system. Shared 
benefits means that all countries have a fair share of the benefits of 
global governance. These principles embody openness and inclusiveness 
in global governance and conform to the global trend of democratic 
development. In practice, they actively involve all members of the 
international community, especially developing countries, heeding their 
concerns, better safeguarding their legitimate rights and ensuring they 
share in the benefits of global governance. The practice could enhance the 
trust between China and the rest of the world, and is a reliable path for 
burying doubts and achieving expectations.
Promote gradual reform of global governance
As an expanding country, China is a taker, rather than a maker, of 
existing international rules and institutions. Previously, interactions 
between China and international institutions were mostly conducting 
coordination under the current system and internalising the rules. As the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the global governance system face more 
challenges, and as China plays an increasingly important role in the global 
economic system and security affairs, China has become a major force in 
promoting reform of global governance. In this regard, some may have 
unrealistic expectations that the increase in China’s national strength will 
47
1 . CHInA’S InTERnATIOnAL STRATEGIC EnvIROnMEnT
bring fundamental changes to international rules and the international 
order. In fact, the evolution of the international system is a long-term 
process. It is not realistic or necessary to make revolutionary changes to 
unreasonable international order or rules, especially those that favour 
vested interest country groups.
In its participation in global governance, China does not wish to 
establish an entirely new system or instigate a revolution of the 
existing system. Rather, it seeks modest reform of existing multilateral 
mechanisms. In doing so, China should take a cooperative path and 
emphasise the rise of emerging economies and developing countries 
and focus on complementing, not replacing, the current mechanisms 
(i.e. improvements, rather than revolution). To deal with mechanisms 
in various areas, China should employ differentiated approaches based 
on its own conditions, national interests and the characteristics of those 
mechanisms. China should promote the concept of inclusive development 
to improve the current system. The system is influenced by Western values 
and institutional patterns and does not adequately acknowledge the 
diversity of development paths and national conditions.
As China grows, it may seek reform of rules and institutions. In the next 
decade, China should seize opportunities and work with other emerging 
economies to make improvements to the current system and exert 
a larger influence.
Rationally respond to external challenges
China is on the road to ‘great rejuvenation’. A peaceful global environment 
is critical to accomplishing this mission. While defending its territory and 
marine rights, China should exercise care and take appropriate actions. 
China should also be aware of the harmfulness of extreme nationalism 
and the danger of falling into an arms race trap. In addressing global 
issues, China must be patient and properly identify priorities.
In terms of foreign relations, China has two priorities. First, is the 
establishment of a new major power relationship based on mutual 
respect, mutual benefits and win–win cooperation. This is a new way of 
dealing with conflicts and contradictions between emerging countries and 
existing powers. The major obstacle to China’s long-term development is 
the US, which intends to bring China into the existing system using the 
rules dominated by and favourable to itself. In engaging with the US, 
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China should consolidate risk management to avoid a lose–lose situation 
and promote win–win cooperation to establish a new major power 
relationship.
The second priority involves creating a stable peripheral environment. 
Peripheral instability is still a threat to China’s security. Pressing issues 
in relation to islands, seawaters and resources in surrounding areas will 
continue or become worse. China should prioritise establishing a new 
regional security mechanism with Northeast Asia. While protecting its 
national sovereignty and core interests, China could enhance its influence 
in the region and explore new ways to solve disputes, break deadlocks and 
create new and favourable situations.
Specifically, China should reconsider the practicality and feasibility of 
some foreign policy objectives and respond to changes in the external 
environment in a flexible manner. China should improve weak links in 
foreign policymaking—for example, improving coordination among 
government departments, information sharing, intellectual support and 
personnel training mechanisms—to enhance the effectiveness of decision-
making. Multiple policy instruments and contingency plans should be 
employed to respond to uncertainties in the external environment.
Actively seek support from the international 
community
As developed countries currently dominate international public opinion, 
China should enhance communication with other countries, actively 
express its voice and create an atmosphere beneficial to the dissemination 
of China’s ideas of ‘peaceful development’ and ‘inclusive development’. 
In particular, it is necessary for China to articulate how its rejuvenation 
contributes to the welfare improvement of all countries, so that the 
international community accepts China’s development.
The Chinese Government should enhance the impact of its 
communication  with the rest of the world, equip itself with 
modern communication technology and make full use of communication 
resources. This can be achieved by using new media tools and adopting 
multiple perspectives and narrative forms to shape China’s international 
image more vividly. At the domestic level, China should promote cultural 
prosperity by establishing institutions and creating a favourable cultural 
environment. At the international level, the government and the public 
49
1 . CHInA’S InTERnATIOnAL STRATEGIC EnvIROnMEnT
should actively use multilateral and bilateral communication channels to 
conduct cultural diplomacy. China should also leverage its position as the 
host country of global conferences to raise Chinese topics, concepts and 
plans and shape the agenda. Additionally, in the process of promoting 
international economic cooperation, China should disseminate 
knowledge of Chinese enterprises that have met social obligations and 
promoted people’s livelihoods abroad, and tell success stories of the Belt 
and Road Initiative.
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Introduction
China’s responses to the shocks of the 2008 global financial crisis 
(GFC) and its endeavours to rectify market order have led to significant 
reforms and developments in the financial industry. In or around 1996, 
the banking industry faced problems related to a high ratio of non-
performing loans (NPL). Further, the stock, bond and insurance markets 
were underdeveloped and in a chaotic state. During this time, many 
authoritative international media commentators denigrated China’s 
financial sector, claiming that China’s commercial banks were technically 
insolvent and that this would stall economic growth. To promote stable 
and sustained economic development, China has striven vigorously to 
reform its financial system. In doing so, profound changes have been 
made to the financial sector.
1  Chair of the National Institute of Financial Research, Tsinghua University.
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3  Researcher at the Institute of International Finance, BOC.
4  Researcher at the Institute of International Finance, BOC.
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Today, China’s financial sector plays an increasingly important role in 
the global financial system. It has evolved from playing a little-known 
‘supporting role’ to a ‘leading role’ and is now the subject of significant 
international attention.
Part 1: China’s banking industry: 
Development history, international status 
and future directions
Banking plays a crucial role in China’s financial system. Since the 
launch of its reform and opening up policy, China’s banking industry 
has undergone historic changes, including the separation of functions, 
resolution of bad loans and joint-stock reforms. Such endeavours have 
enhanced the banking industry’s competitiveness and improved its 
international status significantly. In the global banking system, the role 
of Chinese banks has become increasingly important. However, unlike 
other large global banks, Chinese banks continue to rely on savings and 
loan business. Consequently, interest remains the major source of income 
for Chinese banks. In the future, the banking industry will continue to 
dominate China’s financial system. Universal banking represents a future 
development direction. A major theme of regulatory reform will be to 
strengthen regulations related to bank capital, behaviours and functions.
Development history
The banking industry began to develop after it broke away from 
the ‘unified  administration system’. In 1979, China established or 
re-established three national specialised banks: the Agricultural Bank 
of  China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC) and China Construction 
Bank (CCB). In 1984, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC) was established to undertake industrial and commercial credit 
and savings business, a  function previously performed by the People’s 
Bank of China (PBC). Thus, a national professional banking system was 
formed with a clear division of responsibilities. Under this system, the 
four specialised banks (the ABC, BOC, CCB and ICBC) conducted four 
major types of businesses (rural finance, foreign exchange, construction 
projects, and industrial and commercial loans respectively).
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In the early 1980s, the Chinese Government began to liberalise market 
access restrictions to satisfy the need of funds and financial services 
for rapid economic development. Several new credit cooperatives 
and commercial banks were restored or established in major regions 
and cities. For example, in July 1986, the Bank of Communications 
(BOCOM)—China’s first joint-stock commercial bank—was established. 
Subsequently, a number of other national joint-stock commercial banks, 
including China Merchants Bank, the Shenzhen Development Bank and 
CITIC Bank (formerly CITIC Industrial Bank), were established. The 
establishment and development of joint-stock commercial banks broke 
the monopoly held by the national specialised banks under the planned 
economy system. Thus, a multitype and multilevel banking system that 
met the needs of China’s socialist market economy gradually formed.
Since 1994, China has established three policy banks—the China 
Development Bank (CDB), Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC) 
and Agricultural Development Bank of China—to separate policy-
oriented services from commercial banking services. These three banks 
are responsible for funding policies related to national key investments, 
foreign trade and rural reform respectively.
In 1995, China promulgated the Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on Commercial Banks and legally defined the four specialised national 
banks as commercial banks. The four banks took this opportunity to 
accelerate the process of becoming true commercial banks. However, 
due to some policy-related services, ineffective management, economic 
overheating and other factors, China’s banking industry suffered a sharp 
increase in NPLs. In or around 1997, the NPL ratio reached approximately 
30 per cent.
In 1999, to increase public confidence in the financial industry, reform 
state-owned banks and address the NPL issue, China established four 
financial asset management companies (AMCs): China Great Wall 
Asset Management Co. Ltd; China Cinda Asset Management Co. Ltd; 
China Huarong Asset Management Co. Ltd; and China Orient Asset 
Management Co. Ltd. These AMCs received and disposed of non-
performing assets (approximately CN¥1.4 trillion) divested from the 
four large banks. Following this, the NPL ratio of the four state-owned 
commercial banks decreased significantly.
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On the basis of this restructuring, the Chinese Government proposed 
a four-step plan to further reform the commercial banks. This comprised 
implementing joint-stock reforms, increasing the disposal of non-
performing assets, strengthening capital and creating the right conditions 
for listing. On 30 December 2003, the Chinese Government invested 
US$45  billion in the BOC and CCB through the Central Huijin 
Investment Company (Central Huijin). In June 2004, the Central 
Huijin  injected another CN¥3 billion into the BOCOM. In 2005, 
the Central Huijin and China’s Ministry of Finance jointly injected 
US$30  billion (50 per cent each) into the ICBC. Additionally, since 
2004, the ICBC, CCB, BOC and BOCOM have divested CN¥1 trillion 
in non-performing assets. After restructuring, the financial burden of the 
four banks was reduced significantly. The substantial increase in asset 
quality and capital strength created favourable conditions that allowed the 
banks to transform into joint-stock companies and be listed. In 2015, the 
CDB and EIBC received US$48 billion and US$45 billion respectively 
to improve the corporate governance mechanism, of which the capital 
adequacy ratio was the core factor.
The BOCOM was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in June 2005 
and on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) (A-share market) in 2007. 
The CCB was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in October 2005 
and on the SSE (A-share market) in September 2007. The BOC was listed 
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in June 2006 and on the SSE in 
July 2006. The ICBC was listed on the SSE and the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange simultaneously in October 2006 through the ‘A + H’ model, 
the world’s largest initial public offering (IPO) at that time. The ABC was 
listed on the SSE (A-share market) and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
in July 2010, setting a new record for the world’s largest IPO.
China’s banking industry has moved from the edge of ‘technical insolvency’ 
to being on track for positive development. Further, the overall strength, 
profitability and competitiveness of China’s banking industry have 
improved greatly.
First, the asset scale has continued to expand. At the end of 2016, 
China’s total banking assets had reached CN¥226.26 trillion, 1,206 
times that in  1978 (CN¥187.65 billion) and 7.2 times that in 2003 
(CN¥27.7 trillion). In 2016, the assets of the domestic banking institutions 
reached CN¥208.92 trillion, 6.9 times that in 2003 (CN¥26.6 trillion) 
(see Figure 2-1).
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Figure 2-1: Total assets/liabilities of China’s banking industry (2003–2016).
Source: Wind (2017) .
Second, operational efficiency has improved significantly. In 1978, 
China’s commercial banks achieved a loss of CN¥1.66 billion; in 2016, 
they achieved a net profit of CN¥1.65 trillion. Return on assets (ROA) 
was 1.1 per cent in 2016, compared to 0.1 per cent in 2003. Return on 
equity (ROE) was 14.8 per cent in 2016, compared to 3 per cent in 2003. 
The cost-to-income ratio dropped to 27.8 per cent, significantly lower 
than that of a decade ago. In addition to realising higher profits, the listed 
banks paid out ample dividends to their shareholders. Indeed, since being 
listed, the five major banks have achieved an average dividend ratio of 
more than 30 per cent.
Third, asset quality has fundamentally improved. Non-performing assets 
have shown a ‘double decrease’; the NPL balance and NPL ratio dropped 
from nearly CN¥2 trillion and 20 per cent respectively at the end of 2003 
to CN¥1.17 trillion and less than 1.5 per cent respectively at the end of 
2013 (of this, the NPL ratio of commercial banks was only 1 per cent). 
In the past three years, due to the economic slowdown and some other 
factors, the NPL balance and NPL ratio have increased, but have 
remained stable overall, with the NPL ratio remaining low (see Table 2-1). 
By the end of 2016, the NPL balance of China’s commercial banks was 




Fourth, risk resistance capacity has substantially increased. The capital 
adequacy ratio of Chinese commercial banks increased from a paltry 
level in 2003 to 13.28 per cent in 2016. With a provision balance of 
CN¥2.67 trillion, the provision coverage ratio of commercial banks rose 
from under 30 per cent 20 years ago to 295.5 per cent in 2012. Despite 
a subtle decline in 2016 (to 176.4 per cent), it has remained at a high level.
Table 2-1: NPL of commercial banks (2012–2016)
Indicator 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
nPL balance 
(trillion yuan)
4336 .0 4279 .0 4929 .0 5921 .0 8426 .0 12744 .0 15122 .0
Subprime 
(trillion yuan)
1562 .6 1725 .0 2176 .0 2537 .0 4031 .0 5923 .0 6091 .0
Doubtful 
(trillion yuan)
2120 .7 1883 .0 2122 .0 2574 .0 3403 .0 5283 .0 6640 .0
Loss 
(trillion yuan)
670 .9 670 .0 630 .0 809 .0 992 .0 1539 .0 2391 .0
nPL ratio (%) 1 .10 1 .00 0 .95 1 .00 1 .25 1 .67 1 .74
Subprime (%) 0 .40 0 .40 0 .42 0 .43 0 .60 0 .78 0 .70
Doubtful (%) 0 .50 0 .40 0 .41 0 .43 0 .50 0 .69 0 .77
Loss (%) 0 .20 0 .20 0 .12 0 .14 0 .15 0 .20 0 .28
note: nPL = non-performing loans .
Source: Wind (2017) .
International status
In recent years, China’s banking industry has consistently propelled 
reform and opening up and sustained the shocks of the GFC. As a result, 
its overall strength and international competitiveness have significantly 
increased. In just a few decades, China’s major banks have developed 
into world-class financial institutions, and have adopted international 
accounting and regulatory standards. The rise in the international status 
of these banks can be observed in the following five areas.
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Assets
In 1996, in a ranking of the world’s top 10 banks by assets, only one 
Chinese bank (the ICBC) ranked (at number 10). It had assets of 
US$373.6 billion, 74 per cent of that of Deutsche Bank (the largest bank 
at that time). Conversely, 10 years later, in 2016, all four of China’s major 
state-owned banks were included in the ranking of the world’s top 10 
banks by assets, all ranking in the top five. In 2016, the ICBC was the 
world’s largest bank with assets of US$3.42 trillion (1.9 times that of 
Deutsche Bank) (see Table 2-2).
Table 2-2: Rankings of the world’s top 10 banks by assets (1996 and 2016)
1996 2016
Rank Bank Country Assets 
(billion 
USD)
Rank Bank Country Assets 
(billion 
USD)
1 Deutsche Bank Germany 503 .4 1 ICBC China 342 .22
2 UFJ Bank Japan 501 .0 2 CCB China 282 .73
3 Sumitomo 
Bank
Japan 499 .9 3 ABC China 274 .14
4 Dai-Ichi 
Kangyo Bank




5 Fuji Bank Japan 487 .3 5 Bank of 
China
China 259 .10
6 Sakura Bank Japan 478 .1 6 HSBC 
Holdings
UK 240 .97
7 Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi
Japan 475 .0 7 JP Morgan 




Japan 429 .5 8 BnP Paribas France 216 .76
9 Crédit Agricole 
Group
France 386 .4 9 Bank of 
America
US 214 .74
10 ICBC China 373 .6 10 Crédit 
Agricole
France 184 .66
note: ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, CCB = China Construction Bank, 
ABC = Agricultural Bank of China .




In 2016, according to The Banker’s6 list of the world’s top 1,000 banks, 
China had 119 banks ranked by tier 1 capital, of which 17 were ranked 
in the top 100. Of the world’s 20 largest banks, China had five, and the 
ICBC, CCB, BOC and ABC ranked in the top five. Conversely, in 1996, 
no Chinese banks were ranked in the top 20. In 1996, the BOC was 
ranked 26th (the highest of all Chinese banks) and the ICBC was ranked 
28th. In the 1985 list, no Chinese banks were listed (see Table 2-3).
Table 2-3: Presence of China’s banks in The Banker’s top 1,000 
world banks
1985 1987 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2016
number of banks 
in top 1,000
0 1 8 5 9 19 84 119
number of banks 
in top 25
0 0 1 1 3 2 3 5
number of banks 
in top 10
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4
Highest ranking 0 51st 16th 23rd 10th 11th 7th 1st
note: Only the world’s top 500 banks were counted before 1987 .
Source: The Banker (1996, 2016) .
Profit
In 1996, only one Chinese bank (the BOC) was listed among the world’s 
20 most profitable banks, ranking 17th with a profit of US$1.86 billion. 
The BOC’s profit was about one-third of the HSBC’s profit (the most 
profitable bank at that time, with a profit of US$5.69 billion). Of the 
total profit of the 20 most profitable banks, the BOC’s profits accounted 
for only 3.2 per cent. By 2016, of the world’s 20 most profitable branks, 
China had nine. The ICBC became the world’s most profitable bank in 
2016, with a profit of US$35.68 billion (1.9 times that of HSBC). Of the 
total profit of the 20 most profitable banks, the profits of Chinese banks 
accounted for nearly 54 per cent (see Table 2-4).
6  The Banker releases its list of the top 1,000 banks around 1 July each year. It is one of the most 
authoritative and credible global banking rankings. The list removes national and regional restrictions 
and assesses the operating results of the majority of the world’s banks. The rankings are largely based 
on banks’ capital strength as defined by the Basel Accords. The rankings also evaluate banks’ profit 
growth and risk resistance capacity by measuring their capital adequacy situations. The tier 1 capital 
of commercial banks is an important index for measuring banks’ abilities for business development 
and risk tolerance and is also an important guarantee in realising sustainable development.
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Table 2-4: Top 10 world banks by profit (1996 and 2016)
1996 2016
Rank Bank Country Assets 
(billion 
USD)
Rank Bank Country Assets 
(billion 
USD)
1 HSBC Holdings UK 56 .9 1 ICBC China 559 .7
2 Citigroup US 56 .1 2 CCB China 459 .7
3 Banco do Brasil Brazil 45 .8 3 Bank of China China 356 .8
4 Bank of 
America Corp
US 45 .7 4 ABC China 355 .7




(see Bank of 
America)









UK 27 .2 8 Bank of 
America
US 221 .5
9 Lloyds TSB 
Group
UK 25 .6 9 HSBC 
Holdings
UK 188 .7




note: ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, CCB = China Construction Bank, 
ABC = Agricultural Bank of China .
Source: The Banker (2019) .
Chinese banks deemed global systemically important banks
In November 2011, the Financial Stability Board began publishing a list 
of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The list divides financial 
institutions across five levels based on their systemic importance, which 
correspond to 3.5 per cent, 2.5 per cent, 2 per cent, 1.5 per cent and 
1 per cent of additional capital buffering requirements respectively. Only 
one Chinese bank (the BOC) was included in the first-level G-SIBs and 
it was required to take an additional 1 per cent capital buffer. In 2014, 
the number of Chinese banks listed as first-level G-SIBs rose to three. 
In 2016, four Chinese banks were listed as G-SIBs, with the ICBC listed 
as a second-level G-SIB to meet an additional 1.5 per cent capital buffer 
requirement (see Table 2-5).
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5 (3 .5%) – – –




HSBC, JP Morgan Chase Citigroup, JP Morgan 
Chase
3 (2%) Barclays, BnP 
Paribas
Barclays, BnP Paribas, 
Citigroup, Deutsche Bank




2 (1 .5%) Bank of America, 







Royal Bank of 
Scotland, UBS
Bank of America, Credit 
Suisse, Goldman Sachs, 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial 
Group, Morgan Stanley, 







1 (1 .0%) Bank of China, BBvA, 
Groupe BPCE, Groupe 
Credit Agricole, InG Bank, 
Mizuho FG, nordea, 
Santander, Société Générale, 
Standard Chartered, State 
Street, Sumitomo Mitsui FG, 
Unicredit Group, Wells Fargo 
Agricultural Bank of China, 
Bank of China, Bank of new 
York Mellon, BBvA, Groupe 
BPCE, Groupe Credit 
Agricole, InG Bank, Mizuho 
FG, nordea, Santander, 
Société Générale, Standard 
Chartered, State Street, 
Sumitomo Mitsui FG, UBS, 
Unicredit Group, Wells Fargo
Agricultural Bank 
of China, Bank of 
China, Bank of new 




Agricole, InG Bank, 
Mizuho FG, Morgan 
Stanley, nordea, 





Sumitomo Mitsui FG, 
UBS, Unicredit Group
note: ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, BBvA = Banco Bilbao vizcaya 
Argentaria, ABC = Agricultural Bank of China, CCB = China Construction Bank .
Source: Financial Stability Board (2016), Institute of International Finance Research, 
BOC (2016) .
61
2 . CHInA’S FInAnCIAL DEvELOPMEnT
Significant improvement of degree of internationalisation 
of Chinese banks
Following the intensification of China’s opening up, the pace of 
internationalisation of Chinese financial institutions accelerated 
significantly. By the end of 2016, the overseas assets of the five major 
banks reached CN¥10.59 trillion, 3.02 times that in 2009 (i.e. an increase 
of CN¥7.96 trillion). In 2016, the five major banks achieved an overseas 
pre-tax profit of CN¥120.3 billion, 2.37 times that in 2009 (i.e. an 
increase of CN¥84.6 billion). At present, the share of overseas assets 
and pre-tax profits in the five banks’ total assets and total pre-tax profits 
account for 11.6 per cent and 10.1 per cent respectively; these figures 
represent an average increase of six to seven percentage points from 2010 
(see Table 2-6).
Table 2-6: Overseas assets and pre-tax profits of China’s five major banks 
(100 million yuan)
Bank Item 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 20161
ICBC Asset 3,857 5,888 9267 12,344 15,994 19,195 19,412 21,262
Pre-tax 
profit
69 88 102 120 166 246 220 225
ABC Asset 544 973 1,549 2,825 4,116 5,904 7,823 8,704
Pre-tax 
profit
6 12 11 28 30 42 54 36
BOC Asset 17,568 23,283 27,737 31,356 38,462 4,5591 48,308 50,690
Pre-tax 
profit
250 283 360 349 412 532 548 814
CCB Asset 2,327 2,711 4,411 5,166 7,299 9,356 11,495 16,664
Pre-tax 
profit
13 32 3 32 39 63 53 68
BOCOM Asset 2,025 2,429 3,348 3,860 5,256 6,451 6,671 8,559
Pre-tax 
profit
19 20 25 32 38 62 61 60
1 The overseas revenue and assets of the ICBC were calculated by the RMB central parity 
against the USD on 31 December 2016 (i .e . 6 .937 RMB = 1 USD) .
note: ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, ABC = Agricultural Bank of China, 
BOC = Bank of China, CCB = China Construction Bank, BOCOM = Bank of Communications .
Source: Annual reports of the five major banks.
Chinese financial institutions are ‘going global’ and achieving fruitful 
results; however, the development of foreign banks in China has been 
relatively slow. At the end of 2016, the assets of foreign-owned banks in 
China totalled CN¥2.9286 trillion, 4.03 times that in 2004 (i.e. an increase 
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of CN¥2.34631 trillion). During the same period, the assets of Chinese 
banks increased 6.35-fold, from CN¥31.599 trillion to CN¥232.2532 
trillion. Foreign bank assets as a percentage of total bank assets fell from 1.84 
per cent in 2004 to 1.26 per cent in 2016. From a profitability perspective, 
foreign banks in China achieved a net profit of CN¥12.8 billion in 2016, 
4.38 times that in 2004 (i.e. an increase of CN¥10.42 billion). During 
the same period, China’s banking sector saw a net profit increase of 1,903 
per cent. Foreign banks’ net profits as a percentage of the banking sector’s 
total net profit fell from 2.30 per cent in 2004 to 0.62 per cent in 2016 
(see Table 2-7).
Table 2-7: Assets and profits of foreign-owned banks in China












1 .84 2 .11 2 .13 1 .83 1 .78 1 .62 1 .26
Foreign bank 
net profit (100 
million yuan)








2 .30 1 .71 2 .04 0 .87 1 .08 1 .03 0 .62
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission (2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017) .
Comparison of the operation characteristics 
of Chinese and international banks
After years of development, China’s banking sector continues to consolidate 
its strengths. Its international status has improved significantly. Chinese 
banks have formed distinctive operation characteristics and development 
strategies. Compared to the global banking industry, the operations of 
Chinese banks have a number of notable characteristics.
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Percentage of deposits and loans in the assets–liabilities 
structure is comparably high
At the end of 2016, the assets and liabilities of Chinese G-SIBs totalled 
US$11.92 trillion and US$11 trillion respectively. These figures 
accounted for 24.73 per cent and 24.62 per cent of G-SIBs’ total assets 
and liabilities respectively. The structure of assets and liabilities of large 
Chinese banks indicates dominance of the traditional deposit and loan 
business. At the end of 2016, the proportion of deposits in Chinese 
G-SIBs’ liabilities was 80.75 per cent, 23.65 percentage points higher 
than the average G-SIB level (57.1 per cent). The proportion of loans in 
Chinese G-SIBs’ assets was 53.7 per cent, 14.5 percentage points higher 
than the average G-SIB level (39.2 per cent) (see Table 2-8).












ICBC 34,732 .4 31,881 .6 81 .4 54 .1
CCB 30,165 .8 27,878 .3 80 .5 56 .1
ABC 28,160 .4 26,258 .7 83 .4 49 .7
BOC 26,115 .4 23,975 .5 77 .7 55 .0
HSBC Holdings 23,749 .9 21,924 .1 58 .0 36 .6
Barclays 14,976 .0 14,095 .0 37 .1 31 .9
Royal Bank of Scotland 9,859 .4 9,249 .5 47 .2 41 .0
Standard Chartered 6,466 .9 5,980 .3 62 .2 40 .1
UniCredit 9,065 .5 8,610 .0 48 .5 52 .5
Banco Santander 14,123 .8 13,040 .6 52 .4 60 .9
UBS 9,192 .1 8,658 .2 48 .1 32 .8
Credit Suisse Group 8,060 .0 7,644 .0 45 .8 33 .8
nordea Bank AB 6,493 .4 6,151 .5 29 .2 48 .9
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial 
Group
27,248 .0 25,751 .4 63 .5 36 .6
Mizuho Financial Group 18,013 .5 17,180 .4 68 .3 40 .0
Sumitomo Mitsui 
Financial Group
17,769 .4 16,760 .2 69 .5 41 .4
JP Morgan 24,909 .7 22,367 .8 61 .5 35 .9
Bank of America 21,877 .0 19,208 .6 65 .6 41 .9
Wells Fargo 19,301 .2 17,296 .2 75 .5 51 .5













Goldman Sachs 8,601 .7 7,727 .7 39 .9 13 .5
Morgan Stanley 8,149 .5 7,377 .7 46 .9 17 .3
Bank of new York Mellon 3,334 .7 2,938 .9 75 .4 19 .3
State Street Corp 2,427 .0 2,214 .8 84 .5 8 .1
InG Bank 8,913 .1 8,381 .5 65 .8 67 .3
BnP Paribas 21,905 .7 20,795 .9 38 .7 37 .3
Crédit Agricole 16,076 .1 15,401 .7 35 .4 23 .2
Société Générale 14,578 .5 13,885 .5 30 .2 31 .8
Banque Populaire 13,028 .1 12,298 .9 45 .6 55 .0
Deutsche Bank 16,775 .5 16,091 .8 36 .1 26 .0
Average 16,066 .3 14,889 .5 57 .1 39 .2
note: ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, CCB = China Construction Bank, 
ABC = Agricultural Bank of China, BOC = Bank of China .
Source: Wind (2017) and Institute of International Finance Research, BOC (2016) .
Interest is the main revenue source and the net interest 
margin is at a medium level
On average, interest income comprised 71.8 per cent of the income 
of Chinese G-SIBs in 2016, 24 percentage points higher than the average 
G-SIB level (47.8 per cent). From 2011–2014, the net interest margin of 
Chinese G-SIBs (all of which ranked in the top 10 G-SIBs) remained at 
a comparably high level across all G-SIBs. However, since 2015, numerous 
factors (e.g. the rapid progress of domestic interest rate marketisation) have 
led to the net interest margin of Chinese G-SIBs declining significantly. 
In 2016, the net interest margin of Chinese G-SIBs was 2.1 per cent, 
equal to the G-SIB average level in the same period (see Table 2-9).
The non-interest income of Chinese G-SIBs is relatively low, only 
accounting for 28.2 per cent of the total G-SIB income in 2016, 
24 percentage points lower than the G-SIB average (52.2 per cent). One 
important reason for this is the lack of income channels. Additionally, 
average service fee and commission income account for more than 
80 per cent of the non-interest income of Chinese G-SIBs, while for the 
average G-SIB these account for less than 60 per cent of non-interest 
income. A  significant gap remains in net investment income between 
Chinese and other G-SIBs.
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Table 2-9: Net interest spread and proportion of interest income 
of G-SIBs (2016)






ICBC 2 .2 71 .8 28 .2
CCB 2 .2 74 .0 26 .0
ABC 2 .3 76 .2 23 .8
BOC 1 .8 65 .3 34 .7
Barclays 1 .5 46 .5 53 .5
HSBC Holdings 1 .7 57 .3 42 .7
Standard Chartered 1 .7 55 .5 44 .5
Royal Bank of Scotland 1 .7 65 .6 34 .4
UniCredit 1 .4 56 .6 43 .4
Banco Santander 2 .8 64 .9 35 .1
Swiss Bank Corp 0 .9 21 .5 78 .5
Credit Suisse Group 1 .0 39 .4 60 .6
nordea Bank AB 1 .0 44 .6 55 .4
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial 
Group
0 .9 43 .9 56 .1
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial 
Group
1 .1 41 .5 58 .5
Mizuho Financial Group 0 .6 33 .8 66 .2
JP Morgan 2 .3 48 .5 51 .5
Wells Fargo 2 .9 55 .8 44 .2
Bank of America 2 .2 48 .1 51 .9
Citigroup 2 .8 63 .1 36 .9
Goldman Sachs 0 .3 6 .9 93 .1
Morgan Stanley 0 .7 10 .7 89 .3
Bank of new York Mellon 1 .1 20 .6 79 .4
State Street Corp 1 .1 20 .4 79 .6
InG 1 .7 72 .5 27 .5
Crédit Agricole 1 .6 45 .6 54 .4
Société Générale 0 .9 34 .6 65 .4
Banque Populaire 0 .9 55 .2 44 .8
Deutsche Bank 1 .4 44 .8 55 .2
Average 2 .1 47 .8 52 .2
note: ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, CCB = China Construction Bank, 
ABC = Agricultural Bank of China, BOC = Bank of China .
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Profit level is relatively high and leverage ratio remains 
at the global average
In 2016, the average ROE of Chinese G-SIBs was 14.17 per cent, the 
average equity multiplier was 12.63 and the average ROA was 1.12 per cent. 
During this period, G-SIBs had an average ROE of 5.5  per  cent, an 
average equity multiplier of 11 and an average ROA of  0.5  per cent. 
The ROE of Chinese G-SIBs was 8.67 percentage points higher than the 
G-SIB average, their ROA was 0.62 percentage points higher and their 
equity multiplier was 1.63 times higher. From this perspective, the high 
profitability of Chinese banks can be explained by strong asset profitability 
and an average overall leverage ratio (see Table 2-10).
Overall asset quality is good, but capital adequacy needs 
to be improved
At the end of 2016, Chinese G-SIBs had an average NPL ratio of 
1.75  per  cent, 0.65 percentage points lower than the G-SIB average 
(2.4 per cent) (see Table 2-10). At the end of 2016, the average capital 
adequacy ratio of Chinese G-SIBs was 14.4 per cent, higher than the 
capital requirements of 11.5–12 per cent. In the same period, G-SIBs’ 
capital adequacy ratio averaged 17.7 per cent, 3.3 percentage points higher 
than the average of Chinese G-SIBs. Reasons for the low capital adequacy 
ratio of Chinese G-SIBs include insufficient financing by other tier 1 and 
tier 2 capital instruments and a relatively high risk per unit of assets.












ROA ROE Equity 
multiplier
ICBC 2 .2 71 .8 14 .3 1 .6 1 .2 14 .8 12 .3
CCB 2 .2 74 .0 15 .3 1 .5 1 .2 15 .4 12 .8
ABC 2 .3 76 .2 13 .1 2 .4 1 .0 14 .6 14 .6
BOC 1 .8 65 .3 14 .7 1 .5 1 .1 12 .1 11 .0
Barclays 1 .5 46 .5 19 .6 1 .7 0 .2 2 .9 14 .5
HSBC Holdings 1 .7 57 .3 20 .1 2 .1 0 .1 0 .7 7 .0
Standard 
Chartered
1 .7 55 .5 21 .3 3 .7 0 .0 –1 .0 n/A
Royal Bank 
of Scotland
1 .7 65 .6 22 .9 3 .1 –0 .6 –13 .6 22 .7
UniCredit 1 .4 56 .6 11 .7 12 .5 –1 .4 –26 .4 18 .86
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2 .8 64 .9 14 .7 4 .1 0 .5 6 .9 13 .8
UBS 0 .9 21 .5 24 .7 0 .8 0 .3 5 .9 19 .7
Mitsubishi UFJ 
Financial Group
0 .9 43 .9 15 .9 1 .4 0 .3 6 .0 20 .0
Sumitomo Mitsui 
Financial Group
1 .1 41 .5 16 .9 1 .1 0 .4 7 .6 19 .0
Mizuho Financial 
Group
0 .6 33 .8 16 .3 1 .1 0 .3 7 .3 24 .3
JP Morgan 2 .3 48 .5 16 .4 0 .8 1 .0 10 .0 10 .0
Wells Fargo 2 .9 55 .8 16 .1 1 .0 1 .2 11 .8 9 .8
Bank of America 2 .2 48 .1 16 .3 0 .8 0 .8 6 .8 8 .5
Citigroup 2 .8 63 .1 19 .1 0 .9 0 .8 6 .6 8 .3
Goldman Sachs 0 .3 6 .9 17 .8 - 0 .8 9 .4 11 .8
Morgan Stanley 0 .7 10 .7 22 .0 - 0 .8 8 .1 10 .1
InG 1 .7 72 .5 19 .3 2 .3 0 .5 9 .5 19 .0
Crédit Agricole 1 .6 45 .6 14 .5 5 .4 0 .4 8 .3 20 .8
Société 
Générale
0 .9 34 .6 17 .9 5 .4 0 .3 5 .6 18 .7
Banque 
Populaire
0 .9 55 .2 20 .1 4 .4 0 .2 5 .9 29 .5
Deutsche Bank 1 .4 44 .8 17 .4 1 .8 –0 .1 –2 .7 27 .0
Average 2 .1 47 .8 17 .7 2 .4 0 .5 5 .5 11 .0
note: nPL = non-performing loans, ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, 
ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, CCB = China Construction Bank, 
ABC = Agricultural Bank of China, BOC = Bank of China .
Source: Wind (2017) and Institute of International Finance Research, BOC (2016) .
Continuously improving banking regulations
In recent years, China’s banking industry has undergone rapid 
development. The regulatory authorities have constantly adapted to 




Promoting the implementation of ‘Basel III’
In 2013, the Chinese version of Basel III was formally implemented 
in China’s banking sector. Since then, the loss-absorbing capacity of 
commercial banks has strengthened continuously. At the end of 2016, the 
level-1 core capital adequacy ratio and capital adequacy ratio of commercial 
banks were 10.75 per cent and 13.28 per cent respectively. These figures 
are much higher than the minimum requirements established in Basel III. 
In addition, the provision of China’s banking sector is relatively high 
compared to other banks. By the end of 2016, the provision coverage ratio 
of commercial banks was 176.4 per cent, 94.6 percentage points higher 
than the average of non-Chinese G-SIBs in the same period. The provision-
to-loan ratio was 3.08 per cent, 1.15 percentage points higher than the 
average of non-Chinese G-SIBs. Additionally, the introduction of two 
liquidity risk measures (the liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding 
ratio) improved the loan-to-deposit ratio and resulted in the establishment 
of a liquidity risk management system that meets Basel III’s requirements.
Regulating interbank, asset management and 
investment business
Since 2013, the regulatory authorities have introduced a series of policies 
aimed at regulating the development of interbank, asset management and 
investment businesses. Of these, the stricter policies include the  2014 
Documents No. 127 and 140 that target interbank business,  the 
2016 ‘Regulation and Supervision of Asset Management Activities of 
the Commercial Banks (Exposure Draft)’, the September 2016 Document 
No. 42 that targets credit risk, and the ‘Notice on Inclusion of Off-balance-
sheet Financing into Calculation of General Credit’ (issued by the PBC 
in October 2016) that placed off-balance sheet financing activities in the 
scope of macroprudential assessment.
Further, since March 2017, the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC), China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) and other 
financial regulators have issued a series of documents introducing financial 
deleveraging. The CBRC issued eight consecutive documents to crack down 
on ‘three violations’, ‘three arbitrages’ and ‘four misconducts’. The CIRC 
issued four documents, including the ‘Notice on Further Strengthening 
the Risk Prevention and Control of the Insurance Industry’. This notice 
targeted systemic loopholes in eight major fields, including insurance 
company governance, the use of insurance funds, claims-paying ability, 
product management, intermediaries and consumer rights protection.
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Normalising the development of internet finance
In July 2015, the PBC (together with 10 other ministries) issued the 
‘Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Healthy Development of Internet 
Finance’ to regulate the development of internet finance. This document 
clarified the regulatory responsibilities of the ‘central bank and three 
regulatory commissions’ in relation to internet finance and gave clear 
instructions on custody of funds, information security, the nature of 
business platforms and other related issues. In August 2016, the CBRC 
issued the ‘Interim Measures for the Regulation of Business Activities of 
P2P Information Intermediaries’. This document established the legal 
status of peer-to-peer lending and established the regulatory requirements, 
including the upper limits of business scale and investment directions.
Speeding up the settlement of non-performing loans
To address significant issues related to the quality of bank assets, the 
regulatory authorities introduced policies to hasten the settlement 
of NPLs. In 2016, the CBRC issued the ‘Notice on the Work of the 
Creditors’  Committee of Banking Financial Institutions’ to clarify 
the nature, purpose and operation mechanisms of the creditors’ committee. 
In October 2016, the State Council issued the ‘Guidance on Actively 
and Steadily Reducing the Leverage Ratio of Enterprises’ to provide 
an overall framework for reducing the leverage ratio of non-financial 
enterprises. In December 2016, the CBRC issued ‘Several Opinions on 
Properly Addressing Financial Debts in the Process of Capacity Reduction 
in the Steel and Coal-mining Industries’ to strengthen the management 
of problematic debts in overcapacity industries by supporting the 
reasonable demand for capital, increasing financial support for mergers 
and acquisitions and establishing creditors’ committees.
Regulating cross-border business
In recent years, the regulatory authorities have introduced a series of 
policies to regulate and standardise the development of international 
banking businesses. In March 2016, the CBRC issued the ‘Notice on 
Further Strengthening the Risk Management of Overseas Operation 
of Banking Financial Institutions’. This document required banking 
financial institutions to strengthen the risk management of overseas 
operations, incorporate a country’s risks into banks’ stress tests and develop 
contingency plans based on the test results. In January 2017, the CBRC 
issued the ‘Guiding Opinions on Regulating the International Business 
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of Banking Services and Strengthening Risk Prevention and Control’. 
This document required Chinese banks to regulate their overseas business 
activities, strengthen anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing 
practices and enhance the service capabilities that support Chinese 
enterprises’ ‘going global’ efforts.
Future development directions
A comparison of the business indicators of large and medium-sized banks 
in China and abroad show that China’s banking industry should take the 
following directions in the future.
First, the banking sector should continue to play a leading role in China’s 
financial system for the foreseeable future. In recent years, China’s 
capital market has developed rapidly and direct financing has assumed 
an increasingly important role in supporting development of the real 
economy. However, given China’s historical traditions, credit environment 
and legal system, it is unlikely that the dominant position of the country’s 
banking sector will change radically. Thus, bank credit will continue to 
be the main source of funding for the real economy, even though it may 
decline as a proportion of funding.
Second, universal banking will be the preferred option. With the 
acceleration of market-oriented reforms directed at financial factors, 
such as interest and exchange rates, Chinese banks will move from the 
traditional business model—which largely depends on deposit and loan 
business—towards universal banking. In particular, the proportion of 
deposit and loan business will continue to decline, while the proportion 
of securities investment and wholesale financing will increase. The 
proportion of non-interest income will increase among all revenue sources, 
especially investment income. The contribution of overseas markets to 
overall profitability will increase, gradually moving towards the average of 
large global banks (i.e. 40 per cent). Consumer finance will see greater 
growth, while the contribution of personal business will continue to rise.
Third, the major tasks of banking regulatory reforms should be to 
strengthen capital, behavioural and functional regulations. Presently, 
regulatory approaches cannot keep up with development of the banking 
sector. The current framework must be improved and upgraded. In the 
future, regulatory authorities should strengthen capital regulations, 
improve the quantity and quality of banks’ capital, and expand the 
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scope of risk-weighted assets and increase measurement accuracy so 
that these regulatory indicators can fully reflect the real risks. China 
should also strengthen behavioural regulations, improve the protection 
of consumer rights and interests, and strengthen on-spot inspection 
mechanisms to normalise the operations of financial institutions and 
eliminate irregularities. Additionally, China should strengthen functional 
regulations, establish and improve regulatory coordination mechanisms, 
clarify regulatory responsibilities, constantly enhance its regulatory 
capabilities and allocate regulatory resources according to the systematic 
importance of financial institutions.
Part 2: China’s capital market: Development 
history and international comparison
Since its reform and opening, China’s capital market has developed rapidly. 
The once relatively minor stock and bond markets are now flourishing 
and significant sectors and China’s market scales are now among the 
world’s largest. However, the degree of market openness is relatively low 
and numerous structural problems highlight the gap between China’s 
market and mature markets in developed countries. In the future, China 
will continue to expand the opening of the capital market, increase the 
proportion of direct financing, and promote market-oriented reform to 
achieve healthy and stable development of its capital market.
The rapid expansion of China’s capital markets 
brought about by financial reforms
Stock market
The development of China’s stock market began relatively late. 
On 14 November 1986, Shanghai Feilo Acoustics Co. Ltd issued shares 
publicly. This was the first real stock issue since China’s reform and 
opening and marked the beginning of China’s capital market reform. 
In 1987, the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Securities Company was 
established, largely to manage securities trading and transfers and provide 
securities investment consulting services. It was China’s first securities 
company established after the reform and opening.
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Since the 1990s, the infrastructure construction of China’s securities 
market has accelerated significantly. In November 1990, China’s first 
stock exchange, the SSE, was established. The SSE conducts transactions 
via electronic auctions. All the listed securities can be publicly bid upon 
through computers. In December of the same year, the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) was also launched. Since then, China’s securities market 
has experienced a period of rapid development. In 2004, the SZSE 
established the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Board. This board 
has played an important role in promoting the development of the Growth 
Enterprises Market (GEM) Board.
After 20 years of concerted effort, China’s stock market has developed 
into a large and flourishing sector. The number of listed companies has 
increased rapidly and secondary transactions have become increasingly 
active (see Table 2-11). By the end of 2016, the total number of listed 
companies in mainland China reached 3,052, 16 times that in 1993. 
Total market capitalisation reached CN¥50.8 trillion in 2016 (equivalent 
to 68.3 per cent of the gross domestic product [GDP]), 38.8 percentage 
points higher than that in 2000 and the second largest in the world. 
The  circulating market value accounted for 52.9 per cent of the total 
market value. China has also driven the construction of a multilevel 
capital market and the number of companies listed on the national 
equities exchange and quotations (NEEQ) system continues to increase. 
By the end of 2016, the total number of companies listed on the NEEQ 
system had reached 10,163. Of these, 5,034 were new companies.


























1993 183 835 3,531 832 3,627 -
1995 323 1,294 3,474 938 4,036 -
2005 1381 7,189 32,446 10,638 31,664 338
2010 2063 13,391 265,422 193,110 545,633 8,954
2015 2827 21,478 531,304 417,925 2,550,538 8,295
2016 3052 11,741 508,245 393,266 1,267,262 18,910
Source: Financial Stability Analysis Group of the PBC (2016), national Bureau of Statistics 
of China (2017) and Wind (2017) .
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Bond market
China’s bond market came into being in 1981 when the government issued 
treasury bonds. In the following 10 years, the Chinese Government 
issued  a number of bonds, including financial, national construction, 
special treasury and indexed bonds. The issuing process relied on 
a combination of political mobilisation and administrative distribution. 
Corporate bonds were first issued in 1984. In 1993, the PBC began issuing 
central bank bills to adjust the balance of funds among different regions 
and financial institutions and to make comprehensive use of the fund 
transfer function. In 1994, policy-oriented financial bonds appeared with 
the establishment of three policy banks. During this time, China’s bond 
market largely consisted of treasury bonds, central bank bills, financial 
bonds and non-financial corporate bonds.
From a transaction perspective, bond transactions were largely conducted 
in the over-the-counter (OTC) market before moving to the interbank 
bond market. In 1993, the SSE launched a pilot scheme of government 
bond futures. In 1994, the SZSE also started bond transactions. 
Consequently, bond transactions gradually became concentrated in the 
two exchanges. However, in 1997, a large amount of bank capital flowed 
into the stock market from various channels. To address this issue, the PBC 
introduced a requirement that commercial banks conduct repurchase and 
spot transactions under the National Interbank Funding Centre’s trading 
system. In 2012, due to the continuous development of primary and 
secondary markets, China established a bond market system consisting 
of the exchanges and OTC markets, with the interbank market as the 
mainstay and the exchange market and bank counters as supplementary.
In the last 20 years, China’s bond market has shown rapid development 
in three respects. First, trading volumes have increased significantly and 
the market structure has changed. China’s bond issuance increased to 
CN¥185,643 trillion in 2016, 574 times that in 1990 (CN¥32.3 billion). 
Bonds in custody rose from CN¥418.4 billion at the end of 1997 to 
CN¥63.7 trillion at the end of 2016, a 151-fold increase. Before 2000, 
both the exchange and OTC markets were active. Since then, the rapid 
increase of market participants and diversified bond products increased 
the activity of the interbank bond market until it gradually became the 
main venue for transactions. Since 2001, the interbank bond market has 
generally retained more than 70 per cent of the market share. By 2015, 
it occupied a market share of 76 per cent.
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Second, bond products and trading instruments have been enriched. 
Before 2005, China’s bond products mainly comprised government 
bonds, policy financial bonds, central bank bills and corporate bonds. 
From 2005, China’s interbank market has constantly rolled out innovative 
products. Notably, it has introduced general financial bonds, commercial 
bank subprime bonds, mixed capital bonds, asset-backed bonds, short-
term financing bills and warrant bonds. Currently, the trading instruments 
in China’s securities market include spot trading, pledged repo, outright 
repo, bond lending and bond forwards, most of which were developed 
after 2004.







































1990 323 - - 197 - - 126
1995 1,811 - - 1,510 - - 300
2000 4,414 - 16,746 4,657 - 1,645 83
2005 42,182 60 .1 73,402 7,042 27,882 7,159 2,047
2010 95,238 64 .0 205,108 19,778 46,608 14,122 16,811
2015 144,178 87 .6 479,000 59,408 - 102,095 67,205
2016 185,643 127 .1 637,000 91,086 - 52,421 82,242
Source: Financial Stability Analysis Group of the PBC (2016) and Wind (2017) .
Third, the proportion of government bonds has decreased, while the 
proportion of corporate bonds has exhibited an inverted U-shape trend 
(see Table 2-12). Initially, the issuance of treasury bonds accounted for 
a relatively high proportion of total bond issuance, but this was followed 
by a downwards trend. In 1990, government bonds accounted for 
60.1  per  cent of total bond issuance. In 1996, the proportion rose to 
87  per cent, but dropped to 18 per cent in 2014. In 1990, corporate 
bonds accounted for 39 per cent of total bond issuance, but from 
1997–2007, the proportion was no more than 10 per cent. Since the 
GFC in 2008, loose monetary policies, interest rate marketisation and 
the rapid development of the bond market have caused the amount of 
non-financial corporate bonds (as a proportion of the total bond issuance) 
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to increase. In 2014, this proportion reached 43 per cent, an increase of 
30 percentage points from 2008. Financial bonds initially accounted for 
a large proportion of total bond issuance (approximately 34 per cent), but 
from 2002–2010 they experienced an overall decline, falling to 14.5 per 
cent in 2010. However, in recent years, they have risen as a proportion of 
total bond issuance once again. In 2015, financial bonds accounted for 
39 per cent of total bond issuance, an increase of 24.5 percentage points 
from 2010.
The international status of China’s capital market
The market value of Chinese listed companies is among the world’s largest. 
According to the World Federation of Exchange, as of 2016, the total 
market value of Chinese listed companies had reached US$7,311.4 billion 
and China was ranked second in the world after the US (see Figure 2-2). 
Additionally, the SSE and SZSE are now respectively ranked as the fourth- 
and sixth-largest world exchanges.
Figure 2-2: Market capitalisation rankings of the world’s major stock 
exchanges at the end of 2016 (US$100 million).
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (2017) .
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The market capitalisation of China’s stock market ranks second in the 
world (see Table 2-13). In 1995, the total market capitalisation of China’s 
listed companies was US$42.1 billion. This rose to US$7.3 trillion in 
2016,  a  more than 170-fold increase. This figure represents nearly 
13.3 per cent of the global total market capitalisation. Notably, in 1995, 
China held only 0.2 per cent of the global total market capitalisation. 
At  the same time, the total market value of the US, the world’s largest 
stock market, increased 3.8-fold from US$5.3 trillion in 1993 to 
US$25.1 trillion in 2015. The US’s global share rose from 37.5 per cent in 
1993 to 40.6 per cent in 2015. The total market capitalisation of Japan’s 
listed companies increased by 68 per cent; however, its global share fell 
from 20.7 per cent in 1993 to 7.9 per cent in 2015. The United Kingdom 
(UK) also experienced a decline in market share, from 8.2 per cent in 
1993 to 5.2 per cent in 2015.
Table 2-13: Total market capitalisation of listed companies (US$100 million)
Year US Eurozone Japan China Global China’s share of 
global total market 
capitalisation (%)
1993 52,511 15,920 29,063 - 139,963 0 .0
1995 69,520 21,957 35,453 421 175,030 0 .2
2005 170,009 62,086 47,529 4,018 406,638 0 .9
2010 172,835 64,395 38,278 40,278 514,530 7 .8
2015 250,675 61,206 48,949 81,880 617,811 13 .3
2016 273,522 62,178 49,553 73,207 648,196 11 .3
Source: World Bank (2017) .
In relation to bond market size, China ranks behind only the US 
and Japan.  China’s bond market value increased 44-fold, from 
US$202.3  billion  in 2000 to US$9.1 trillion in 2016. Over this 
same period,  the US bond market value increased 1.5-fold, from 
US$14.6  trillion  in 2000 to US$35.8 trillion in 2016. Korea’s bond 
market value increased 3.9-fold during this period. Compared to these 
economies, China’s bond market has shown the most rapid development 
(see Table 2-14).
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Table 2-14: International comparison of domestic bond size  
(US$100 million)
Country 2000 2005 2010 2016 Growth (2000–
2016) (%)
China 2,023 8,992 3,0551 91,786 4,437
US 146,503 2,185,881 293,531 358,223 145
Japan 65,715 90,140 143,392 116,650 78
UK 6,955 18,899 35,380 28,675 312
France 10,376 16,129 25,403 25,630 147
Korea 3,540 7,530 11,490 17,200 386
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2000, 2005, 2010, 2016) .
Problems in the development of China’s 
capital market
The degree of foreign capital participation and the openness 
of China’s capital market are limited
China’s stock and bond markets implemented different opening policies. 
In the primary stock market, nonresidents are not yet permitted to issue 
equity securities in mainland China. Conversely, in the secondary market, 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) and RMB Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investor mechanisms for foreign institutional 
investors have been established and the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock 
Connect and Shenzhen–Hong Kong Stock Connect have been launched. 
In the secondary bond market, the interbank market has been opened, such 
that qualified foreign investors and foreign institutions can enjoy the same 
standards as domestic institutions when entering the market. However, 
transactions conducted by the foreign funds that have entered China’s 
market through these methods are relatively small. QFII shares account 
for less than 1.5 per cent of the A-share market (see Figure 2-3). The 
Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect and Shenzhen–Hong Kong Stock 
Connect account for no more than 2 per cent of the total market turnover 
(see Figure 2-4), and foreign institutions hold less than 2.5 per cent of the 
treasury bond and financial bond market (see Figure 2.5).
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Figure 2-3: The proportion of QFII shareholding in the A-share market (%).
Source: Wind (2017) .
Figure 2-4: The proportion of trade volume via the Shanghai–Hong 
Kong Stock Connect and Shenzhen–Hong Kong Stock Connect (%).
Source: Wind (2017) .
Figure 2-5: Proportion of holdings by foreign institutions in the 
government bond and financial bond market (%).
Source: Wind (2017) .
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The depth of China’s capital market has increased,  
but not sufficiently
China’s GDP ranks second globally, but its capital market depth and 
securitisation rates lag behind those of developed countries. In China, the 
ratio of market capitalisation of listed companies to GDP increased by 
20 percentage points from 2011–2016, rising to 65 per cent. China’s ratio 
was slightly higher than the ratios of Germany, Brazil and Mexico, but 
was below the global average, significantly lower than the ratios of Japan, 
South Korea and France and less than half that of the US (see Figure 2-6). 
The  ratio of China’s private sector domestic bond balance to GDP 
increased by 15 percentage points from 2011–2016, to 47 per cent. 
China’s ratio was higher than the ratios of Germany, Brazil and Mexico, 
but lower than the ratios of Japan, South Korea and France and almost 
half that of the US in 2011 (see Figure 2-7).
Figure 2-6: International comparison of the ratio of the market 
capitalisation of listed companies to GDP (%).
Source: Wind (2017) and World Bank (2017) .
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Figure 2-7: International comparison of the ratio of the domestic 
bond balance of the private sector to GDP (%).
Source: World Bank (2016) .
The breadth of China’s capital market still lags behind that 
of advanced economies
China’s stock market capitalisation is among the world’s largest; however, 
the breadth and accessibility of China’s market is far lower than those 
of advanced economies. The number of listed companies per million 
population increased from 1.16 in 2007 to 2.06 in 2015. Despite 
this, China continues to lag significantly behind other countries (see 
Figure 2-8). An international comparison reveals that, on average, there 
are more than 10 listed companies per million population in the US, 
Japan, the UK and South Korea, and around seven listed companies per 
million population in Germany and France. Conversely, in developing 
countries, such as China, Brazil and Mexico, this figure is less than three.
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Figure 2-8: International comparison of the number of listed companies 
per million residents.
Source: World Bank (2016) .
Direct financing has developed, but its contribution to total 
social financing is relatively low
In the US and many other mature markets (as well as some emerging 
markets), direct financing (e.g. the issuance of shares or corporate 
bonds) is an important method of corporate financing. Before the GFC, 
China’s direct financing accounted for less than 15 per cent of social 
financing. However, in recent years, it has undergone rapid development 
(see Figure 2-9). In 2016, the proportion of direct financing increased to 
24 per cent, still relatively low. In terms of structure, the bond market 
made a significant contribution to social financing, but the contribution 
of the stock market has been particularly low. In 2016, in sharp contrast 
to China’s world-leading market capitalisation and turnover ratio, equity 
financing accounted for only 7 per cent of China’s social financing.
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Figure 2-9: Proportion of equity and direct financing in China’s 
social financing.
Source: World Bank (2017) and Financial Stability Analysis Group of the PBC (2017) .
The stock market is mainly composed of retail investors 
and the turnover ratio is comparably high
The Chinese stock market, which comprises of a large number of retail 
investors, lags significantly behind mature markets. In China’s stock 
market, an overwhelming majority of stock trading accounts are held by 
individual investors accounts. By the end of 2016, 99.72 per cent of stock 
trading accounts were held by ‘natural person’ investors, the majority of 
these being ‘retail investors’, while non-natural persons held 0.28 per cent 
of stock trading accounts (see Figure 2-10). Over 72 per cent of natural 
person investors hold less than CN¥100,000 of the market value, while 
retail investors hold more than 43 per cent of the free float market 
capitalisation of the A-share market (see Figure 2-11). Thus, retail investors 
have assumed a leading role in China’s stock market transactions, creating 
high turnover ratios.
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Figure 2-10: Account structure of Chinese investors in 2016 (%).
Source: Wind (2017) and China Securities Depository and Clearing Co . Ltd (2017) .
Figure 2-11: Investor structure of free float market capitalisation 
of A-share market (%).
Source: Haitong Securities (2017) .
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China’s stock market turnover ratio is much higher than that of other 
markets (see Figure 2-12). In 2016, China’s turnover ratios in the Shanghai 
Composite Index and GEM were more than 500 per cent and 900 per cent 
respectively. Given the special conditions of China’s stock market, this 
represents more than 1,000 per cent if the calculation is based on free 
float market capitalisation. The turnover ratio of the Shanghai Composite 
Index was more than twice that of the S&P 500 Index and FTSE 100 
Index, and 180 per cent higher than that of the NASDAQ Index. Further, 
the turnover ratio of the Nikkei 225 Index was only 200 per cent, and 
the turnover ratios of South Korea’s KRX100 Index and the Hong Kong 
Hang Seng Index were less than 100 per cent.
Figure 2-12: International comparison of stock market turnover ratios.
Source: Wind (2017) .
Stock market volatility is too high, while the rate of return 
is too low
The turnover ratio and volatility of China’s stock market are considerably 
higher than those in more mature markets, while the overall low rate 
of return indicates relatively low transaction efficiency.
A high turnover ratio indicates higher volatility. Similar to Brazil, China’s 
stock market volatility was as high as 27 times (see Figure 2-13). While the 
number for mature markets with high volatility, such as France, Germany 
and Japan, was only around 18 times. More mature markets, such as the 
US and UK, experienced half of the volatility of China’s market.
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Figure 2-13: International comparison of stock market volatility (%).
Source: World Bank (2016) .
Figure 2-14: International comparison of stock market returns (%).
Source: World Bank (2016) .
A market with high volatility and high risks encourages short-term 
speculation. In an effective financial market, risks can be properly priced 
and positively correlated with returns. The long-term volatility of China’s 
stock market is higher than that of other markets; however, the rates of 
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return in China’s market have been consistently lower than those of other 
markets over many years (see Figure 2-14). If the opportunities available 
in the two bull markets of 2006–2007 and 2015 had not been taken, 
the rate of return would not only have been lower than the international 
level, but would also have been lower than China’s inflation rate for the 
same period. This has made long-term investment in China’s stock market 
unattractive, but has made short-term speculation attractive.
The structure of government bond investors should 
be optimised
Despite the rapid development of China’s bond market, the major 
investors are commercial banks. Institutional investors represent key 
players in China’s bond market, including state-owned commercial 
banks, joint-stock commercial banks, urban commercial banks, insurance 
companies and AMCs. In the overall bond custody balance, commercial 
banks hold a considerably high proportion (30 per cent) of government 
bonds. At the end of 2016, China’s commercial banks held 67 per cent 
of total government bonds; of these, national commercial banks held up 
to 50 per cent (see Figure 2-15). Conversely, US commercial banks hold 
less than 4 per cent of US Treasury bonds and 15 per cent of municipal 
bonds. These percentages are far below those held by China’s commercial 
banks (see Figure 2-16).
Figure 2-15: Structure of China’s government bond holders in 2016.
Source: World Bank (2017) and ChinaBond (2017) .
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Figure 2-16: Structure of US Treasury bond holders in 2016.
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (2017) .
Figure 2-17: Comparison of China and the US government bond 
turnover ratios (times).
Source: Authors’ original based on Wind (2017) and ChinaBond (2017) .
An investor structure dominated by commercial banks has resulted in a low 
turnover ratio of government bonds. Commercial banks hold government 
bonds to meet risk management needs and regulatory requirements. Thus, 
they often hold bonds until maturity. Additionally, insurance companies 
generally hold long-term government bonds and AMCs hold government 
bonds as part of their portfolios. However, Chinese fund and insurance 
companies hold less than 10 per cent of total government bonds. All these 
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factors have led to a sustained low turnover ratio in the bond market, 
especially in relation to government bonds. To some extent, this has 
restricted the transmission effectiveness of the monetary policy on the 
financial market. In 2016, China’s turnover ratio for government bonds 
was 1.1, far below the US’s turnover ratio of 9.3 (see Figure 2-17).
The status quo of China’s capital market regulation
China’s capital market was established in the early stage of the economic 
system transition, when elements of a market economy were introduced 
while strong administration was maintained. The regulatory system 
has continued to develop and improve, but, overall, the regulatory 
mechanisms are not yet perfect and struggle to meet the demands of 
economic development and reform.
The fragmented regulatory system restricts the sustainable 
development of the credit bond market
Credit bond regulation in China is conducted by multiple agencies. 
The  National Development and Reform Commission approves the 
issuance of corporate bonds, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
approves the issuance of bonds by listed companies and the National 
Association of Financial Market Institutional Investors (under the PBC’s 
leadership) registers and approves medium-term notes and short-term 
financing bills. This fragmented system places significant constraints on the 
bond market. The market lacks a unified development plan. Additionally, 
the application scope and effectiveness in relation to the execution of laws 
and regulations are limited. For example, while the Securities Law applies 
to bond transactions on the exchanges, it does not apply to the interbank 
market. Conversely, the interbank market is limited by its self-disciplinary 
nature and lack of law enforcement authority. Thus, different standards 
are applied to illegal conduct in the two markets. Finally, the lack of 
unified regulatory standards and accountability mechanisms creates 
regulatory arbitrage opportunities in relation to the issuance of different 
types of bonds.
Two separate bond markets
In general, China’s bond market is divided into the interbank and 
exchange market. In recent years, several attempts have been made to build 
connections between the two markets, but limited interconnectivity has 
been achieved. The separation has had a negative effect on bond pricing. 
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Significant differences exist between the two markets in relation to fund 
supply and market liquidity. Notably, funding costs in the exchange 
market are higher than those in the interbank market. Consequently, the 
bond prices on the exchange market are significantly lower than those 
on the interbank market. Thus, different prices often exist for the same 
bond. Additionally, the separation has increased operation costs. Issuers 
and investors must follow the different regulatory standards of the 
individual markets, are subject to the regulations of multiple agencies and 
must manage procedures in two registration systems—all of these increase 
the transaction costs. Finally, fragmentation of the transaction, clearing, 
settlement and custody systems affects the efficient and smooth operation 
of the bond market.
The stock issuing system results in insufficient market-
based share pricing
China’s A-share market approval system for stock issuance has resulted 
in abnormal stock pricing behaviours. In the 2015 stock market turmoil, 
even after the entire market had declined, IPO was still subject to much 
speculation. From 26 June to 2 July 2015, 25 new shares were issued, all 
of which saw an increase of more than 40 per cent in their market prices 
in their first days of listing, and 20 enjoyed an increase of more than 
100 per cent in their first five days of listing. The approval system—with 
its strong administrative characteristics—limits the number of companies 
able to be listed and the supply of new shares on the market, prolongs 
the listing cycles and increases listing costs. These strict controls result 
in generally high stock prices and the high prices and yields of newly 
issued stocks.
The delisting mechanism has not been fully implemented
In recent years, delisting mechanisms have been continuously improved; 
however, in practice, the rules have not been implemented strictly. 
For example, some companies bypass the delisting requirements by 
manipulating their accounting methods. Consequently, the delisting 
mechanisms do not fulfil their intended functions. Further, poor-quality 
enterprises are able to remain in the market, the ‘survival of the fittest’ rule 
does not apply in relation to listed companies, and investors’ interests are 
not properly protected. In the absence of an effective delisting mechanism, 




Future development directions of China’s 
capital market
Under China’s ‘13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development’, 
development of the capital market includes increasing the proportion of 
direct financing, promoting equity financing through multiple channels, 
developing and standardising the bond market, building multilevel 
financial markets and introducing diversified financial products.
Increasing the proportion of direct financing, particularly 
equity financing
China used to rely very heavily on credit-led indirect financing. 
Consequently, economic growth generated incremental debts and 
caused risks to become excessively concentrated in the banking system. 
To address this issue, China must now vigorously develop capital markets 
(such as the stock market), broaden the channels of direct financing for 
enterprises and optimise social financing structures. Additionally, a path of 
market-oriented reform must be adopted, and unnecessary administrative 
interventions must be reduced to stimulate market power and vitality and 
cultivate commercial credit. Respect for market rules should be enhanced 
and the investor structure improved to increase stability. Market discipline 
and risk-sharing mechanisms must be strengthened to further improve 
the transparency of market operations.
Promoting equity financing through multiple channels
The construction of a multilevel capital market should be accelerated. 
Simultaneously, the financing functions of the main board, SME 
Board and GEM Board should be strengthened, reform of the NEEQ 
system deepened, the regional equity market development standardised 
and connections within the equity market promoted. Institutional 
arrangements in relation to market makers, targeted issuance, and 
mergers and acquisitions should be established and optimised. Financing 
instruments and transaction types should be enriched and their ability 
to serve various types of enterprises, including SMEs, improved. China 
should also actively guide the healthy development of private equity 
investment and venture capital funds and support the equity financing of 
innovative and growth-type enterprises.
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Developing and standardising the bond market
The development of various fields must first be coordinated. Growing the 
bond market size will not only increase the proportion of direct financing, 
but may also increase the leverage ratio. Thus, balance is needed between 
the development of direct financing and controlling leverage to promote 
the stable and healthy development of the bond market. Innovative 
instruments are also necessary. Credit bonds will play an important role in 
improving underdeveloped areas and optimising supply. SME integrated 
bonds, private equity bonds and other financing instruments should be 
developed to broaden corporate financing channels. The proportion of 
short-term credit bonds should be controlled to avoid moving funds out of 
the real economy for profit-making from pure financial activities. Finally, 
institutions should be improved. The custody and settlement infrastructure 
of the bond market should be properly integrated with specific functions 
and its responsibilities clearly defined. Further, authorities should drive 
the unified and coordinated development of the interbank and exchange 
markets in a steady manner.
Building multilevel financial markets and introducing 
diversified financial products
The levels of financial markets and the variety of products should be 
enriched and an innovation-driven strategy adopted. Innovative financial 
market mechanisms, organisation, products and service models should 
be promoted and financial market depth and breadth expanded. Effort 
is required to build a financial market system with a rich variety of 
products, one that operates efficiently, embodies complete functions, is of 
considerable scale and adapts to a socialist market economy. Simultaneously, 
risk prevention must be undertaken in the process of financial innovation. 
The relationship among innovation, development and risk control needs 
to be well managed; innovations that seek to circumvent regulations or 
fail to serve economic development should be avoided.
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Part 3: China’s insurance industry: 
Rapid development and improvement 
of international status
China’s insurance industry has one of the longest histories of opening 
up to the outside world and is one of the fastest growing industries in 
China’s financial sector. Since 1980—due to extensive reforms, opening 
up and rapid economic development—the insurance industry has become 
much larger and stronger and has achieved extraordinary progress. 
This vigorous development has played an important role in protecting 
residents’ properties and lives, enriching their investments, expanding 
their financing channels and optimising the allocation of their financial 
resources. The industry’s international status has also improved. China’s 
premium income is highly ranked globally, and its insurance depth and 
density continue to grow, as does the international influence of China’s 
insurance regulations.
China’s insurance industry: A leap from ‘quantitative 
change’ to ‘qualitative change’
Since the resumption of insurance businesses in 1980, China’s insurance 
industry has made great advances, along with rapid economic and social 
development. It has made a number of achievements.
First, the asset scale of the insurance industry has continued to expand, 
and insurance density and depth have improved significantly. At the 
end of 2016, the total assets of China’s insurance industry reached 
CN¥15.12  trillion, approximately 23 times that in 2002 (see Figure 
2-18). In 2016, premium income reached CN¥3,096 trillion, 10 times 
that in 2002. In terms of premium income, China has become the world’s 
third-largest insurance market. In 2015, the national insurance density 
was CN¥1,770 per person, 7.4 times that in 2002. In 1980, the national 
insurance density was only CN¥0.47 per person. In 2015, insurance 
depth increased by 3.59 per cent, an increase of 1.07 percentage points 
over that in 2002 (see Figure 2-19). In 1980, the insurance depth was 
0.1 per cent.
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Figure 2-18: Total assets of China’s insurance industry and growth trend 
(2000–2016).
Source: Financial Stability Analysis Group of the PBC (2016) .
Figure 2-19: China’s insurance density and depth (2000–2015).
Source: Compiled based on data from Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2015) .
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Second, market participants continue to diversify. By the end of 2016, 
China had a total of 203 life insurance companies. Notably, only one 
existed immediately following the resumption of insurance businesses 
in 1980. Of these 203, 12 were insurance groups, 79 were property 
insurance companies, 77 were life insurance companies, 22 were insurance 
AMCs, nine were reinsurance companies and four were other types. Over 
almost 40 years of development, China’s insurance industry has formed 
a market structure based on fair competition and joint development. The 
industry encompasses various types of organisations and multiple types 
of ownership, including state-owned enterprises, joint-stock companies, 
policy companies (e.g. China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation), 
professional companies (in health, pensions, agriculture and automobile 
insurance) and foreign-funded insurance companies.
Third, indemnity and payments by insurance companies have grown 
rapidly.  In 2016, total indemnity and payments by Chinese insurance 
companies totalled CN¥1,051.289 billion, 10.5 times that in 2004 
(see  Figure 2-20). Loan guarantee insurance has helped SMEs and 
individuals obtain CN¥101.56 billion of credit in 2015. Further, 
short-term export  credit insurance has provided nearly US$390 billion 
(US$416.7 billion in 2016) in risk protection to 63,000 export enterprises 
(82,200 in 2016). The insurance industry also continues to play out 
its advantage in long-term investments. In 2015, insurance companies 
(with registered assets totalling CN¥1.3 trillion) initiated 499 plans to 
support programs related to debt and equity financing and investment 
projects. These plans have provided vital funding support to key national 
projects, including the rebuilding of ‘shantytowns’ and urbanisation.
Figure 2-20: Total insurance claim payments in China and growth trends 
(2004–2016).
Source: Financial Stability Analysis Group of the PBC (2016) .
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Fourth, returns on investments and operational efficiency have improved 
significantly (see Table 2-15). In 2015, the allocation of insurance funds 
changed considerably. The ratios of bank deposits and bond investments 
decreased by 5.3 per cent and 3.8 per cent respectively, while the proportion 
of securities and other investments (mainly alternative investments) 
increased by 4.1 per cent and 5 per cent respectively. In 2015, the total 
yield on insurance fund utilisation reached CN¥780.4 billion, an increase 
of 45.6 per cent per year. The average yield was 7.56 per cent, the highest 
since the 2008 GFC. The increase of this yield was mainly driven by 
investments in stocks.
Fifth, the reform of the insurance industry led to comprehensive 
breakthroughs. In recent years, entry and exit mechanisms have continued 
to improve. Comprehensive, professional, regional and group insurance 
institutions have been developing side by side. Between 2011 and 2015, 
eight insurance institutions were listed in China or abroad. Innovative 
forms of insurance companies, such as self-insurance, interactive 
insurance and online insurance firms, have emerged. A modern, unified, 
open, coordinated and vibrant market system has emerged. The market is 
playing a more decisive role in resource allocation. Notably, comprehensive 
market-oriented reforms have been introduced in relation to life insurance 
premium pricing, the management of clauses and the premium pricing 
of commercial auto insurance. Insurance fund utilisation reforms have 
also been extended, as the allocation of insurance funds has become 
more diversified.
China’s insurance industry began from nothing, but the sector has 
continued to expand and a market system has now been established. 
More importantly, behind the quantitative growth, the function, status 
and nature of China’s insurance industry have undergone—and continue 
to undergo—profound changes.
International status of China’s insurance industry
When China began to implement its reform and opening up policy, 
only one insurance company existed, the People’s Insurance Company 
of China. The insurance industry was small, almost negligible, and had 
a very low degree of marketisation. After almost 40 years of vigorous 
development, the international status of China’s insurance industry has 
improved significantly. The income China derives from premiums is one 
of the largest in the world, and China’s insurance depth and density have 
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also significantly improved. An international comparison reveals that 
the US, Japan and the UK represent the mature insurance markets and 
have led the world in terms of premium income. China, India, Brazil and 
Russia are typical emerging insurance markets.
Improvement in the international status of China’s insurance industry 
is observable in the following areas.
First, China’s premium income has grown rapidly. In 1995, China’s 
premium income was only US$7.4 billion, a sum 12 per cent of that 
of the US’s premium income of US$624 billion. By 2015, the sum had 
increased to US$38.65 million, making China the third ranked in the 
world and one of the fastest growing economies in terms of premium 
income. In 2015, China’s premium income was 29.3 per cent that of the 
US. This represents an increase of 17 percentage points since 1995. China’s 
share in global premium income also rose to 8.49 per cent in 2015.
Second, insurance density has increased significantly. In 1995, China’s 
insurance density was only US$6.1 per capita while the US’s insurance 
density was US$2,343 per capita (see Table 2-17). By 2015, China’s 
insurance density had reached US$280.7 per capita, a figure 6.8 per cent 
of that of the US and 45 per cent of the world average.
Third, China’s insurance depth has improved greatly. In 1995, China’s 
insurance depth was only 1 per cent, the lowest among many countries 
(see Table 2-16). By 2015, it had increased to 3.57 per cent. This figure 
was still significantly lower than that of Japan, the UK, the US and other 
developed countries (see Table 2-17); however, it also represents a great 
improvement to China’s 1995 insurance depth.
Fourth, the regulatory system continues to improve. An insurance system 
with Chinese characteristics has been established. Regulation of corporate 
governance has adopted a new quantitative assessment approach, leading 
the trend of international regulation. A second-generation regulatory 
system of insurance companies’ claims-paying ability has been established 
and has had significant effects on the development of the global insurance 
market and regulatory rules. Multilateral and bilateral international 
cooperation has also advanced. Notably, China was elected as the presiding 
chair of the Asian Forum of Insurance Regulators. China also led the 
passing of the ‘Colombo Declaration’ and has gained a much stronger 
voice in informing international insurance regulations.
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Table 2-16: Comparison of GDP, premium income and insurance density 
and depth across selected countries (1995)












China (mainland) 7,345 74 6 .1 1 .00
US 76,641 6,240 2,343 .3 8 .14
Japan 54,491 6,373 5,080 .2 11 .69
Germany 25,916 1,551 1,898 .3 5 .98
France 16,099 1,316 2,210 .8 8 .18
The netherlands 4,465 353 2,281 .8 7 .90
South Korea 5,593 600 1,330 .3 10 .73
Mexico 3,438 37 39 .3 1 .08
India 3,666 60 6 .3 1 .64
note: China’s data excludes data of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan .
Source: Insurance density and depth calculated based on GDP and population data from 
the World Bank and premium income data from Swiss Reinsurance Company Sigma (1998) .
Table 2-17: Comparison of GDP, premium income and insurance density 
















Global 730,497 4,553,785 - 621 .2 6 .23
US 180,899 1,316,271 1 4,095 .8 7 .28
China 
(mainland)
108,114 386,500 3 280 .7 3 .57
Japan 41,561 449,707 2 3,553 .8 10 .82
Germany 33,543 213,263 6 2,562 .5 6 .24
UK 28,491 320,176 4 4,358 .5 9 .97
France 24,228 230,545 5 3,392 .0 9 .29
India 20,868 71,776 12 54 .7 3 .44
Italy 18,147 165,037 7 2,580 .5 8 .68
Brazil 17,723 69,091 14 332 .1 3 .90
Korea 13,452 153,620 8 3,034 .2 11 .42
Russia 12,364 16,801 31 117 .1 1 .41
note: China’s data excludes data of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan .
Source: Swiss Reinsurance Company Sigma (2016) .
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Problems with the development of China’s 
insurance industry
The development mode is still extensive and the insurance 
industry is large, but not strong
After nearly 40 years of development, China can be described as an 
insurance giant, but still not an insurance power. Mainland China’s 
premium income ranks third in the world (following the US and Japan). 
However, the measure of a country’s insurance industry development 
is not its scale, but its depth (premium income divided by GDP) and 
density (premium income divided by total population). In 2015, China 
ranked 40th and 63rd in terms of these two indicators respectively, both 
below the world average.
A large gap still exists between China’s insurance industry and those of 
developed countries. First, China’s insurance coverage remains limited. 
Many properties in China are not insured. For example, more than 70 per 
cent of Chinese property insurance covers automobiles. Office buildings 
and other valuable types of property are less likely to be insured. Similarly, 
liability insurance is also uncommon. On average, residents in developed 
countries have more than one life insurance policy per person. In China, 
life insurance coverage per capita is 0.2. Second, catastrophes are not 
adequately insured against. Chinese people rarely see the necessity of 
insurance. Consequently, in the event of earthquakes, floods and other 
catastrophes, they receive very small amounts of compensation. Third, 
a wide variety of insurance products exists, but these products are largely 
homogenous. Fourth, the pricing of insurance products is generally too 
high. However, in recent years, the CIRC has sought to drive the market-
oriented pricing of premiums and, consequently, prices have become 
more reasonable.
The foundation and environment of China’s insurance industry 
development have undergone profound changes. However, the industry 
has retained an extensive development mode. Overall, competition in the 
industry still focuses on business scale and market share. Most companies 
emphasise expanding scales and establishing more branches, but ignore 
internal management issues and product and service innovation. Some 
companies blindly pursue expansion and market share and do not 
consider the cost effectiveness or legality of their behaviours. This extensive 
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development mode cannot meet the demands of China’s increasingly 
young and well-educated consumer groups. It could even harm the 
interests of consumers and lose their trust.
The ‘13th Five-Year Plan for Insurance Industry Development of the 
People’s Republic of China’ issued in 2016 stated that effort needs to 
be made ‘to develop China from an insurance giant to an insurance 
power’. Specifically, the objectives were for China’s national insurance 
premium income to reach CN¥4.5 trillion with an insurance depth of 
5 per cent, an insurance density of CN¥3,500 per person and total assets 
of around CN¥25 trillion by 2020. These objectives were to be achieved 
by unremitting efforts, but they only represent short-term targets. Long-
term effort will be required if China is to become an insurance power.
The risk prevention function of insurance is still weak
Non-life insurance can only hedge against risks, but life insurance can also 
be an investment instrument. Normally, life insurance products should 
have a clear risk hedging feature. However, this feature has been weakened 
in some products that largely serve as investment instruments. The 
premium income of China’s life insurance companies was CN¥2,169.281 
billion in 2016. This represents an annual increase of 36.78 per cent. 
Clients’ investment funds and the incremental funds of their independent 
accounts that are not included in insurance contracts reached 
CN¥1,279.913 billion. This represents an annual increase of 53.86 per 
cent, much higher than the growth of the premium income of China’s life 
insurance companies. The data indicate that the investment functions of 
life insurance products were magnified, but the risk protection function 
was weakened. Some life insurance products were essentially investment 
instruments, but had very few risk protection functions.
Compared with other financial products, the advantages of life insurance 
products lie in their risk protection function and long-term features. This 
protection function is not offered by other financial products and the long-
term nature can smooth the effect of economic cycles for secure returns. 
When a life insurance product loses its insurance function and changes 
into a pure investment instrument (so that, in essence, it is no longer an 
insurance product), it is prone to liquidity risk and likely to cause turmoil 
in the market. Insurance is essentially a loss-sharing mechanism and must 
perform a risk prevention function.
101
2 . CHInA’S FInAnCIAL DEvELOPMEnT
In 2016, the CIRC issued the ‘Notice on the Issues Concerning the 
Standardization of Short- and Medium-Term Life Insurance Products’, 
‘Notice on Further Improving the Actuarial System of Life Insurance’ and 
‘Notice on Strengthening the Regulation of Life Insurance Products’. All 
of these sought to limit the scale of short- and medium-term insurance 
products, strengthen the protection function of insurance products and 
guide the industry to fulfil its risk protection responsibilities.
The interests of the insured are not sufficiently protected
There are two ways to maximise an insurance company’s profitability. The 
first is to increase the underwriting profit. To this end, it is necessary to 
expand underwriting, charge higher premiums and reduce the loss ratio. 
The second is to increase investment profits. To this end, it is necessary to 
expand the scale of assets and raise the return on investments. Induced by 
profits, insurance companies may expand underwriting, increase premium 
rates, delay indemnity or invest in high-risk projects. Such actions can be 
deceptive and misleading. Legally, insurance companies and insurance 
consumers enter contractual relations with equal status. However, in 
reality, insurance consumers are in a weaker position. Insurance companies 
decide in advance on the clauses and premium rates that insurance 
consumers must accept. Insurance companies possess expertise, while 
insurance consumers generally know very little about insurance. Insurance 
companies have solid foundations and professional legal teams, while 
consumers can generally only afford limited legal assistance once involved 
in disputes with insurance companies. The CIRC should follow the law 
and operate according to the principles of openness and impartiality 
when implementing regulations, supervising the insurance industry and 
maintaining market order. Insurance regulations are intended to protect 
the lawful rights and interests of the applicants, insured and beneficiaries.
Progress has been made in opening the market, but 
openness is still at a low level
The openness stipulated under the insurance industry’s market access 
policy  is relatively high among financial industries and allows the 
establishment of wholly foreign-owned insurance companies, foreign 
insurance company branches and joint-venture insurance companies. 
However, the actual degree of openness is low. There is only one foreign-
owned insurance company in China (AIA Group). Foreign investors are 
allowed to own a maximum of 50 per cent of joint-venture insurance 
companies. At the end of 2016, foreign insurance companies from 
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16 countries and regions had established 57 companies in China, 31 per 
cent of the total number of insurance companies in China. Of these, 22 
were property insurance companies (27 per cent of the total property 
insurance companies in China), 28 were life insurance companies 
(36 per cent of the total life insurance companies in China), six were 
reinsurance companies and one was an asset management company. 
Simultaneously, the number of province-level branches of joint-venture 
insurance companies reached 304. As of July 2017, the total assets of 
foreign insurance companies reached CN¥1,002.25 billion. This figure 
was only CN¥3 billion when China first entered the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001. The market share held by foreign insurance 
companies has increased in recent years, but remains low. The proportion 
of premium income of foreign insurance companies has increased from 
below 1 per cent when China entered the WTO in 2001, to 5.19 per cent 
by the end of 2016. The proportion of assets held by foreign insurance 
companies has increased from 4.4 per cent in 2006 to 6.1 per cent in July 
2017 (see Figure 2-21).
Figure 2-21: Share of insurance assets held by foreign insurance 
companies in China (%).
Source: Wind (2017) and CIRC (2017) .
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Regulation of China’s insurance industry
Currently, laws relating to the insurance industry are inadequate, and 
companies have weak internal controls. Further, both information 
and  infrastructure are lacking. In light of these problems, China has 
adopted a regulatory approach that emphasises the regulation of both 
market behaviours and the claims-paying ability of insurance companies.
Regulation of insurance institutions
To regulate insurance institutions, reviews of applicant companies’ 
qualifications are undertaken and the market behaviours of insurance 
companies are monitored. Currently, China is enforcing a strict approval 
system to manage market access. Requirements for capital adequacy and 
management qualifications are strictly adhered to when issuing licences. 
However, as current mechanisms rely on off-site supervision, it is difficult 
to ensure the integrity of insurance institutions. Consequently, the 
ongoing supervision of market behaviours is weak.
Regulation of insurance policies and premium rates
Under a strict regulatory model, all policy terms must be examined and 
approved. Currently, the internal control systems of insurance companies 
are imperfect and the ability of insurance companies to design policies is 
limited, as is the public’s knowledge of insurance products. If regulations 
were relaxed, insurance companies could compete on premium rates, 
distort premium pricing and introduce risks to the market. Thus, it is 
necessary to implement an approval system in relation to insurance policy 
terms and premium rates. Specifically, the CIRC should formulate the 
basic clauses and premium rates for major types of insurance, while non-
basic clauses and the premium rates for non-major types of insurance 
should be set by insurance companies and registered with the CIRC.
Regulation of insurance companies’ claim-paying ability
Claim-paying ability refers to the ability of an insurer to fulfil its 
contractual agreement with an insured person or body and provide 
economic compensation. It is the key ability of an insurance company. 
Thus, it has also been subject to regulation in China. As part of 
a  developing trend in international regulations, an increasing number 
of countries have adopted (or are close to adopting) a regulatory model 
centred on insurance companies’ claim-paying ability. Currently, China 
uses a minimum claim-paying ability rule. Whether the CIRC intervenes 
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is determined by the variance between the actual claim-paying ability of 
the insurance company and the established standard. Compliance with 
this regulation is considered in relation to a number of major financial 
indicators (e.g.  capital adequacy, contribution of a security deposit, 
contribution to an insurance security fund, contingency reserves and the 
use of funds). All these indicators affect an insurance company’s claim-
paying ability, which is not a static factor, but one in constant flux.
Regulation of the use of insurance funds
In response to financial innovation and increases in market competition, 
the  insurance industry now undertakes both underwriting and  the 
investment of insurance funds in their operations. Previously, 
the  insurance industry relied on underwriting alone. However, the 
investment of insurance funds has become an important pillar of insurance 
companies’ business. Insurance fund investments are regulated in relation 
to their source and use. Further, quotas are imposed on the amounts that 
can be invested to ensure the stability and security of investment income, 
strengthen insurance companies’ claim-paying abilities and protect the 
interests of the insured.
The active use of insurance funds in China began from nothing. Currently, 
regulations in this area are still lacking and investment returns are low. It is 
difficult for insurance companies to cover losses from their underwriting 
businesses with their investment incomes. The regulations largely seek to 
limit the areas in which funds can be invested and the proportion of funds 
that can be invested (see Table 2-18).
Table 2-18: Restrictions on the investment of insurance funds in stocks 









US n/A n/A 20 20 25 10
UK n/A n/A n/A n/A n/A n/A
Japan n/A n/A 30 n/A 20 30
China n/A 30 10 0 5 15
Source: Financial Stability Analysis Group of the PBC (2016) .
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Future development directions of China’s 
insurance industry
According to the ‘13th Five-Year Plan for Insurance Industry Development 
of the People’s Republic of China’, in the next few years, the basic principles 
of reform and development will be to liberalise thinking, introduce more 
initiatives, focus work on key areas, improve reform effectiveness, give 
full play to institutional advantages, promote structural adjustments and 
transform the industry’s development mode. To achieve these, China 
should affect the following:
1. Perfect the modern insurance market system. Reform of the market 
access mechanism must be pursued. An upgrade of the market 
participant structure, business structure and regional layout should 
also be promoted. Additionally, the insurance market system should 
be able to support the real economy and be compatible with financial 
innovations.
2. Further insurance company reforms. Development of a modern 
insurance enterprise system should be accelerated. Investments in 
insurance companies by qualified state-owned capital, private capital 
and foreign capital should be supported, and the diversification of 
capital and equity should be encouraged. Additionally, the mixed 
ownership reform of insurance companies should be promoted.
3. Accelerate development of the reinsurance market. Steps should 
be taken to improve the reinsurance market system, moderately 
increase market participants, develop regional centres for reinsurance 
businesses and increase China’s voice and pricing power in the global 
reinsurance market.
4. Steadily advance development of the intermediary agencies. 
A multilevel, multicomponent and multiform insurance intermediary 
service system should be established. Intermediary agencies with 
unique professional strengths—agencies that are internationally 
competitive—should be fostered. Small and micro, community, brick-
and-mortar insurance agencies should also be established. Diversified 
insurance sales and the development of an independent individual 
agent system should also be encouraged.
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5. Comprehensively drive the market-oriented pricing of insurance 
premiums. A comprehensive reform of the clause and premium rate 
management system for commercial vehicle insurance should be 
promoted. This should establish a pricing mechanism with a pure 
industry risk premium as its basis, and in which additional premium 
rates and adjustment factors are decided by companies.
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Further Expanding the Opening 
Up of China’s Financial Industry
Zhu Jun,1 Guo Kai,2 Ai Ming,3 Zhao Yue4 and Bai Xuefei5
Introduction
A Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) proposed that the 
government should ‘perfect the financial market system and expand the 
opening up of the financial industry both domestically and internationally’. 
The ‘13th Five-Year Plan’ further clarifies the goal of ‘promoting two-way 
opening of the financial industry’. The financial industry is essentially 
a competitive industry, and only full competition can improve its efficiency 
and vitality. International practice shows that expanding the opening 
of the financial industry can enhance the competitiveness of financial 
institutions and fundamentally prevent and defuse financial risks. Since 
joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China has made 
great progress in opening its financial industry. Openness of financial 
institutions has kept increasing, a multilevel and diversified financial 
market is taking shape, the degree of two-way openness is constantly 
expanding, and the institutional environment has improved. However, 
the openness of China’s financial industry is still insufficient. The overall 
1  Director-General of the International Department, People’s Bank of China (PBC).
2  Deputy Director-General of the International Department, PBC.
3  Staff researcher at the International Department, PBC.
4  Staff researcher at the International Department, PBC.
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market share of foreign financial institutions in China is low, much lower 
than in major developed economies and most developing countries. 
There are still many discriminatory provisions in regard to the ownership 
ratio and business scope of foreign financial institutions. Additionally, 
the breadth and depth of China’s financial market is insufficient and the 
accounting, audit and taxation systems are underdeveloped, leaving much 
room for improvement.
China’s experience shows that opening up has promoted trade and 
investment liberalisation, exchange rate liberalisation, relaxation of 
foreign exchange control and allowed the market to play a more active 
role. Over the years, the troika reforms—opening of the financial industry, 
exchange rate liberalisation and relaxation of capital control—have made 
coordinated progress, creating a favourable financial environment for 
China’s economic growth (Zhou, 2017). A problem with any of these 
three will affect the entire opening process. Therefore, although the pace 
of the three reforms may be uneven, they have been moving forward in 
the same direction. Other chapters discuss the exchange rate and capital 
flows; this chapter focuses on the opening of the financial industry.
Part 1: Theoretical basis and practical 
significance of further opening of the 
financial industry
The opening of the financial industry needs to address two important 
issues: whether a country should open its financial industry, and 
how to open it. To answer the first question, we need to have a clear 
understanding of the nature and position of the financial industry. If the 
financial industry is a competitive industry, it does not need monopolies 
and should not impose too many restrictions on investors. The authorities 
should fully promote market competition and enhance the efficiency and 
vitality of the financial system through further opening.
The nature and position of financial services industry
In theory, the financial service industry is essentially competitive; therefore, 
its vitality and competitiveness must be enhanced through competition. 
George Stigler, the Economics Nobel laureate, proposed three elements 
that a competitive industry should possess (Stigler, 1983). First, there 
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should be a high number of enterprises within the industry, and the 
products of the enterprises should be similar and substitutable to a certain 
extent. Second, collusion among enterprises should be difficult. Third, 
for new enterprises wishing to enter the industry, the long-term average 
cost should not be significantly higher than for existing enterprises in 
the industry.
The financial industry conforms to the above characteristics of 
a  competitive industry. First, there are many financial institutions and 
the financial services are very similar. For example, China’s banking 
industry had 4,399 corporate financial institutions at the end of 2016 
(China Banking Regulatory Commission [CBRC], 2017). Their main 
financial services included clearing business, credit business, financial 
transaction, and investment banking—homogenisation is quite apparent. 
Second, it is difficult for different financial institutions to influence the 
prices of financial services through collusion. Due to the large number of 
financial institutions and high similarity of financial products, consumers 
have greater freedom in choosing financial services and it is difficult for 
financial institutions to monopolise pricing. Additionally, along with the 
deepening of financial innovation, the barriers among banking, securities 
and the insurance industry are gradually being removed. Different 
businesses overlap and penetrate each other. The competition in financial 
institutions no longer originates in that industry, which further increases 
the difficulty of collusion. Third, natural monopoly industries such as 
water, power and gas often require a significant initial investment in 
pipelines and other infrastructure, so the sunk costs are relatively high. 
Many enterprises providing similar services will lead to the duplication 
and waste of inputs and are not conducive to efficiency improvements in 
the industry. However, as a service industry, the competitiveness of the 
financial industry is mainly embodied in the customer relationship, core 
technology and financial innovation. It is more dependent on limitless 
investments, rather than a one-off large investment. Therefore, the average 
operating costs of new financial institutions are not significantly higher 
than those for current financial institutions. Further, the innovation 
of products and services provided by a single financial institution also 
contributes to the development of the entire financial industry, along with 
improvements in financial efficiency, reducing duplication and waste. 
Thus, the financial service industry is essentially competitive, and only 
competition can enhance efficiency and stimulate vitality.
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From the practice of China’s reform and opening, the introduction of 
competition has effectively improved operational efficiency in the banking 
industry. This further confirms the financial services industry’s competitive 
nature. During the 40 years of reform and opening, domestic banks have 
achieved great improvements in operating efficiency, asset quality and 
corporate governance through introducing external strategic investors, 
competitive share reform, initial public offerings and other measures. 
Simultaneously, more and more financial institutions have begun to 
‘go global’. They have participated in international competition globally; 
made substantial improvements in all aspects including risk management, 
product pricing and anti-money laundering; and have promoted the stable 
operation of enterprises and the healthy development of the financial 
market. Conversely, a lack of competition can lead to inefficient practices, 
resulting in high leverage, low capital, non-performing loans and other 
phenomena, making the system prone to financial crises. The main reason 
for the Asian financial crisis was the low efficiency and risk accumulation 
caused by the lack of competition among financial institutions over 
a long period.
Compared to competitive industries, the financial services industry also 
has its own characteristics. First, the asset liability structure of financial 
institutions is unique, such as the liquidity risk brought about by high 
leverage and maturity mismatches that are naturally formed. This 
makes financial institutions vulnerable to competition, which shows a 
certain level of fragility. Second, the day-to-day operations of financial 
institutions are susceptible to market sentiment, and public confidence is 
critical to the soundness of the financial system. Third, financial crises are 
highly contagious; the problems of a single financial institution may lead 
to a chain reaction in many financial institutions, and even endanger the 
stability of the whole financial system. Therefore, the security and stability 
of the financial industry is essential to the healthy and smooth operation 
of the economy. A fully competitive financial services industry is premised 
upon an effective allocation of resources, the basis for effective transmission 
of monetary policy and a guarantee for the rapid development of financial 
innovation. Only by building a more competitive financial service system 
can we effectively maintain financial stability and enable a comprehensive 
supporting role of finance in the real economy.
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Comparison of international and Chinese 
experiences of opening
Opening to the outside world can promote competition. By introducing 
advanced management models, technologies and rules, the competitiveness 
and soundness of the financial system will be improved, and financial risks 
will be reduced. The entry of foreign financial institutions has compelled 
domestic financial institutions to achieve greater improvement in product 
design, market development, business models, management experience 
and other aspects. Additionally, it creates the need to reform accounting 
rules and regulatory standards (Zhou, 2017). Market competition can 
force financial institutions to focus more on key areas such as the capital 
adequacy ratio, leverage ratio and liquidity risks, and encourage them to 
guard against risks through self-discipline. Additionally, full competition 
can reduce the moral hazard associate with ‘too big to fail’ and better 
safeguard the bottom line of no systemic financial risks. International 
experiences also show that financial opening is not the cause of financial 
risk. On the contrary, opening can reduce and defuse financial risks.
First, expanding opening can introduce advanced management concepts, 
techniques and rules to promote market competition, improve market 
efficiency and maintain financial stability (Claessens, 2009; Yeyati & 
Micco, 2007). An efficient financial system is the fundamental guarantee 
of financial stability. Taking Turkey as an example, the entry of foreign 
banks had a positive spill-over effect on its financial system. During 
the 1980s and 1990s, foreign banks took the lead in using modern 
budgeting methods in Turkey. An electronic banking office system was 
introduced and use of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunications network was pioneered. These advanced systems and 
technologies were subsequently adopted by many Turkish banks. Financial 
sector efficiency was improved, along with management standards and 
budget transparency.
Second, expanding opening is beneficial for risk diversification. Previous 
financial crises show that concentrated financial risks can have a significant 
impact, while dispersed risks can be defused more easily. More opening is 
an important method to spread risk. Opening will bring in more market 
players and increase competition, meaning risks will be less concentrated 
and borne by more market participants (Dages, Goldberg & Kinney, 
2000). For example, from 1994–1999, Latin American economies were 
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highly dependent on foreign debts, cross-border capital flows fluctuated 
dramatically, the governments ran long-term deficits and local currencies 
were seriously overvalued. As a result, serious crises broke out successively 
in some countries. However, foreign banks were not the trigger of these 
crises. Instead, they played the role of ‘economic stabiliser’. Both before 
and after the crisis, the non-performing loan ratios of foreign banks in 
Argentina, Brazil and other Latin American countries were generally 
lower than those of domestic banks, and the pro-cyclicality and volatility 
of their lending were also smaller than domestic banks.
Third, a closed financial industry will lead to risk accumulation and 
threaten financial stability. For example, Mexico forbade foreign banks 
from entering the domestic market before the late 1980s. During the 
1990s, the pace of opening remained slow in Mexico. In 1994, foreign 
bank loans in Mexico accounted for only 1 per cent of Mexico’s total 
bank loans. Due to lack of competition, the efficiency of domestic banks 
was very low, risk control was inadequate, moral hazard was serious and 
potential non-performing loans surged. Faced with rising interest rates 
globally, the Mexican Government was forced to raise interest rates in 
1994. As a result, the interest rate burden of enterprises was increased, 
loan defaults started to rise, financial risk was highlighted, investor panic 
grew and the Mexican peso was sold off. The Mexican Government 
issued large amounts of debt in dollars to maintain the exchange rate. 
Eventually, the government was overwhelmed by the debt burdens, the 
peso depreciated sharply, the default rates of bank loans rose dramatically 
and Mexico was plunged into a full-blown financial crisis. After the crisis, 
the Mexican Government drew on the lessons learned and gradually 
allowed foreign financial institutions to enter the domestic market to 
encourage competition, strengthen market discipline and reduce the risk 
of financial instability.
Since China joined the WTO, all those areas that have thoroughly opened 
and actively participated in the global allocation of resources—China’s 
finance, commerce, agriculture, automobile and other industries—have 
achieved better development, strong competitiveness and high degrees 
of internationalisation. China has become the world’s second-largest 
economy and the largest exporter. Opening has ushered in extensive reform 
in China, helped industries to meet international standards, promoted 
innovation of mechanisms and systems, and expanded the competitiveness 
and influence of many sectors. Some competitive industries, such as the 
home appliance industry, developed rapidly after opening. With goods 
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such as colour televisions, refrigerators, washing machines and other 
large appliances, domestic brands occupy the leading position in China’s 
market and operate as spokespeople for ‘Made in China’ internationally.
Conversely, industries that lag in opening are developing at a slower 
pace. More protection and restriction policies can only protect the weak 
and preserve monopolies. China started its WTO negotiations during 
the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, and there were various views 
on financial opening and financial risks. Compared to other industries, 
the liberalisation of the financial industry was relatively slow. With the 
accomplishment of banking reforms and the continuous development 
of the financial market, the time was right for the financial industry 
to open. However, the opening process still lagged significantly due to 
outdated thinking and institutional inertia. After a series of reform, state-
owned banks in China have improved in indicators, such as the non-
performing loan ratio and capital adequacy ratios, and the four major 
state-owned banks now rank among the global systemically important 
banks (see Table  3-1). However, Chinese financial institutions still lag 
behind in many areas such as fund management and derivatives. The 
level of financial opening is becoming increasingly incompatible with 
the development of the real economy and the overall openness. This not 
only affects the financial industry’s competitiveness, but also restricts the 
internationalisation of the RMB and the ‘going global’ strategy. Therefore, 
China needs to further open up the financial services industry, introduce 
more competition and provide a strong incentive for reform.
Table 3-1: Global systemically important banks (2016)
Grade (Capital requirement) Bank
5 (3 .5%) –
4 (2 .5%) Citi Group, JP Morgan Chase
3 (2 .0%) Bank of America, BnP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, HSB
2 (1 .5%) Barclays, Credit Suisse, GoldmanSachs, Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China, Mitsubishi UFJ FG, 
Wells Fargo
1 (1 .0%) Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, Bank of new 
York Mellon, China Construction Bank, Groupe BPCE, 
Credit Agricole, InG Bank, Mizuho FG, Morgan Stanley, 
nordea, Royal Bank of Scotland, Banco Santander 
of Spain, Société Générale, Santander, State Street, 
Sumitomo Mitsui FG, UBS, Unicredit Group
Note: Classification is determined by the criteria set by the Basel committee.
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2016) .
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Further opening the financial industry meets China’s 
own need for development
Currently, international and domestic situations have set higher demand 
for the opening of China’s financial industry. Internationally, globalisation 
faces great challenges due to unbalanced technological development, low 
productivity growth and increased income inequality. Following Donald 
Trump’s election as president of the United States (US), nationalism, 
populism and trade protectionism have increased, and an undercurrent 
of anti-globalisation has surged. The US and other developed economies 
have taken measures to enhance their competitiveness, such as bringing 
manufacturing industries home, offering tax cuts and deregulating the 
financial industry. These policies may set an example for other countries 
and impact the free trade system and the multilateral rules that have 
been formed globally over the years. As a result, the global governance 
system may reach a ‘crossroad’. China is a rising power and a beneficiary 
of globalisation and the current multilateral mechanism. It needs an open 
and fair environment that protects international trade and investment. 
If protectionism continues to grow and global trade and investment 
fade, China’s interests will suffer. Therefore, China should send a clear 
message that it will further open to the outside world; play a leading 
role in globalisation together with other major countries; ensure free 
movement of trade, resources, capital, technology and human resources 
across borders; and better safeguard its interests.
Domestically, China’s economic development has entered a ‘new normal’. 
Economic transformation and upgrading have entered a crucial period, 
and the foundation of financial development is undergoing profound 
changes. Additionally, the financial industry also has the arduous task 
of supporting the supply-side structural reform, and potential financial 
risks cannot be ignored. Therefore, China must further open the financial 
sector to promote reform, improve the investment environment and 
market condition, and enhance the soundness of the financial system. 
Simultaneously, China’s comparative advantage is changing and 
enterprises have accelerated their pace of ‘going global’. This places higher 
requirements on the depth and breadth of the financial system. However, 
the pace of China’s financial institutions entering the global markets is 
lagging significantly and can barely meet the financial needs of enterprises 
that are ‘going global’ (Ministry of Commerce, 2015). Therefore, further 
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opening of the financial sector is required, along with the acceleration of 
the ‘going global’ of financial institutions and financial services. A global 
network must be formed to support the real economy more effectively.
Simultaneously, the low level of openness of China’s financial sector 
has brought criticism from the outside. Some foreign businesses believe 
that the improvement in China’s business environment in recent years is 
limited and, thus, hope China will further push forward reform, opening 
and marketisation (American Chamber of Commerce in the People’s 
Republic of China, 2017). For example, they hope that the government 
further loosens restrictions on market access and business scope for 
banking, securities, insurance and fund management. It is also hoped that 
the government increases the transparency, consistency and predictability 
of foreign exchange policy; treats foreign enterprises fairly; further reduces 
licensing barriers; strengthens the protection of intellectual property 
rights; and relaxes or cancels data flow restrictions. The top priority for 
Chinese authorities is to improve the domestic investment and market 
environment. One important measure is to further expand the opening 
of the financial sector.
Opening the financial industry: Pros and cons
First, opening the financial industry can help build a diversified financial 
system. Theoretically, the entry of foreign financial institutions into 
the Chinese market promotes competition, expands financial services 
channels and enhances financial stability (Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria & 
Sanchez, 2001; Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2001). Foreign 
banks, securities and insurance firms have brought new business models 
to China, which has enriched the Chinese financial system and improved 
its operational efficiency. China’s first township bank was established by 
a Hong Kong financial institution (Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation), and unsecured credit loans were launched by Standard 
Chartered Bank in 2006. Foreign banks also had an earlier interest in 
green finance, financial technologies, risk pricing and other business. 
Their technology and concepts have provided valuable reference to 
Chinese financial institutions. AIA Group entered China in 1990 and 
brought in the sales agent model. The model was gradually adopted across 
the country and became an important sales channel for life insurance 
companies in China. The development of China’s securities market also 
draws on the Western trading system. The trading rules of the London 
Stock Exchange and Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing have become 
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important references for the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The entry of 
more foreign financial institutions could produce economies of scale and 
attract new businesses and technologies, which helps build China into an 
international financial centre.
Second, opening the financial industry can better serve the real economy 
and push forward supply-side structural reforms. The financial sector 
and the real economy are closely linked and mutually reinforcing. 
Transformation and upgrading of China’s economic structure needs 
to further boost domestic demand and encourage the development of 
small and medium-sized enterprises and high-tech enterprises. However, 
Chinese financial institutions have made relatively slow progress areas 
such as consumer credit, small and micro loans, and venture capital 
investment. As a result, there is only a limited number of financial 
products that truly serve the real economy, and speculation and arbitrage 
is prevalent. In contrast, foreign financial institutions have rich experience 
and advantages in corporate governance, credit management and risk 
pricing. They can serve as good examples for Chinese institutions and 
help optimise the economic structure.
Third, opening the financial industry can accelerate the opening of the 
service sector. Currently, the level of openness of China’s service industry is 
below that of the manufacturing industry and significantly lower than the 
average level of other countries. The level of openness is not in proportion 
to the contribution of the service industry to economic growth. This has 
also been criticised by other countries. Presently, countries are working 
on more comprehensive and higher standards for opening the service 
industry. China needs to seize the opportunity and be more proactive. 
The negative impact of opening the financial sector is relatively small and 
controllable, and the sector is a critical area in which there are plenty of 
opportunities for China.
Additionally, opening the financial industry can consolidate the reserve 
currency status of the RMB and promote internationalisation of the 
RMB. Owning an international reserve currency is important to the 
long-term development of an economy. After becoming an international 
reserve currency, the RMB will enjoy institutional rights, and international 
recognition and attractiveness of bilateral currency swap agreements signed 
by the People’s Bank of China and other central banks and monetary 
authorities will substantially increase. The RMB becoming an international 
reserve currency can greatly enhance confidence in the currency at home and 
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abroad, reduce the possibility of economic and financial turmoil, and lessen 
the spill-over effects of other countries’ policies. Simultaneously, the issuer of 
a reserve currency can have more independent monetary policies and more 
tools to deal with financial crises, and use the currency more frequently for 
international transactions and investment. This will enhance the pricing 
power and voice of the country in trade and investment. To consolidate 
the RMB’s status as a reserve currency and promote its internationalisation, 
China must make the RMB more ‘freely usable’, expand the opening of the 
financial industry, and provide a friendly and convenient environment for 
investors to conduct RMB business both in China and overseas to enhance 
China’s global attractiveness.
There are concerns that opening will bring risks. For example, opening 
the financial sector is likely to accelerate cross-border capital flows 
and bring risks to the country’s macroeconomic and financial stability. 
Additionally, foreign financial institutions have complex products, have 
a high frequency of transactions and engage extensively in derivatives 
transactions. Problems in these areas may cause cross-institutional and 
cross-market risks through liquidity, products and asset price channels. 
However, with the continuous progress of reform and opening, the 
flexibility of RMB exchange rate has been enhanced, the convertibility 
of capital accounts has also made great progress, and the conditions for 
opening the financial industry are becoming ripe. The aforementioned 
risks are largely controllable for several reasons.
First, China has made great progress in strengthening financial regulation 
and preventing risks. In recent years, China has constantly improved the 
assessment, prevention and early warning of systematic financial risks 
as well as risk disposal mechanisms. The financial regulation system has 
been continuously perfected, the effectiveness of regulation has been 
enhanced, the framework of macroprudential regulation has been well set 
up, financial infrastructure has been steadily developed, and authorities’ 
ability to guard against financial risks has significantly increased. These 
measures can effectively safeguard financial security.
Second, in recent years, Chinese financial institutions have rapidly 
increased their assets and network of branches, and acquired a high 
market share and a large client base. Foreign financial institutions have 
no obvious advantages in business scale, networks and client relations. 




Third, China has some unique advantages that enable it to resist external 
shocks. China is already the world’s second-largest economy, the world’s 
largest exporter and has the largest foreign exchange reserve in the world. 
The size of its financial market is also significant. The balance of China’s 
bond market ranks third in the world and second in Asia (see Figure 3-1). 
Additionally, China has the second-mover advantage. Many developed 
countries and emerging markets economies have rich experiences with 
financial opening that China can use as reference.
Figure 3-1: International comparison of bond market size 
(as of September 2016).
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2016) .
There are also concerns that further opening of the financial sector might 
put China’s financial security at risk. However, financial security should 
be secured by sound systems and institutions, rather than discriminatory 
market access policies. China should safeguard financial security through 
sound operation and risk management in financial institutions, effective 
policy tools including a prudential regulation framework, and increasingly 
effective and transparent financial markets. Only with sound institutions 
can China maintain public confidence in the financial system and 
safeguard the bottom line of no systemic financial risks.
Additionally, China can use the national security review mechanism 
to fend off threats to security, stability and integrity of the financial 
system. Developed countries have highly open markets where national 
security review is applied only to a small number of foreign investment 
applications. China needs to properly balance opening up and national 
security and use the review rationally. Investigations should be carried out 
with caution to avoid criticism that China implements protectionism in 
the name of national security.
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Part 2: Progress in opening China’s 
financial sector
In recent years, China has made great progress in opening its financial 
sector. The openness of financial institutions and financial markets has 
improved, the pace of financial institutions ‘going global’ has accelerated, 
RMB internationalisation has made remarkable achievements, and 
China’s participation in global economic and financial governance has 
achieved positive results.
Financial institutions and financial markets
The openness of China’s financial institutions has improved. Since 
joining the WTO, the opening of China’s financial services industry 
has constantly deepened. The country launched a series of policies and 
measures in the banking, securities and insurance industries, and has 
eased restrictions on the establishment, location and business scope of 
foreign financial institutions based on a gradual approach. At the end 
of 2016, there were 39 foreign banks (including financial companies) 
and 121 branches of foreign banks in China. The assets of foreign banks 
accounted for 1.3 per cent of the total assets of banking institutions in 
China (CBRC, 2017). As of March 2017, there were 13 joint-venture 
securities companies in China, making up 10 per cent of the total 
securities companies and assets accounting for 4.5 per cent of total assets. 
At the end of 2016, there were 56 foreign property insurance companies 
(including wholly-owned and joint ventures) and joint-venture personal 
insurance companies, accounting for 30.4 per cent of the total property 
and personal insurance companies in China (see Figure 3-2).
In terms of the opening of the financial market, foreign investors in the 
bond and interbank bond markets continue to increase. As of February 
2017, there were 432 foreign investors in the interbank bond market, 
including foreign central banks and monetary authorities, sovereign 
wealth funds, international financial organisations, offshore clearing banks 
and participating banks, foreign insurance institutions, Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors (QFIIs) and RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors (RQFIIs). This represents a total investment of nearly CN¥800 
billion (Zhu, 2017). The varieties of interbank bond investment have been 
enriched constantly, and the level of development and professionalism 
of the bond market has been improved. The scope of issuers of Panda 
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bonds has also expanded to include non-financial foreign enterprises, 
foreign commercial banks, international development institutions and 
foreign governments. As of the end of 2016, a total of CN¥63.1 billion 
of Panda bonds were issued (Zhu, 2017). Additionally, the mainland 
and Hong Kong bond markets have achieved interconnection via the 
‘Bond Connect’. In the stock market, the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock 
Connect and Shenzhen–Hong Kong Stock Connect have been launched 
successively, greatly improving the two-way opening of capital accounts. 
China’s A-share market was officially included in the MSCI index, which 
further enhanced the degree of internationalisation.
Figure 3-2: The change in proportion of assets of foreign financial 
institutions in banking, securities and insurance industries in recent years.
Sources: CBRC (2017), China Securities Regulatory Commission (2017) and China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission (2017) .
RMB internationalisation
In recent years, the internationalisation of the RMB has made remarkable 
progress. In early 1992, China approved small amounts of RMB settlement 
to meet the demand of trade activities in 13 cities along the borders such 
as Heihe. After 2002, Vietnam and other neighbouring countries allowed 
their local currencies and the RMB (or only the RMB) to be used for 
border trade settlement, which promoted cross-border use of the currency. 
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In 2004, Hong Kong and Macao launched cross-border RMB business. 
The business grew rapidly, but the scale remained small. After the 2008 
global financial crisis, major international settlement currencies such as 
the US dollar fluctuated sharply, and the demand for the RMB in cross-
border trade settlement by Chinese and foreign enterprises rapidly rose. 
Given this need, the People’s Bank of China conducted pilot programs on 
cross-border trade settlement in RMB in 2009. In recent years, bilateral 
currency swap, direct currency trading, RQFII, RMB clearing banks, the 
RMB cross-border interbank payment system and other institutional 
arrangements have effectively reduced the exchange rate risk and promoted 
trade and investment facilitation.
In 2015, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conducted the special 
drawing right (SDR) review. The People’s Bank of China, along with 
relevant departments, introduced a number of important measures in 
relation to opening the bond and foreign exchange markets, improving 
data transparency and strengthening policy communication. With these 
efforts, the RMB finally reached the standard of the SDR basket currency. 
On 30 November 2015, the Executive Board of the IMF decided to include 
the RMB in the SDR basket, and the IMF affirmed that the RMB was 
a ‘freely usable currency’. The new basket became effective on 1 October 
2016. The inclusion of the RMB in the SDR basket greatly increased the 
attractiveness of the RMB. In September and October 2016, the RMB 
assets held by the People’s Bank of China exceeded US$10 billion. The 
RMB assets held by international financial organisations and multilateral 
development institutions and in foreign exchange reserves of various 
countries also increased. On 31 March 2017, the IMF released its official 
statistics on the currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves 
(COFER) in which the RMB was listed separately for the first time. As of 
the end of 2016, RMB reserves held by COFER-reporting countries were 
US$84.51 billion (about CN¥582.2 billion), accounting for 1.1 per cent 
of the total foreign exchange reserves of those countries and further 
confirming the status of the RMB as a reserve currency (see Figure 3-3).
The aforementioned reform measures also greatly promoted the 
convertibility of China’s capital account. According to the classification 
of capital account transactions (a total of seven categories and 40 items) 
by the  IMF (2016a), 37 items have achieved convertibility, basic 
convertibility  and partial convertibility in China, accounting for 
92.5 per cent of all transaction items.
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Figure 3-3: Proportion of currencies in foreign exchange reserve assets 
held by COFER-reporting countries.
Source: IMF (2016a) .
Specifically, direct investment has achieved full convertibility, and 
investment facilitation has been steadily improved. China has adopted 
registration management for outward direct investment, and eliminated 
examination of the source of funds of foreign direct investment and 
approvals for remittance. For the overseas direct investments of banks, 
China also changed the regulation from administrative approval to 
filing. In terms of foreign direct investment, China has simplified the 
regulation process and placed more emphasis on regulation during and 
after the transactions. Simultaneously, the convertibility of cross-border 
financing has increased, and most items have achieved basic convertibility. 
All the items under external debts are also basically convertible. There is 
no restriction on currency exchange relating to financial credit provided 
by financial institutions. The proportion limit on commercial credit 
between residents and nonresidents has been retained, but prior control 
was abolished. With external debt, only a few necessary authenticity 
checks remain, and other administrative licensing relating to accounts 
and currency exchange has been cancelled. Additionally, the convertibility 
of securities investments has steadily increased. The control over currency 
exchange relating to cross-border securities trading in the secondary 
market is relaxed.
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Part 3: Problems with China’s financial 
opening process
China’s financial industry opening has made some amazing achievements, 
but many problems remain. The level of openness is below international 
levels and insufficient to meet the need of economic development, the 
Belt and Road Initiative, RMB internationalisation and construction of 
international financial centres.
Financial institutions and financial market
Since China’s accession to the WTO, foreign financial institutions have 
not  had as strong a development momentum as expected. Conversely, 
the  assets of foreign financial institutions have remained at a low 
proportion and have even decreased in recent years. Foreign banks hold 
around 2  per  cent of China’s total banking assets, which decreased to 
1.29 per  cent in 2016. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries’ ‘average’ has declined since the financial 
crisis but is still above 10 per cent. The average level of the other BRICS 
countries—Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa—soared to 15.5 per cent 
in 2009, substantially higher than that of China. The proportion of 
foreign investment in the insurance industry decreased to 5.6 per cent in 
2016 after reaching a peak of 8.9 per cent in 2005; this is well below the 
20–30 per cent market share in OECD countries. Additionally, change of 
ownership occurred in many joint-venture securities firms.
There are a number of causes for the decline of foreign financial institutions. 
Some multinational financial institutions were greatly affected by the 
2008 financial crisis and suffered a decline of profitability. As a result, 
they shifted business focus to their home countries and reduced business 
in emerging markets. Financial regulation has also become more stringent 
after the crisis, cross-border operation costs have risen, and the financial 
institutions of some developed economies have withdrawn from emerging 
market economies. China’s state-owned bank reform, which began in 
2005, attracted a great amount of foreign investment and many foreign 
banks became strategic investors. With the public listing of Chinese 
banks, their assets continue to grow. Some foreign banks have chosen to 
sell the stocks and cash in to realise financial returns.
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Additionally, the withdrawal of foreign banks largely reflects that China 
has a relatively poor environment for business operation. Although it 
seems that China has a high degree of openness in many sectors, foreign 
financial institutions in China face more policy barriers, such as restrictions 
on ownership percentage and business scope.
In terms of shareholding ratio, China is one of the few countries with 
restrictions on the proportion of foreign ownership in the banking, 
security and insurance sectors. From an international comparison of 
the 24 major economies (19 G20 countries including China, as well as 
Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Singapore and Chile) (see Tables 3-2, 
3-3 and 3-4), most countries have lifted restrictions on the shareholding 
ratio of foreign and domestic capital in the banking, security and 
insurance sectors. Countries with requirements for shareholding ratios 
(the US, Canada, Australia, Mexico, Italy, South Korea and Singapore) 
treat domestic and foreign ownership equally and have no additional 
requirements for foreign investors. In some countries, the shareholding 
ratio is limited only for total foreign investment. For example, Russia 
has no limit on the shareholding of a single foreign investor; its only 
requirement is that the total amount of foreign investment does not 
exceed a certain percentage. Only India and China have discriminative 
shareholding ratio requirements for foreign ownership, with China’s 
requirements being more stringent.
Table 3-2: Provisions on the proportion of foreign investment in banking 
sector of major economies
Country Shareholding ratio Specific provisions




Chile, South Africa, 
Saudi Arabia
no restrictions on shareholding ratios of domestic and 
foreign investment .
Canada A limit on the 
proportion of shares 
held . However, it 
applies to both 
domestic and 
foreign investment .
According to Canada’s broad 
shareholding requirements, for banks with 
C$12 billion or more in capital, the voting 
shares and the non-voting shares held 
by any person or co-actors  should not 
exceed 20% and 30% respectively . For 
Canadian domestic banks with capital 
between C$2 billion and C$12 billion, the 
public holding of voting shares is required 
to reach 35% . But for those banks with 
capital of less than C$2 billion, there are 
no shareholding restrictions .
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Country Shareholding ratio Specific provisions
Italy A limit on the 
proportion of shares 
held . However, 
it applies to both 
domestic and 
foreign investment .
Domestic or foreign financial institutions 
cannot hold more than 15% of the shares 
of banking financial institutions.





needs to pass 
certain regulatory 
procedures (such as 
regulatory approval) .
Shareholding by a single investor 
(domestic or foreign) of a financial 
institution exceeding 15% needs to be 
approved by the Australian Treasury 
Department; the Treasury Department 
authorises the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority the right to approve 
investment of less than A$1 billion .





needs to pass 
certain regulatory 
procedures (such as 
regulatory approval) .
Any company (including foreign banks) 
acquiring more than 25% of the voting 
shares in banks or bank holding companies 
needs to be approved by the Federal 
Reserve . If a foreign bank has a branch/
agent bank, a commercial loan company 
or subsidiary in the US, the acquisition of 
more than 5% of the shares of the US bank 
or bank holding company requires the 
approval of the Federal Reserve .





needs to pass 
certain regulatory 
procedures (such as 
regulatory approval) .
Individuals or business entities cannot 
own or control more than 10% of 
a national commercial bank’s (regional 
banks, more than 15%) voting shares . 
In exceptional circumstances, a domestic 
individual or a business entity may hold 
100% of the shares with the approval of 
the Finance Committee, and a financial 
institution established under the laws of 
another country that is an ‘internationally 
recognized financial institution’1 may 
owe more than 10% of the shares of 
commercial banks or bank holding 
companies established under the laws 
of the Republic of Korea . However, 
it should meet additional approval 
requirements of the Finance Committee .





needs to pass 
certain regulatory 
procedures (such as 
regulatory approval) .
For commercial banks, if shareholding 
by a single or multiple shareholders in 
a local bank reaches 5%, approval by the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore is needed . 
For financial companies, if shareholding by 
a single or multiple shareholders reaches 
5%, 12% or 20% of a financial company, 
approval by the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore is needed .
THE JInGSHAn REPORT
128
Country Shareholding ratio Specific provisions





needs to pass 
certain regulatory 
procedures (such as 
regulatory approval) .
A single domestic or foreign financial 
institution cannot hold more than 40% of 
the shares of a bank, a single domestic 
or foreign non-financial institution cannot 
hold more than 30% of the shares 
of a bank, and a domestic or foreign 
individual investor cannot hold more than 
20% of a bank’s shares . For shareholdings 
exceeding the above ratios, approval by 
the Indonesian central bank is needed .
Mexico Restrictions for 
certain banks .
Restrictions on foreign investment in 
development banking institutions .
Russia no restriction on 
shareholding ratio 
of foreign investors 
in any single bank . 
Restrictions on 
the proportion of 
foreign investment 
in the banking 
system .
The amount of a single bank’s foreign 
investment is not limited, but the amount 
of foreign investment in the entire 
banking system is limited . All foreign 
investment in the Russian banking system 
cannot exceed 50% (excluding foreign 
capital entering the Russian banking 
system before 2007 and that went into 
privatisation of Russian banks after 
Russia’s accession to the WTO) .
Turkey Restrictions 
on the form of 
establishment .
Foreign investment in Turkish banks 
must be in the form of a joint venture or 
a branch and should be approved by the 
Turkish Banking Authority .
India Only restrictions 
on shareholding 
ratios of foreign 
investment .
In the first five years, the proportion of 
shares held by foreign institutions shall 
not exceed 50% and shall not exceed 
74% later .
China Only restrictions 
on shareholding 
ratios of foreign 
investment .
The proportion of the shares held by a 
single foreign institution shall not exceed 
20%, and the proportion of total foreign 
investment shall not exceed 25% .
1 According to Appendix 3 of the Free Trade Agreement between Korea and the United 
States, ‘internationally recognized financial institutions’ refers to any financial institution that 
obtains a rating from an international rating agency that is accepted by a Korean regulator, 
or that shows it has similar qualifications to Korean regulators via other means.
Source: Regulatory agencies of the countries .
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Table 3-3: Provisions on the proportion of foreign investment in the 
insurance sector of major economies
Country Shareholding ratio Specific provisions




Korea, Saudi Arabia, 
Brazil, Argentina, 
Chile, South Africa, 
Australia, Turkey
no limits on domestic or foreign shareholding .
Singapore There is a limit on the 
proportion of shares 
held . However, it applies 
to both domestic and 
foreign investment .
49% is the cap of shareholding 
allowed in a life insurance or non-
life insurance company, and no 
foreign investors can be the largest 
shareholder .
Canada There is a limit on the 
proportion of shares 
held . However, it applies 
to both domestic and 
foreign investment .
According to Canada’s shareholding 
requirements, for insurance 
institutions with capital of more than 
C$2 billion, voting shares held by 
the public should reach 35% . But 
for insurance institutions with capital 
of less than C$2 billion, there are no 
shareholding restrictions .
Mexico Shareholding by domestic 
and foreign investment 
surpassing a certain 
percentage needs to 
follow specific regulatory 
procedures (such as 
regulatory approval) .
Generally, foreign ownership should 
not exceed 49%; if more than 49%, 
it must be approved by the foreign 
investment committee .
Russia no restriction on foreign 
holding of a single 
insurance company . 
Restrictions on the 
proportion of foreign 
investment in the 
insurance system .
Total foreign investment in the 
Russian insurance system cannot 
exceed 50% . Foreign capital entering 
the Russian insurance system before 
2007 and foreign capital that went 
into privatisation of Russian insurance 
companies after Russia’s accession 
to the WTO are excluded .
Indonesia Restrictions only on 
foreign shareholding .
A foreign investor cannot hold more 
than 80% of the shares .
India Restrictions only on 
foreign shareholding .
A foreign investor cannot hold more 
than 49% of the shares .
China Restrictions only on 
foreign shareholding .
Foreign insurance companies that 
set up joint-venture life insurance 
business with Chinese companies 
and enterprises cannot hold more 
than 50% of the total shares .
Source: Regulatory agencies of the countries .
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Table 3-4: Provisions on the proportion of foreign investment in the 
securities sector of major economies
Country Shareholding ratio Specific provisions
US, UK, France, Germany, 
Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Japan, 
Korea, Singapore, South 
Africa, Brazil, Argentina, 
Chile, India, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, Australia, Canada1
no limits on domestic or foreign shareholding .







Generally, foreign shareholding 
of brokerage firms and bonding 
institutions should not exceed 
49%, and if foreign shareholding of 
institutions that qualify stock and 
similar exceeds 49%, approval by 
the foreign investment committee is 
needed .
Indonesia Restrictions for 
shareholding 
ratio by foreign 
investment only .
A foreign investor cannot hold more 
than 49% of the shares .
Russia Restrictions for 
shareholding 
ratio by foreign 
investment only .
Foreign investment can only enter 
the securities market as a Russian 
legal entity . Foreign shareholding of 
certain types of securities market 
participants (securities registration 
company, and special depositary 
company with bookkeeping capacity 
through the traders) should not 
exceed 25% of registered capital .
China Restrictions for 
shareholding 
ratio by foreign 
investment only .
Foreign shareholding of listed 
securities companies shall not 
exceed 25% and the proportion of 
that of unlisted securities companies 
shall not exceed 49% .
1 Canada has no uniform rules on foreign holdings of securities companies . The Canadian 
provinces make their own rules based on specific needs.
Source: Regulatory agencies of the countries .
A number of historical factors contributed to the imposition of 
restrictions  on foreign holdings of financial institutions. When the 
reform and opening-up policy was first launched in China, ‘super-
national treatment’ was given to foreign financial institutions and joint 
ventures by some special economic zones and local governments to attract 
foreign investment. Preferential tax policy is one example. For example, 
foreign financial institutions and Sino–foreign joint ventures could 
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enjoy a 15 per cent income tax rate if the initial investment or operating 
capital exceeded US$10 million and the business was in existence for 
over 10 years. In contrast, the income tax rate was as high as 33 per cent 
for Chinese financial institutions. Simultaneously, foreign financial 
institutions enjoyed favourable treatment in terms of tax base, turnover 
tax, etc. Because of this, some Chinese financial institutions wanted to 
‘transform’ themselves into joint ventures by introducing foreign capital. 
According to the ‘Sino–Foreign Joint Ventures Law’, one requirement 
for a  joint venture is that foreign investment should be no less than 
25 per  cent. Only when foreign investment reached 25 per cent could 
a business enjoy the preferential tax treatment.
Since China’s accession to the WTO, investment policy has become more 
standardised. ‘Super-national treatment’ was gradually abolished, but the 
25 per cent requirement has been retained. According to ‘Measures for 
the Implementation of Administrative Licensing of Chinese Commercial 
Banks’ (2003), if combined foreign holdings of a non-listed financial 
institution reached 25 per cent, the business would be treated as a foreign 
financial institution. In 2015, regulatory authorities amended the 
implementation measures to impose more strict restrictions on foreign 
ownership, stipulating that combined foreign shareholding of a Chinese 
financial institution should not exceed 25 per cent. This provision has 
substantially limited the role that foreign investors can play in corporate 
governance, strategic planning and financial management. Restrictions 
on business scope and licensing has also restricted the development of 
foreign-funded financial institutions.
The securities sector
Foreign securities companies can only enter China by setting up joint 
ventures, and can only conduct limited business such as underwriting, 
brokerage of foreign stocks and bonds.6 The Chinese controlling 
shareholder must be a securities firm. Because a subsidiary cannot 
compete with its parent company, the business of joint-venture securities 
companies is seriously restricted. The advanced products and pricing 
technology of foreign companies cannot be introduced to China, which 
dampens foreign investors’ enthusiasm for doing business in China.
6  Securities companies have seven business functions: securities brokering, securities investment 
consulting, financial consulting related to securities trading and investment activity, securities 





Branches of foreign banks need to operate in China for at least one year 
before they can conduct RMB business. There is no such requirement for 
Chinese banks. This requirement has delayed the development of foreign 
banks. For example, in 2011, the Silicon Valley Bank received approval to 
set up a joint-venture bank, SPD Silicon Valley Bank (SSVB). However, 
due to regulatory restrictions, SSVB could only conduct foreign exchange 
business until 2015 when it was allowed to engage in RMB business. As 
the bank’s major customers are small and medium-sized technology start-
ups that do not have much demand for foreign exchange, SSVB did not 
experience much growth in China. In 2011, SSVB also entered the UK 
market and was allowed to conduct pound business immediately. The 
bank has since provided professional financial services to many British 
small and medium-sized enterprises, especially technology companies. 
Even though the operating requirement has been reduced from three 
years to one year in China, this restriction is still a major impediment to 
foreign banks at their initial stage of development in China.
Foreign banks that intend to establish branches in China must have 
significant amounts of assets. Foreign banks establishing subsidiaries 
and joint-venture banks in China must have total assets of no less than 
US$10  billion the year before application. Foreign banks that intend 
to set up branches in China must have no less than US$20 billion.7 
Neighbouring countries and countries along the ‘Belt and Road’ find it 
difficult to meet such requirements. International experience shows that 
most countries do not have requirements regarding total assets for foreign 
banks intending to establish subsidiaries or branches; rather, emphasis is 
given to regulatory and compliance factors.
In terms of the number of licences, even big foreign banks can only acquire 
up to two licences each year, and the two licences are usually for different 
regions. Although this approach has been gradually abolished, foreign 
banks are no longer enthusiastic about investing in China. Therefore, 
China has missed the best opportunity to attract foreign banks.
7  The total asset requirement was abolished in October 2019.
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The insurance sector
The regulator has been slow to approve the establishment of branches 
of foreign insurance companies in China. Fewer than two new licences 
are granted each year for qualified joint-venture life insurance companies. 
Strict licence approvals and the small quota have distorted the business 
plans of foreign insurance companies and restricted their ability to serve 
the Chinese market.
An international comparison shows that the openness of China’s financial 
industry is still low. According to the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index 
(STRI),8 as of 2016, Latvia’s banking industry had the highest degree 
of openness (0.12), while China’s banking industry ranked 41st among 
the 44 countries surveyed (including all the OECD countries and nine 
emerging economies9) with an STRI of 0.41, just above Brazil, India 
and Indonesia (OECD, 2016a) (see Figure 3-4). The STRI of China’s 
insurance industry was 0.46 (Korea had the highest degree of openness at 
0.11), ranking 42nd among the 44 countries surveyed, only above India 
and Indonesia (OECD, 2016b) (see Figure 3-5).
Simultaneously, the depth of China’s financial market is insufficient. 
The  opening of the securities markets is not conducted in a systemic 
manner, but via a ‘channelised’ mode, whereby foreign institutional 
investors invest in the domestic market through QFII and RQFII schemes, 
domestic institutional investors invest in the international market through 
QDII and RQDII, and domestic individual investors invest abroad 
through the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect and Shenzhen–Hong 
Kong Stock Connect. But outside these channels, the domestic market is 
disconnected from the international market. The ‘channelised’ opening 
mode is a very primitive approach with heavy administrative intervention 
and a low degree of openness.
8  The STRI measures market access, competition and regulatory transparency and represents the 
degree of openness. The higher the STRI, the lower the degree of openness.
9  The nine emerging economies are Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, 
Lithuania, Russia and South Africa.
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Figure 3-4: Degree of openness of the banking sector (2016).
note: Blue represents foreign capital restrictions, yellow represents labour mobility 
restrictions, orange represents other discriminatory measures, purple represents 
competition restrictions, green represents regulatory transparency, the black horizontal 
line represents the average, and the purple dot represents data in 2014 .
Source: OECD (2016a) .
Figure 3-5: Degree of openness of the insurance sector (2016).
note: Blue represents foreign capital restrictions, yellow represents labour mobility 
restrictions, orange represents other discriminatory measures, purple represents 
competition restrictions, green represents regulatory transparency, the black horizontal 
line represents average, and the purple dot represents data in 2014 .
Source: OECD (2016b) .
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Bond market convenience has yet to be improved; some of the provisions 
and procedures are tedious, opaque and unfriendly to market participants. 
First, foreign investors cannot transfer their positions among different 
accounts (such as QFII account, RQFII account and interbank bond 
market investment account), which affects the efficiency of use of their 
funds. Second, investors in China’s interbank bond market are required to 
open accounts with the central custody institution, while internationally 
investors can open accounts with custody institutions at various levels, 
which offers higher efficiency, lower transaction costs, flexible market-
based transactions, and convenient and efficient clearing. Third, foreign 
institutions can participate in bond underwriting, but cannot be the lead 
underwriter. This has caused the business of foreign institutions to shrink, 
making it more difficult for them to meet the business qualification 
requirements and compete with domestic financial institutions. Fourth, 
non-central bank foreign investors can only sign the NAFMII (National 
Association of Financial Market Institutional Investors) Derivative Master 
Agreement, which differs from the commonly used ISDA Agreement and 
increases the legal costs of foreign investors. Fifth, the exchange bond 
market is more blocked than the interbank bond market, with a lower 
level of openness. Currently foreign investors can only invest in the 
exchange market through the QFII and RQFII channels.
Additionally, China’s accounting, auditing and taxation systems are not yet 
aligned with international standards (discussed at length in Chapter 5).
Convertibility of the capital account
Despite significant progresses in China’s capital account liberalisation in 
recent years, openness remains low compared to developed economies 
and many emerging market economies. An international comparison 
shows that China’s capital account convertibility is low among the G20 
countries. According to IMF’s measure of capital account convertibility 
based on the countries’ capital control provisions, China’s capital account 
convertibility is ranked the second lowest, only higher than that of India.10 
10  The compilation of capital account convertibility is based on the IMF’s (2016a) ‘Annual report 
on exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions’. This was prepared by authorities in each 
country, describing in detail the seven categories and 40 items of the capital account. Based on the 
report, the number of convertible items or the weighted average index can be calculated, such as 
the Chinn-Ito index and Quinn index. The Chinn-Ito index focuses on whether there are multiple 
exchange rates, whether the current account and the capital account are regulated, and whether there 
are controls on remittance of funds. The Quinn index not only measures the presence of controls, but 
also assesses the degrees of regulations.
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The Chinn-Ito index, Quinn index and other indices of capital account 
convertibility have shown that the convertibility of China’s capital 
accounts is not only far below that of the major developed economies, 
but also lower than the average level of emerging market economies 
(see Figure 3-6). Some indices focused on laws and regulations and may 
underestimate the actual degree of convertibility; however, there is much 
China could do to improve capital account convertibility.
Figure 3-6: International comparison of capital account convertibility.
Source: IMF (2016a) .
137
3 . FURTHER EXPAnDInG THE OPEnInG UP OF CHInA’S FInAnCIAL InDUSTRY
Part 4: Proposals on further opening the 
financial sector
China should consider both national conditions and international best 
practices; proactively expand the opening of its financial sector; adopt 
a more transparent approach that aligns with international practices; 
treat domestic and foreign financial institutions equally; and improve 
regulatory rules, accounting standards and other systems.
Principles for opening the financial sector
Principle I: continue to promote the ‘troika’—opening the financial sector, 
improving the exchange rate regime and reducing capital controls—in 
a coordinated fashion.
China is already deeply integrated into the global economic and 
financial  system. China should continue to push forward the opening 
of the financial sector, market-oriented reform of the exchange 
rate regime and liberalisation of capital controls in a coordinated 
manner. Expanding  financial opening will help China better use both 
domestic and international markets and resources, optimise resource 
allocation  and  enhance the competitiveness of the financial system. 
Improving the exchange rate mechanism could enable the authorities to 
better regulate cross-border capital flows and enhance macroeconomic 
flexibility. Reducing capital controls helps stabilise market expectations 
and attract more foreign capital. Coordinated progress of the troika 
provides momentum for China’s sustained and healthy development.
Principle II: opening the financial sector with pre-established national 
treatment and the negative list system as the core approach.
The financial industry is a competitive industry and should operate on 
market principles. Financial institutions should be allowed to make 
their own decisions and innovate. In terms of market access, competitive 
industries usually implement the negative list system, which allows market 
players to equally enter all the areas not specified in the list. This system 
helps all types of market players to form clear expectations and ensures 
that they compete fairly.
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The implementation of pre-established national treatment and the 
negative list has become common practice internationally, and China has 
made it clear it will also adopt the approach. Currently, more than 100 
countries employ this model including many developing and emerging 
market economies. China is the only BRICS country and one of only two 
G20 countries (the other being Saudi Arabia) that has not implemented 
this model. The third plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee 
decided to explore the use of this approach under which China has 
conducted negotiations on the Sino–US bilateral investment agreement 
and Sino–Europe bilateral investment agreement. Free trade zones in 
Shanghai, Guangdong, Tianjin and Fujian are applying the model that 
will be applied nationwide in the future. The negative list approach is in 
line with China’s financial reform and opening policy and will facilitate 
China to better participate in global economic and financial governance.
Currently, the negative list of the financial industry is rather long 
(The State Council, 2017). Therefore, the primary task is to shorten the 
list and replace market access restrictions with prudential supervision. 
The negative list still contains restrictions on shareholding percentage, 
shareholder qualifications and business scope of foreign financial 
institutions (The State Council, 2017). These discriminatory restrictions 
reduce the enthusiasm of foreign investors and make it difficult for them 
to leverage advantages in corporate governance, credit management and 
risk pricing. Therefore, China should shorten the negative list, eliminate 
unreasonable access and qualification restrictions, and carry out prudential 
regulation to provide proper incentives to foreign financial institutions 
and enhance the competitiveness of Chinese financial institutions.
Principle III: promote opening of the financial sector in an orderly 
manner and effectively prevent risks.
Over the past four decades, the overall openness of China’s financial 
sector has been low. One reason is that there were varied opinions over 
the relationship between financial crises and the admission of foreign 
financial institutions when China negotiated its WTO accession. Thus, 
while other industries have greatly increased their level of openness, the 
financial sector has opened slowly. It is relatively easy to control risks 
when openness is low. However, the situation has changed, and China 
needs to learn how to effectively control risks while further opening the 
financial sector. This requires China to strengthen financial regulation; 
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draw lessons from global regulators; and improve capital, behaviour and 
functional regulation to ensure that its regulatory capability is compatible 
with the level of openness.
Generally speaking, in the short term, equal treatment of foreign and 
domestic financial institutions should be applied to remove restrictions 
on the equity cap, form of incorporation and business scope of foreign 
financial institutions. Regarding custody model and underwriting 
qualifications, the standards and requirements that are unfriendly to 
foreign investors should be re-examined. Additionally, accounting and 
auditing standards need to align with international standards to facilitate 
overseas investors. In the medium to long term, China should pay 
more attention to market cultivation and product innovation; develop 
an open and inclusive financial market that is in line with international 
standards; and  create a fair, transparent and predictable business and 
legal environment. Simultaneously, China should further promote RMB 
internationalisation and achieve capital account convertibility in an 
orderly fashion.
In the short term, China should remove policy constraints 
and release the vitality of financial institutions and the 
financial market
Equal treatment of foreign and domestic financial institutions should be 
applied to remove restrictions on the equity cap, form of incorporation, 
business scope and number of licences of foreign financial institutions 
to create a fair and equitable environment for foreign institutions. 
The following are recommended:
• Apply equal treatment of domestic and foreign financial institutions; 
reduce restrictions on foreign ownership of banking, securities and 
insurance firms; and allow wholly foreign-owned securities companies 
and life insurance companies.
• Further action could include eliminating the requirement on the 
total assets of shareholders of foreign banks, the minimum years 
of operation for foreign banks to conduct RMB business, and the 
requirement that at least one Chinese shareholder of a joint-venture 
securities companies must be a securities firm.
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• Do not limit the number of licences granted to joint-venture life 
insurance companies. Grant regional operation licences to wholly-
owned foreign life insurance companies and speed up the issuance of 
licences to facilitate the business of those institutions.
Regarding the bond market, the following are suggested:
• Streamline the transfer process between various bond accounts to 
improve the efficiency of fund utilisation.
• Introduce multi-tiered custody and gear up to international practice, 
establishing a multi-tiered custody model and a nominal holder 
account.
• Give foreign banks special treatment in granting some business 
licences based on their overall capability and scale, including their 
global networks and expertise in specific products and business areas.
• Align with international standards and allow foreign investors 
to  independently choose between the NAFMII and ISDA master 
agreements.
Chapter 6 contains recommendations for financial infrastructure and 
institutions.
In the medium term, China should improve the institutional 
environment and promote deep integration of domestic and 
foreign capital markets
In terms of the stock market, China should improve the Shanghai–Hong 
Kong Stock Connect and Shenzhen–Hong Kong Stock Connect and 
explore connecting domestic and foreign capital markets via the Shanghai–
London Stock Connect and Shanghai–Singapore Stock Connect to 
achieve full opening of the market. This will help mobilise global capital to 
serve China’s economy, expand the investor base, attract more experienced 
and professional institutional investors that are committed to long-term 
investment, reduce market disturbance caused by the great number of 
retail investors and curb speculation.
In terms of taxation, China should clarify tax rules relating to foreign 
institutional investors in the interbank bond market as soon as possible. 
Preferential policies should be adopted at certain times to bring down tax 
rates to relatively low levels globally to attract more foreign institutions to 
invest in China’s market.
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In the medium to long term, China should further promote 
RMB internationalisation and achieve convertibility of the 
capital account in an orderly manner
The inclusion of the RMB in the SDR has brought China many practical 
benefits. China should seize the opportunity to strengthen the RMB’s 
status as an international reserve currency and further promote its 
internationalisation. The following are recommended:
• Consolidate the RMB’s status in the payment and denomination 
of international trade and finance; support the international reserve 
function of the RMB; promote the use of the RMB in the pricing 
and settlement of large commodity transactions; raise the degree of 
convenience of cross-border RMB payment of non-bank payment 
institutions; support cross-border, e-commerce, RMB-denominated 
settlement; and fully liberalise the personal current account cross-
border RMB settlement business.
• Promote the development of markets for direct exchange of the RMB 
and other currencies to support cross-border RMB settlement business, 
continue currency cooperation with the monetary authorities of other 
countries, and support the inclusion of the RMB in the reserves of 
foreign central banks.
• Support the healthy development of offshore RMB markets, expand 
the channels for offshore RMB to flow back, and establish a virtuous 
circle between the two markets.
Achieve capital account convertibility in an orderly manner
At present, China is not far from achieving capital account convertibility. 
The following three reforms are vital (Zhou, 2015). First, relax the control 
on overseas investment of domestic individual investors and introduce 
Qualified Domestic Individual Investor (QDII2) scheme. Second, amend 
the ‘Foreign Exchange Management Regulations’ based on the ‘negative 
list + national treatment’ approach. Third, while pushing forward a 
registration-based initial public offering system, allow a small number of 
high-quality foreign companies to issue shares in China based on existing 
policy and domestic market situations. A great deal of preparation has 
already been conducted for these reforms, and relevant programs have 




Use comprehensive measures to better deal with capital 
flow shocks
The IMF (2016b) pointed out that countries should mainly rely on 
macroeconomic policies to cope with cross-border capital flow shocks. 
This can include increasing the flexibility of the exchange rates, curbing 
excessive fluctuations in the foreign exchange market, adjusting monetary 
and fiscal policies, establishing a more inclusive financial system, 
developing deep and well-regulated financial markets, and avoiding the use 
of capital control measures. Therefore, China should accelerate the pace of 
domestic reform, further improve the macroeconomic policy framework, 
and improve the resilience of the economic and financial system against 
capital flow shocks. Simultaneously, China should accelerate the reform 
of state-owned enterprises, reduce the distortion of price signals caused by 
soft budget constraints, improve the efficiency of resource allocation and 
enhance financial system soundness.
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RMB Exchange Rate: Moving 
Towards a Floating Regime
Zhang Bin1
Introduction
The RMB exchange rate formation mechanism has undergone frequent 
adjustments since the 1980s, with the transition from a double-track 
exchange rate system to a single exchange rate system, a de facto fixed 
regime (pegged to the USD) during the financial crisis, as well as many 
attempts in normal periods to reform the exchange rate regime so that it 
can respond to market changes.
The major challenge is that the exchange rate does not respond adequately 
to changes in market supply and demand. When the exchange rate 
deviates from economic fundamentals, expectation for one-way currency 
fluctuation and large-scale capital flow follow. Authorities are then 
forced to intervene in the foreign exchange market. This affects the 
independence and effectiveness of monetary policy and also jeopardises 
domestic economic stability. Additionally, regular intervention in the 
foreign exchange market has negative effects on economic upgrading, 
RMB internationalisation and outbound investment.
Since the beginning of 2017, supply and demand in the foreign exchange 
market have been more balanced, and the time is right for further reform. 
International experience suggests that reducing intervention in the foreign 
1  Senior Fellow at the China Finance 40 Forum.
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exchange market will not lead to a large depreciation of the RMB, given 
China’s economic fundamentals. Two strategies can be used to introduce 
a floating exchange rate regime: free-floating regime, and allowing a wide 
band for the RMB exchange rate fluctuation against a basket of currencies. 
The latter could well be a transition plan towards a free-floating regime.
Part 1: History and current situation of the 
RMB exchange rate regime reform
Since the launch of reforms and the opening policy, the RMB exchange 
rate regime has undergone frequent changes, switching from a double-
track exchange rate system to a single rate system during early 1980s 
and mid-1990s. After the mid-1990s, the Chinese monetary authorities 
experimented with the managed floating regime and the de facto 
USD-pegged regime, and attempted many reforms under the managed 
floating exchange rate regime. Currently, the authorities are still driving 
the RMB exchange rate through measures such as guidance of the central 
parity, the daily floating band, market intervention and capital controls. 
The RMB central parity formation mechanism has been adjusted to take 
into account multiple factors including foreign exchange supply and 
demand, exchange rate stability against a basket of currencies and the 
counter-cyclical factor. Clearly, the exchange rate of the RMB against the 
USD is a dollar-pegged regime with a slope rate (reflecting market supply 
and demand and the counter-cyclical factor) and a stochastic volatility 
variable (reflecting basket currency exchange rate movements). This 
chapter briefly reviews the evolvement of the RMB exchange rate regime 
since the 1980s while focusing on analysis of the current regime.
History of the RMB exchange rate regime reform
First stage: from 1981–1984, China adopted a dual exchange rate system 
with an official exchange rate and an exchange rate for trade settlement.
Objectives: to promote exports and increase foreign exchange earnings.
Measures: based on the ‘Regulations Concerning a Number of Issues 
on Vigorously Boosting Foreign Trade and Foreign Currency Earnings’ 
enacted by the State Council in 1979, on 1 January 1981, the government 
introduced the exchange rate for trade settlement in addition to the official 
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exchange rate. First, the trade settlement exchange rate was applied to 
exports. Based on 1978 data, the average cost of US$1 in export revenue 
was 2.56 RMB; after adding a profit of 10 per cent, the settlement 
exchange rate was set at 2.8 RMB. Second, the official exchange rate 
was applied to imports. US$1 was exchanged for 1.5 RMB in July 1980, 
based on a weighted average exchange rate against a basket of currencies.
Second stage: from 1985–1993, China adopted a dual rate system with 
an official exchange rate and a foreign exchange market exchange rate.
Objectives: to establish a more reasonable exchange rate level through 
market mechanisms, improve the efficiency of foreign exchange utilisation 
and compensate for the loss of foreign trade enterprises.
Measures: first, foreign exchange swap centres had been established 
throughout the country since March 1988. The exchange rate in the 
foreign exchange swap markets was liberalised to balance the supply 
and demand of foreign exchange and compensate for the loss of foreign 
trade enterprises. In September 1988, an open foreign exchange swap 
market was pioneered in Shanghai. The open bidding mechanism was 
introduced in foreign exchange swaps, and the foreign exchange swap 
price was allowed to float within a certain range according to supply and 
demand in the open market. Second, the official exchange rate underwent 
several significant devaluations, and gradually came closer to the foreign 
exchange swap market exchange rate. With gradual liberalisation of 
the exchange rate in the foreign exchange swap market, the share of foreign 
exchange transactions at official exchange rate gradually decreased.
Third stage: from 1994–1996, China unified the exchange rates and 
adopted a managed floating exchange rate regime.
Objective: to establish a more reasonable exchange rate level through the 
market mechanism.
Measures: on 29 December 1993, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) 
issued the ‘Public Announcement on Further Reforming the Foreign 
Exchange Administration System’, declaring a major reform to take effect 
on 1 January 1994. Several important measures were undertaken. First, 
the official exchange rate of the RMB and the swap market exchange 
rate were unified. Second, the foreign exchange retention system was 
abolished, a system of foreign exchange surrender and purchase through 
banks was implemented, and the RMB achieved convertibility under 
THE JInGSHAn REPORT
148
the current account. Third, mandatory foreign exchange planning was 
cancelled; users with valid import documents were allowed to purchase 
foreign currencies from designated banks. Fourth, any form of pricing 
and settlement in foreign currencies domestically was also cancelled. The 
circulation of foreign currencies within the territory and foreign exchange 
transactions outside of designated financial institutions were prohibited. 
Additionally, the issuance and circulation of Foreign Exchange Certificates 
was terminated. Finally, the interbank foreign exchange market was 
established and a nationwide unified market for foreign exchange 
transactions was formed.
The fourth stage: from 1997–2005, China adopted a de facto USD-
pegged regime for the RMB exchange rate.
Objective: to reduce the risk of exchange rate fluctuations and maintain 
macroeconomic stability.
Measures: the RMB was pegged to the USD at a fixed exchange rate. 
During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, east Asian countries devalued their 
currencies successively, while the Chinese Government adopted a policy 
of stabilising the RMB exchange rate. The RMB exchange rate against the 
USD was kept stable at 8.27, and the exchange rate was virtually pegged 
to the USD until July 2005.
The fifth stage: from mid-2005 to mid-2008, China adopted a managed 
floating exchange rate regime similar to the crawling peg system.
Objective: to reduce external imbalances and international pressure.
Measures: on 21 July 2005, the PBC issued the ‘Public Announcement 
on Reforming the RMB Exchange Rate Regime’, declaring the adoption 
of a managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and 
demand with reference to a basket of currencies. The RMB was no longer 
singularly pegged to the USD. The PBC announced the central parity of 
the RMB exchange rate to guide market participants and intervened to 
maintain the RMB market price close to the central parity. The monetary 
authority maintained control over the trajectory of the RMB exchange 
rate. During this period, the RMB exchange rate fluctuated very slightly 
against the USD and gained a gradual appreciation. As such, the exchange 
rate regime was also regarded as a soft peg to the USD.
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The sixth stage: from mid-2008 to 19 June 2010, China moved back to 
a de facto USD-pegged regime.
Objective: to reduce the risk of exchange rate fluctuations and promote 
macroeconomic stability.
Measures: the 2008 global financial crisis had a serious impact on the 
real  economy. Consequently, the RMB exchange rate was returned to 
a USD-pegged regime.
The seventh stage: from 19 June 2010 to the present, China has tried 
various forms of managed floating exchange rate regimes.
Objective: to explore a more market-oriented exchange rate regime.
Measures: China adopted a managed floating exchange rate regime in 
various forms. On 19 June 2010, a spokesperson from the PBC announced 
measures to ‘further promote the reform of the RMB exchange rate 
regime, and enhance the flexibility of RMB exchange rate’, sending signals 
to the market about restarting RMB exchange rate reform. The spot daily 
fluctuation range of the RMB/USD exchange rate was expanded from 
0.5 per cent to 1 per cent in April 2012, and then from 1 per cent to 
2 per cent in March 2014. Since then, the market has gradually played 
a more important role in the RMB exchange rate formation.
On 11 August 2015, the monetary authority decided to improve the 
formation mechanism of the RMB’s central parity against the USD. The 
core reform was to require market makers to refer to the closing rate in 
the interbank foreign exchange market on the previous day and report 
the central parity to the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) 
daily before the market opened. This adjustment kept the central parity 
of the RMB/USD exchange rate close to the previous day’s closing rate, 
instead of being set daily by the monetary authority to meet management 
goals. By doing this, the monetary authority abandoned years of guiding 
market expectations through the central parity of the exchange rate, giving 
way to market supply and demand determining the exchange rate. After 
the reform, market supply and demand played a larger role in exchange 
rate determination, and the RMB depreciated by nearly 2  per  cent 
(the threshold of daily fluctuation) for two consecutive days.
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On 13 August 2015, the monetary authority believed that the RMB 
exchange rate had moved to a reasonable and balanced level, so the 
government took a series of measures (mostly foreign exchange market 
intervention) to stabilise the exchange rate. After that, the monetary 
authority made a series of adjustments in the exchange rate regime, 
including reintroducing the central parity formation mechanism, 
adopting a transparent formula for central parity and introducing the 
counter-cyclical factor.
Supply and demand, basket of currencies and the 
counter-cyclical factor
The RMB exchange rate regime after May 2017 had three characteristics.
First, the monetary authority played a dominant role in the level of 
the RMB exchange rate. The monetary authority dominated the RMB 
exchange rate through three key measures: central parity, the daily floating 
band and intervention in the foreign exchange market. The central 
parity of the RMB exchange rate can send the market a message about 
the monetary authority’s desired exchange rate level, guiding market 
expectations of the rate. The daily floating band limits exchange rate 
fluctuations. Foreign exchange market intervention (mainly referring to 
the sale and purchase of foreign currencies in the market, as well as other 
measures affecting supply and demand in the foreign exchange market) 
can absorb excess supply or demand, given the central parity of the RMB 
exchange rate and the floating band. For example, assuming the RMB/
USD central parity is 6.5, with 2 per cent daily floating band limit, the 
range of exchange rate is 6.5±0.13. If the market equilibrium price is out 
of the above range, the monetary authority must intervene in the market 
by buying or selling excess supply or demand.
Second, market supply and demand, the basket of currencies and the 
counter-cyclical factor determine exchange rate movements. In the RMB 
exchange rate regime reform of 21 July 2005, China adopted a managed 
floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with 
reference to a basket of currencies. In 2016, the monetary authority 
further clarified the specific role of the above two aspects in forming the 
central parity of the exchange rate. This was explained clearly in ‘China 
Monetary Policy Report Quarter One, 2016’:
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For example, if the previous day’s central parity rate of RMB/USD 
was 6.5000, closed at RMB6.4950, and the changes in the currency 
basket indicated the RMB had to appreciate by 100 basis points, 
the central parity quote from the market makers would be 6.4850, 
an appreciation of 150 basis points, where 50 basis points reflect 
the changes in market demand and supply and the other 100 basis 
points reflect the changes in the currency basket. Likewise, changes 
in the central parity of the RMB to the USD not only represent 
changes in the currency basket, but also indicate the market demand 
and supply situation. The central parity formation mechanism is 
more clearly characterized as based on market demand and supply 
and adjusted with reference to the currency basket.
In May 2017, the ‘counter-cyclical factor’ was introduced to the pricing 
model for central parity of the RMB against the USD.
Under the new formula, ‘the change of central parity rate’ = ‘the closing 
rate on the previous trading day – the central parity rate on the previous 
trading day’ + ‘the exchange rate movements needed to maintain RMB 
exchange rate stability against the basket of currencies + the counter-
cyclical factor’. The ‘China Monetary Policy Report Quarter Two, 2017’ 
explained the counter-cyclical factor as follows:
To calculate the counter-cyclical factor, one begins by excluding 
the impact of the currency basket changes from the difference 
between the previous day’s closing rate and the central parity. After 
that the exchange-rate movements mainly reflect market supply 
and demand. Then one adjusts counter-cyclical coefficient to get 
‘counter-cyclical factor’. The coefficient is set by the quoting banks 
on their own based on changes in the economic fundamentals and 
the extent of pro-cyclicality in the foreign exchange market.
Third, the monetary authority alleviates the pressure of supply and demand 
in foreign exchange markets with capital controls. When it is difficult 
for exchange rate movements to automatically adjust supply and demand 
in the market, the greater the market pressure and the harder it is for 
interventions to maintain the RMB exchange rate within the target range. 
Massive intervention in the foreign exchange market, whether buying or 
selling, will lead to changes in the RMB’s base money supply, putting 
pressure on China’s macroeconomic stability. The monetary authority 
is faced with the dilemma of stabilising exchange rates and maintaining 




China has been facing continuous pressure of capital outflow and RMB 
depreciation since mid-2014, so capital controls have been strengthened. 
The government has not placed new restrictions on capital flows, but 
instead has implemented the existing measures of capital controls more 
strictly, along with strengthening capital flow authenticity checks. In 
practice, many companies report that availability of foreign currencies 
and the convenience of foreign exchange transactions have been affected.
In terms of formula, the RMB/USD exchange rate is a USD-pegged 
regime with a slope and a stochastic fluctuation of basket currency. 
The  three items in the central parity formula—‘the closing rate on the 
previous trading day – the central parity rate on the previous trading 
day’ + ‘the exchange rate movements needed to maintain the stability of 
the RMB exchange rate against the basket of currencies’ + ‘the counter-
cyclical factor’—correspond to the peg with slope, stochastic fluctuation 
and the correction of the slope of the peg, respectively.
The first item is ‘the closing rate on the previous trading day – the central 
parity rate on the previous trading day’. Considering that the monetary 
authority buys or sells foreign currencies and that the closing rate is also 
affected by intervention in the foreign exchange market, the first item 
only partly reflects market supply and demand.
To maintain relative stability of the RMB/USD exchange rate, the 
monetary authority’s intervention in the foreign exchange market has to 
change over time as the need for intervention fluctuates. During 2015 
and 2016, China faced great pressure to intervene, and the monetary 
authority was forced to spend a large amount of foreign exchange reserves, 
which decreased from US$3.81 trillion in early 2015 to US$3.01 trillion 
by the end of 2016. From 2017, the pressure of supply falling short of 
demand in the foreign exchange market eased, and the foreign exchange 
market intervention required for the gradual change of the exchange rate 
has been  reduced substantially. In addition, the foreign exchange 
reserve has even rebounded slightly due to the valuation effect.
The second item is ‘the exchange rate movements needed to maintain 
the stability of the RMB exchange rate against the basket of currencies’. 
For  example, three currencies—the USD, euro and JPY—exist in the 
basket, and their weights are 0.5, 0.3 and 0.2 respectively. If BSK is 
the  exchange rate against the basket (basket rate), then the following 
formula can be constructed:
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BSK = 0.5*USD/RMB + 0.3*euro/RMB + 0.2*JPY/RMB
= USD/RMB (0.5 + 0.3*euro/USD + 0.2*JPY/USD)
‘The exchange rate movements needed to maintain the stability of the 
RMB exchange rate against the basket of currencies’ refers to the changes 
in the USD/RMB exchange rate required to keep the BSK constant, given 
the changes in the euro/USD and JPY/USD exchange rates. In practice, 
the basket covers more currencies,2 and the above is just an example. 
We can conclude that exchange rate adjustments depend on the exchange 
rate changes of other currencies in the basket against the USD, which has 
nothing to do with the domestic economy and supply and demand in the 
foreign exchange market.
The exchange rates of the USD against other major currencies in the 
basket, such as the euro, JPY, Australian dollar and British pound, are 
all under a floating regime and fluctuate randomly. This ensures that 
the exchange rate movement of the RMB against the USD is random, 
maintaining a fixed basket rate. The exchange rate against the basket 
essentially introduces the stochastic fluctuation for the exchange rate of 
the RMB against the USD.
The third item is the counter-cyclical factor. According to the official 
explanation, the counter-cyclical factor adds a counter-cyclical coefficient 
to market supply and demand (i.e. ‘the closing rate on the previous trading 
day – the central parity on the previous trading day’). This coefficient 
determines to what extent the factor of ‘the closing rate on the previous 
trading day – the central parity on the previous trading day’ will be 
reflected in the central parity on the current trading day.
If the coefficient is equal to –1, ‘the closing rate on the previous trading 
day – the central parity on the previous trading day’ will be completely 
offset. This will not affect central parity on the next trading day. The slope 
of change in the RMB exchange rate caused by market supply and demand 
is 0, so the RMB exchange rate regime will be a fixed RMB/USD peg plus 
the exchange rate movements required to maintain basket rate stability.
2  For the latest currencies in the basket and their weights, see Appendix 4-1.
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If the coefficient is equal to 0, ‘the closing rate on the previous trading 
day – the central parity on the previous trading day’ and ‘the exchange 
rate movements needed to maintain the stability of the RMB exchange 
rate against the basket of currencies’ will jointly determine central parity 
on the next trading day. Therefore, the RMB exchange rate regime will be 
a USD peg with the slope plus the exchange rate movements required to 
maintain basket rate stability.
If the coefficient is between 0 and 1, ‘the closing rate on the previous 
trading day – the central parity on the previous trading day’ and ‘the 
exchange rate movements needed to maintain the stability of the RMB 
exchange rate against the basket of currencies’ will jointly determine the 
central parity of the next trading day. The RMB exchange rate regime 
will be a USD peg with the slope (the slope is smaller than the slope 
when the counter-cyclical coefficient is equal to 0) plus the exchange rate 
movements required to maintain basket rate stability.
Through simple regressions,3 we can test the effect of various factors on 
the RMB central parity rate. We take the daily change of the central 
parity (‘D(MID)’) as the dependent variable, ‘the closing rate on the 
previous trading day – the central parity on the previous trading day’ and 
‘the exchange rate movements of the RMB/USD needed to maintain the 
stability of the exchange rate of the basket of currencies’ as two independent 
variables. The sample period is from 5 April 2016 to 8  August 2017. 
The  coefficients of the two independent variables in the regression are 
0.96 and 0.5 respectively. Together, they explain 72 per cent of the central 
parity rate movement.
The residual term has shown a systematic downward deviation since 
2017. The part that cannot be explained by the model is no longer subject 
to random distribution, but concerns appreciation of the RMB against 
the USD. A possible reason for this is that the influence coefficient of 
‘the closing rate on the previous trading day – the central parity on the 
previous trading day’ on central parity has changed due to the introduction 
of the counter-cyclical factor. Through testing, 19  January 2017 was 
determined as the breakpoint. We conducted the same regression on the 
two subsamples before and after the breakpoint (i.e. from 5 April 2016 
to 19  January 2017 versus from 20 January 2017 to 8 August 2017) 
(see  Tables A4-3 and A4-4 in Appendix 4-2). The results showed that 
3  For the regression equation, see Appendix 4-2.
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the coefficients of the two independent variables are 1.13 and 0.46 in 
the previous sample, and 0.77 and 0.54 in the latter sample. The effect 
of ‘the closing rate on the previous trading day – the central parity on the 
previous trading day’ on the central parity of the RMB exchange rate was 
a significant decline.
Part 2: Challenges facing the RMB 
exchange rate regime
To properly identify the challenges faced by the RMB exchange rate 
regime, we must first determine an appropriate evaluative framework. The 
exchange rate is one of the most important prices in an open economy. 
It affects all aspects of the economy, and evaluations of the regime can 
vary  from different subjects and perspectives. According to Frankel 
(1999), ‘[n]o single currency regime is right for all countries or at all 
times’. This is not to say that a country can choose any kind of exchange 
rate regime; rather, a country should determine the optimal exchange rate 
regime based on its specific national circumstances and timing.
From the perspective of macroeconomic management, evaluation of 
the exchange rate regime should be based on three criteria. First, is it 
conducive to macroeconomic stability? Second, is it conducive to the 
adjustment of economic structures and sustainable economic growth? 
Third, can it assist China’s long-term goal of capital account liberalisation 
and RMB internationalisation? The first is the traditional criterion found 
in most mainstream literature, while the latter two are tailored to China’s 
development level and policy environment.
A macroeconomic stability perspective
For a long time, the independence of China’s monetary policy has been 
constrained by the exchange rate policy. For most of 2003–2014, the 
monetary authorities constantly and significantly intervened in the foreign 
exchange market to maintain the exchange rate target. This resulted in 
substantial increases of base money. The growth of base money was more 
than required to maintain price stability, which seriously affected monetary 
policy independence. The monetary authority had to offset the effect of 
excessive base money by issuing central bank bills, raising the reserve ratio 
of commercial banks, etc. Even so, these operations could not completely 
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offset the effect, as the volume of interventions was significant and changes 
were without restraints. Additionally, continuous interventions led to 
expectations of RMB appreciation and influenced asset prices, which 
were difficult to address with quantitative measures. The authority had to 
balance target conflicts between interest rate policy, whose goal was to serve 
domestic macroeconomic stability, and exchange rate policy targets. When 
conflicts arose, the former was compromised for the latter.
After mid-2014, expectations of RMB appreciation turned into 
depreciation, and the monetary authority faced reversed pressures. 
Intervention in the foreign exchange market moved from buying to 
selling foreign currencies, and the amount of base money was reduced. 
The monetary authority had to find new ways to offset the effect, but 
a perfect outcome remained difficult to achieve. Interest rate policy was 
again compromised. See Box 4-1 for details.
Box 4-1: Large capital outflows and RMB depreciation expectations 
from 2014–2016
This box explains why the RMB faced continuous depreciation expectations and why 
capital outflows increased substantially from late 2014 to the end of 2016.
1. Predetermined conditions—a sharp increase in external debts and 
currency mismatch risks
According to Zhang and Xu (2012, p . 7) and Zhang and He (2012), since the expansion 
of the RMB trade settlement for imports and exports and the further promotion of 
RMB internationalisation, carry trades profiting from the one-way appreciation 
expectations of the RMB and the spread between Chinese and US interest rates 
had increased significantly. As a result, China began to accumulate external debts 
quickly . Based on the data of Dealogic, Bank for International Settlements and 
the PBC, Yi and Ports (2016) found that the external debts of Chinese enterprises 
witnessed substantial increases between 2012 and 2014 . The growth of external 
debts was highly correlated with arbitraging spreads . The indebted enterprises were 
mainly from the oil and gas, real estate and other sectors . Miao and Rao’s (2016) 
similar findings suggested that the factors (such as the changes in spreads between 
domestic and foreign interest rates and the credit constraints imposed by macro-
regulation authorities on overcapacity industries, including real estate and the iron 
and steel industry) stimulated the enterprises’ borrowing abroad . During the one to 
two years prior to the second half of 2014, Chinese enterprises had increased their 
external debts by a large amount . A considerable portion of these enterprises did not 
have enough foreign exchange earnings to match their external debts . An important 
motivation of external debt accumulation is to capture the interest rate spread and 
gain from a one-way appreciation of the RMB . This paved the way for the deleveraging 
of massive external debts thereafter .
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2. Shocks—the divergence of economic trends and monetary conditions 
in China and the US
Many factors could have impacts on foreign exchange market, among which monetary 
and credit policies are of higher market concern and greater significance. Around 
the second half of 2014, the monetary policy environment at home and abroad 
changed significantly. While the US Federal Reserve was discussing the possibility 
of raising interest rates, China’s domestic monetary policy conditions were relaxed 
to some extent . Interest rates in the domestic interbank market had been declining 
generally since the end of 2013, decreasing from 4 .78 per cent in the fourth quarter 
of 2013 to 2 .49 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2016 . During this period, interest 
rates experienced a brief rebound in the first quarter of 2015, but this did not change 
the downward trend that had begun in the fourth quarter of 2013 . Since that quarter, 
the interest rate spread between China and the US was also largely dominated by 
changes in interest rates in China’s interbank market . The spread of change between 
China and the US markets and the direction of capital flows aligned with expectations.
A high correlation exists between interest rate spreads between China and the US 
and China’s cross-border capital flows. In simple terms, interest rate spreads drive 
capital flows. More precisely, changes in the economic fundamentals of China and 
the US drive capital flows, and changes in interest rate spreads reflect comprehensive 
information on the changes in fundamentals and policy responses . After mid-2014, 
cyclical industries in China continued on a downward trend, and also had to address 
overcapacity in the process of economic restructuring . Enterprises’ investment returns 
were low, while the monetary authority adopted a loose monetary policy to boost 
economic growth . Domestic enterprises generally had relatively ample liquidity and low 
capital costs, but were troubled by the lack of suitable investment projects . In contrast, 
the US economic recovery was successful during the same period; enterprises’ profits 
increased and the stock market hit record highs. With distinctly different changes in 
the economic fundamentals of the two countries, an outflow of capital was expected.
3. Response measures—phased depreciation under the principles 
of supply and demand, basket of currencies and stability
As previously discussed, the formation of the RMB/USD central parity considers two 
factors: market demand and supply, and stability against a basket of currencies .
As a result of these two factors combining, when the USD is strong against other 
currencies in the basket, the RMB depreciates against the USD . When the USD is 
weak, the RMB is stable against the USD, which leads to a gradual and phased 
depreciation of the RMB against the USD . From February to April 2016, a weaker USD 
should have led to an appreciation of the RMB against the USD . A shortage of foreign 
exchange supply should have led to a depreciation of the RMB against the USD . With 
the two factors combined, the RMB exchange rate was relatively stable in relation to 
the USD . After October 2016, the USD strengthened . While these two factors both 
require depreciation of the RMB, the RMB cannot depreciate too much under the 
principle of maintaining the stability of the RMB exchange rate .
THE JInGSHAn REPORT
158
4. Vortex—the vicious circle of RMB depreciation (due to the exchange 
rate regime) and capital outflow
Under different exchange rate regimes, the net effects of shocks on short-term capital 
flows vary widely. In a floating exchange rate regime, capital flow pressure caused 
by internal or external shocks will lead to exchange rate adjustment . Therefore, the 
relative prices of domestic and foreign financial assets will change, so the floating 
exchange rate spontaneously stabilises capital inflow or outflow. In a fixed exchange 
rate regime, capital flows caused by internal or external shocks will put pressure on 
the exchange rate . The monetary authorities have to use foreign exchange reserves 
or adjust interest rates. Therefore, the relative prices of domestic and foreign financial 
assets will change, so capital flows will be stabilised and the fixed exchange rate level 
maintained .
Under the current RMB exchange rate regime, exchange rate changes cannot stabilise 
short-term capital flows, but instead create a cycle where capital outflows and RMB 
depreciation reinforce each other. The specific logic is as follows: internal or external 
shocks lead to the situation of demand exceeding supply in the foreign exchange 
market  under the current RMB exchange rate regime, the RMB shows periodic 
depreciation  the periodic depreciation of the RMB reinforces the depreciation 
expectations of the RMB  the depreciation expectation of the RMB stimulates 
a new round of capital outflow  capital outflows exacerbate the problem of demand 
exceeding supply in the foreign exchange market (see Figure 4-1) .
Figure 4-1: The circle of RMB phased depreciation and short-term 
capital flows.
Source: Author’s original .
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The monetary authority saw the problems with the exchange rate regime 
and took measures to modify the central parity formation mechanism. 
The authority began to consider introducing a counter-cyclical factor into 
the RMB central parity formation mechanism. The main purpose of this 
was to offset pro-cyclical fluctuations driven by market sentiment and 
alleviate the ‘herd effect’ in the foreign exchange market.
After introducing the counter-cyclical factor, expectations of a one-way 
movement of the RMB exchange rate should have weakened and capital 
flow pressure should have eased. However, the exchange rate still cannot 
reflect market supply and demand or economic fundamentals. It remains 
difficult to break expectations of a one-way movement of the RMB. The 
independence of the monetary authority and macroeconomic stability still 
face challenges. After introducing the counter-cyclical factor, the impact 
of ‘the closing rate – the central parity on the previous trading day’ on the 
central parity decreased. If we do not consider the exchange rate against 
a basket of currencies, changes in the RMB/USD exchange rate will be 
minimal or even negligible (i.e. changes could be completely offset by 
the counter-cyclical factor). The introduction of the RMB exchange rate 
against a basket of currencies simply adds a stochastic volatility item to the 
RMB/USD exchange rate.
Compared to the former mechanism with no counter-cyclical factor, 
the current mechanism has lowered expectations of one-way exchange 
rate movement and eased the pressure of capital flows. However, this 
mechanism is essentially similar to a fixed exchange rate regime and 
the exchange rate does not fully respond to supply and demand in the 
market. Once economic fundamentals change, if the exchange rate 
does not respond to this, the aforementioned problems will return. The 
monetary authority will still need to intervene substantially in the market 
to maintain the exchange rate target level.
A structural adjustment perspective
To evaluate the exchange rate regime, mainstream literature adopts 
a  macroeconomic stability perspective and generally does not consider 
an economic structure perspective. But this latter perspective is necessary 
for China’s circumstances. The mainstream literature does not consider 
this perspective because the monetary authorities cannot control the real 
exchange rate no matter what type of exchange rate regime is adopted. 
Under a fixed regime, the nominal exchange rate will not change. However, 
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the price will change when shocks occur, so the real exchange rate will 
eventually be adjusted according to the economic fundamentals. Under 
a floating regime, adjustment of the nominal exchange rate will lead to an 
adjustment of the real exchange rate. In China, intervention in the foreign 
exchange market has resulted in excess base money, which in turn has 
pushed up the price level. The monetary authority then uses many policy 
instruments, including central bank bills, raising the reserve ratio, capital 
control and credit control, to offset the impact. In this way, the authority 
has a strong influence on both the nominal exchange rate and price level. 
Because of these practices, the real exchange rate cannot adjust fully in 
the short term. If the monetary authority only intervenes temporarily and 
the intervention offsets the influence of the base money increase fully, 
distortion of the real exchange rate will gradually be corrected. However, 
if the intervention remains for an extended period, distortion of the real 
exchange rate will be long-lasting and resource allocation will also be 
seriously distorted.
In an unpublished paper, Mao and Zhang (n.d.) introduced capital 
account control and foreign exchange market intervention to the 
intertemporal general equilibrium model and explained the mechanism 
by which continuous interventions in the foreign exchange market 
influence resource allocation along with the various outcomes. The model 
assumes that the government’s goal is to stabilise the nominal exchange 
rate. When external demand is high, technology advancement of domestic 
trade sector is fast, the level of the target exchange rate is low and more 
intervention will be required to stabilise the nominal exchange rate. The 
model also assumes that the capital account is balanced under capital 
control measures and that the scale of market intervention equals the 
current account balance. Based on these assumptions, the findings are as 
follows: 1) a current account surplus instigated by massive interventions 
in the foreign currency market raises real interest rates, which in turn 
curbs domestic investment; 2) market intervention can stimulate the 
industrial sector, but it suppresses non-industrial sectors and, as a result, 
the industrial sector will grow larger relative to the non-industrial 
sector, causing imbalance within the economic structure (internal 
imbalance); and 3) domestic consumption is restrained, leading to a rise 
in both the aggregate savings ratio and private sector savings ratio. This 
is how continuous purchase of foreign currencies could influence the real 
economy; the sale of foreign exchange works in the opposite direction.
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This model shows that market intervention does affect resource allocation 
in the real economy and can lead to external and internal imbalances. 
Simulation analysis shows the effect is significant.
A financial opening up perspective
This perspective is unique to China and is not discussed in mainstream 
literature. As a large developing country, China still faces many problems 
of reforms and institutional improvement. The reforms relate to many 
fields and cannot be undertaken simultaneously but implemented in an 
orderly manner. The sequence of reform of the exchange rate regime is 
a key issue.
The current exchange rate regime is not conducive to RMB 
internationalisation. Further liberalisation of the capital account is 
needed to promote RMB internationalisation. If the monetary authority 
frequently intervenes in the market and the RMB is constantly faced 
with expectations of one-way movement, the relaxation of capital 
controls will lead to excessive capital flows and threaten economic 
stability. Control measures will need to be tightened again. During 
2010 and 2013, expectations of RMB appreciation were high, and RMB 
trade settlement was liberalised. Large profits were made through carry 
trades between the onshore and offshore markets, and overseas RMB 
deposits increased rapidly. The carry trades boosted capital inflows, the 
monetary authority was  forced to take measures to maintain exchange 
rate stability and economic stability was threatened. Further, as result 
of frequent interventions and a failure of market clearing, expectations 
of RMB depreciation during 2014 and 2016 were high. Then, overseas 
RMB  deposits decreased rapidly and capital inflow turned into capital 
outflow, again threatening economic stability. During this process, the 
offshore RMB market experienced great volatility and the monetary 
authority had to intervene in the offshore market and impose stricter 
capital controls. However, these measures slowed the development of the 
offshore RMB market and the pace of RMB internationalisation.
The current exchange rate regime is also a drag on overseas direct 
investments. If the exchange rate mechanism cannot remove expectations 
of a one-way RMB movement, overseas direct investments by Chinese 
enterprises will be hindered. If a persistent expectation of RMB 
appreciation exists, overseas investment will face additional exchange 
rate risks and enterprises will choose to delay investment. Conversely, 
if  a  persistent expectation of RMB depreciation exists, enterprises will 
THE JInGSHAn REPORT
162
have a strong motivation to invest overseas. In that case, the authorities 
will tighten capital controls to restrict capital outflow, so enterprises will 
still have to postpone their investments.
Part 3: Moving towards a floating exchange 
rate regime
The floating exchange rate regime has become the choice of a growing 
number of countries. Many developed economies, and all large economies 
except China, use this regime. An increasing number of emerging market 
economies have also adopted the regime over the past 20 years. According to 
Rey (2015), in today’s highly integrated global financial market, monetary 
policy independence might not be fully realisable under a floating regime. 
Former International Monetary Fund (IMF) Chief Economist Maurice 
Obstfeld (2015) noted that, compared with other exchange rate regimes, 
although the floating regime cannot fully protect the independence of 
monetary policy, it can cushion the shock effectively and provide more 
space for domestic monetary policy. Under the floating regime, shocks from 
capital flows can cause the exchange rate to adjust and change the relative 
prices of domestic and foreign financial assets. Therefore, the floating 
exchange rate can automatically stabilise capital flow.
A consensus between the government and academia already exists that the 
ultimate goal of RMB exchange rate regime reform is to adopt a floating 
regime. However, widespread concerns remain that the transition will 
cause drastic volatility of the exchange rate and hurt the real economy. 
Many emerging market economies were forced to abandon the managed 
exchange rate regime and move to a floating regime after losing the ability 
to intervene effectively in the market. This was an involuntary choice 
for those economies in crisis situations. The following discussion is on 
whether China can actively introduce a floating regime as soon as possible.
In the medium and long term, adopting a floating regime is conducive 
to macroeconomic stability. It can improve resource allocation and 
promote RMB internationalisation and opening of the financial 
market. Putting these benefits aside, this part discusses concerns over 
the adoption of a floating regime. The focus is on whether the RMB 
will depreciate substantially if the currency floats freely, the impact of 
currency depreciation on the economy and specific approaches to achieve 
a floating regime.
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The changing trend of capital flows
Currently, short-term capital outflow is relatively large, but has steadily 
decreased. This change is due to the following situations.
First, since mid-2016, changes in net external debts have turned capital 
outflows to inflows. There are several reasons for this: 1) the scale of 
China’s external debts is not large relative to the size of the economy. 
The external debts of enterprises have decreased by more than US$300 
billion over the past two years, and the need to further reduce external 
debts has decreased; 2) local government financing platforms and state-
owned enterprises have increased their external debts; 3) interest rates in 
the domestic interbank market have increased slightly since mid-2016. 
Financial regulation has also tightened, making it more difficult for 
enterprises to raise capital in the domestic market, and enterprises are 
more willing to take on external debts; and 4) the size of existing external 
debts in China is relatively small compared to the size of its economy, and 
there is a great potential for overseas investors to hold more RMB assets. 
For these reasons, external debts should increase naturally.
Second, the motivation to hold overseas assets is weakening because: 
1)  many enterprises engaged in international trade significantly 
increased their holdings of the USD in the past two years to avoid the 
RMB’s depreciation. Now that the expectation of RMB deprecation has 
weakened and the cost of holding the USD is high, these enterprises are 
less willing to increase their holdings of the USD; 2) higher interest rates 
in the domestic market and tighter financial regulations have discouraged 
enterprises from increasing overseas assets. Yields on wealth management 
products in the household sector have recently risen significantly, while 
the opportunity cost of holding USD assets has increased; and 3) control 
of foreign exchange has been tightened and illegal overseas investments 
are subject to stricter controls.
Third, the size of China’s current account surplus and foreign direct 
investment is large, and the return on China’s financial assets is comparable 
to that of US assets. A floating exchange rate will lead to an expectation of 
two-way fluctuations in the currency. If there is no expectation of RMB 
depreciation, the rate of return on Chinese financial assets, including safe 
assets such as government bonds, will not be lower than the yields on 
US Treasury bonds. Therefore, net foreign assets will not be expected to 
increase and neither will net foreign liabilities be expected to decrease.
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Even so, it is difficult to estimate the degree of RMB depreciation that 
would occur after adopting a floating exchange rate regime. International 
experiences may shed some light on this issue.
Abandoning intervention would not lead to sharp 
currency depreciation
Here, a ‘large depreciation’ is defined as an annual depreciation of more 
than 15 per cent, and below are tallied the cases of ‘large depreciation’ in 
the IMF’s database since the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971. 
In subsequent years, a sample of 27 developed countries accumulated 
72 cases of large depreciation, while 25 less developed countries saw 
85  cases. Altogether, there are 157 cases of large depreciation from 
52 sample countries.
Most of the large depreciations occurred in a situation of inflation or 
trade  deficits. Of the 157 cases, the countries in 148 cases had high 
inflation or trade deficits or both. Only nine cases occurred in the 
context of low inflation and trade surplus. Table 4-1 shows these nine 
cases and their backgrounds, which can be divided into several categories: 
1) export-oriented economies suffered severe external crises, South Korea 
(2008–2009) and Malta (1993); 2) governments guided the devaluation 
with a  substantial relaxation of monetary conditions, Sweden (2009) 
and Japan (2013); 3) monetary system reform, Denmark (2000) and 
Switzerland (1997); 4) currencies were overvalued during the previous 
period, Japan (1996) and the Netherlands (1997); and 5) excessive credit 
and external debts, Indonesia (2001).
These international experiences show that the foreign exchange market is 
not as ineffective as some argue. Most large depreciations have occurred 
only when serious problems existed in the economic fundamentals, when 
the monetary system or monetary policy changed suddenly, or when the 
country suffered from a severe external crisis. Currently, China’s economy 
is growing at a medium rate with low inflation and a large trade surplus, 
no serious external economic crisis exists, the overall risk of the domestic 
financial system is manageable, and external debts have reduced. According 
to international experiences, the probability of large depreciation in this 
context is very low.
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Table 4-1: Cases of large depreciation
Country Year Depreciation (%) Background
Developed countries
Denmark 2000 47 .84 Introduction of the euro
Japan 1996 15 .65 Substantial appreciation during the 
previous period (appreciated 56 .8% 
in the previous two years)
Japan 2013 22 .31 Abenomics, printing money 
aggressively
Malta 1993 19 .87 Europe’s economic crisis
The 
netherlands
1997 15 .74 Pegged to the deutschmark; 
depreciation of the deutschmark 
led to the depreciation of the 
netherlands guilder
Sweden 2009 16 .12 The monetary authority guided 
depreciation by reducing interest rates
Switzerland 1997 17 .42 The gold content of each Swiss franc 
was decreased from 40% to 25%
Less developed countries
Indonesia 2001 21 .84 Banking crisis and debt crisis
South Korea 2008–2009 37 .41 2008 global financial crisis
Source: IMF database .
The advantages of deprecation to the real economy 
outweigh the disadvantages
In theory, in regard to the relationship between depreciation, economic 
growth and price, the conclusion is that depreciation will usually increase 
aggregate demand, increase economic growth and raise price levels. But 
what is the reality? According to the above sample, the economic growth 
rate in a depreciating year was higher than that of the previous year in 
41 cases, and lower in 95 cases. The inflation rate in the depreciating year 
was higher than that of the previous year in 75 cases, and lower in 52 cases. 
On the surface, a large depreciation was accompanied by a decline in 
economic growth and a rise in inflation. However, this is not a causal 
relationship. The large depreciation itself is a result, and the driving forces 
behind it are often economic downturn and upward inflation. Instead of 
depreciation leading to slower economic growth and higher inflation, the 




We should examine the relationship of depreciation to economic growth 
and inflation, after controlling for the effects of other common factors. 
Economies without high inflation and trade deficits before depreciation 
did not suffer from the effects of serious negative shocks, so the changes 
in their economic growth and inflation might reflect the impact of 
depreciation. Out of nine cases with low inflation and a trade surplus, the 
economic growth rate of six in the year of depreciation was higher than 
that of the previous year. Three were lower than the previous year, Malta 
(1993), Sweden (2009) and South Korea (2008–2009). Even in these 
three cases, it is difficult to blame depreciation for the decline in economic 
growth, because the countries suffered severe external economic crises in 
the year of depreciation. These external crises may have been the common 
factor behind the depreciation and the slowing of economic growth. The 
inflation rate rose in most of the nine cases, but not much further. Only 
Indonesia (2001) experienced an increase in inflation. This was due to low 
supply elasticity in Indonesia caused by its relatively single and backward 
economic structure. This created upward pressure on prices when demand 
rose sharply.
Yu, Zhang and Zhang (2016) studied the negative effects that a large 
depreciation might instigate based on international experiences. They 
found that, in addition to inflationary pressures, excessive external debts, 
debt crises under the background of serious currency mismatches and 
even banking and sovereign debt crises could occur. After discussing the 
overall scale, distribution pattern of industries and recent progress of 
China’s external liabilities, they concluded that the risk of depreciation 
through external debt channels was set within a limited range. The scale 
of short-term debts in China was limited and had decreased sharply in the 
past, and the profitability of cyclical industries such as real estate, steel, 
coal and other industries that borrowed more money from abroad had 
improved significantly since 2016. As such, these industries’ ability to 
resist risk was enhanced.
Two alternative floating exchange rate strategies
One strategy is to adopt a free-floating exchange rate regime like the US, 
the European Union or many other developed countries. This does not 
mean that monetary authorities have completely abandoned intervention 
in the foreign exchange market. Monetary authorities can intervene in 
extreme cases, but intervention should not become the norm.
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We can also consider a similar regime in which the RMB exchange 
rate floats  within a wide band, taking into consideration that many 
policymakers  and scholars in China have little confidence in the free-
floating exchange rate regime and are concerned that unexpected 
problems will arise during the transition period despite the advantages of 
such a regime.
Another strategy is to adopt a regime in which the RMB exchange rate 
can fluctuate in a wide band. This strategy allows the RMB to float against 
a basket of currencies and simultaneously introduces a wide band for the 
annual fluctuation of currency. For example, the index of the RMB against 
the currency basket is 100 today. In the next year, the index could float 
freely within the bands of 100±7.5 per cent and will convert to basket peg 
automatically if it hits the upper or lower limit. The central rate should 
not be adjusted too frequently.
However, there is arbitrariness about the annual floating range of 
±7.5 per cent. The choice of 7.5 per cent is mainly based on the following 
two aspects. First, if the band is too small, the space left to the market 
will not be enough. In this situation, the market cannot really play its 
role of adjusting supply and demand and the monetary authority has to 
consume more foreign exchange reserves. Second, if the band is too wide, 
the exchange rate may be too volatile to be accepted by people in China. 
We can also widen the band to 15 per cent on the basis of the European 
exchange rate regime experience. The wider the band is, the closer the 
RMB is to the floating exchange rate, and more reserve ammunition is at 
the central bank’s disposal to spare in guarding the lower limit.
There is no daily central parity and daily floating band in this strategy. The 
RMB exchange rate against the USD depends on the choice of fluctuation 
band and the change in the USD exchange rate against other currencies in 
the basket. The RMB is likely to appreciate or depreciate against the USD. 
Krugman (1991) found that if the monetary authorities had sufficient 
market credibility and the exchange rate level did not seriously deviate 
from the fundamentals, the market exchange rate would fluctuate within 
the band. Even if the currency faced a greater pressure of depreciation 
or appreciation, the exchange rate would fluctuate somewhat close to 
the lower or upper band, with the credibility of monetary authorities 
guaranteed by ample foreign exchange reserves.
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Compared with the current exchange rate regime, this strategy has the 
following advantages. First, the market forces of supply and demand 
are fully released and the risk of assuming RMB depreciation increases. 
Second, it can minimise the consumption of foreign exchange reserves. 
Third, the relatively stable basket rate is conducive to the stability 
of foreign trade. Finally, the RMB exchange rate regime can convert 
spontaneously to a two-way floating regime at any time with changes in 
the market environment.
Compared with the completely free-floating exchange rate regime, this 
strategy is a compromised choice. If the band is not wide enough, the 
independence of monetary policy will still be limited, and the monetary 
authority will need to consume foreign exchange reserves. However, this 
strategy avoids the effect of excessive exchange rate depreciation on the 
economy and combines the benefits of both short-term macroeconomic 
stability and floating exchange rates. With the widening of the fluctuation 
band, the difference between this strategy and the free-floating regime 
will disappear.
There are some important provisos in the transition from a peg regime 
to a  floating exchange rate regime. First, the monetary authority must 
tolerate  abnormal fluctuations of the foreign exchange market after 
introducing a  floating exchange rate. It should not easily intervene in 
the market, as non-intervention except for in extreme cases is related 
to the credibility of the monetary authority and market expectations. 
Second, the transparency and analysis of foreign exchange–related data 
should be strengthened and all kinds of panic statements eliminated with 
facts and logic. Third, it must be ensured that financial institutions have 
ample foreign exchange liquidity, and international coordination and 
communication must be strengthened. As depreciation of the RMB has 
an even greater impact on some small trading partners than it does on 
China, multilateral and bilateral agreements should be used to reduce 
the impact of exchange rate reform on the international market. Fourth, 
appropriate capital control should be maintained. This is particularly 
important during the transition period of exchange rate regime reform.
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Appendix 4-1: Latest currency composition 
and weights in the CFETS basket
The CFETS RMB exchange rate index refers to the CFETS’s basket of 
currencies, including all foreign currencies traded against the RMB in 
the CFETS. The weights of the sample currencies are calculated by the 
trade-weighted method after considering transit trade. The base period is 
31 December 2014, and the index of the base period is 100 points. On 
1 January 2017, the CFETS basket added 11 currencies, increasing the 
number of currencies in the CFETS basket to 24 (see Table A4-1).
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Appendix 4-2: Central parity rate and its 
independent variables
The dependent variable is the change in the central parity rate, D(MID). 
The independent variables are ‘the closing price on the previous trading 
day – the central parity rate on the previous trading day’, CLOSE(–1) 
– MID(–1), and ‘the exchange rate movements needed to maintain the 
stability of the RMB exchange rate against the basket of currencies’, 
D(BSK) (see Table A4-2 and Figure A4-1).
Table A4-2: Changes in central parity rate: Regression equation with all 
the samples
Dependent variable: D(MID)
Sample: 4/05/2016 to 8/08/2017
Observations: 330 after adjustments
variable Coefficient SE t-statistic Prob .
CLOSE(–1) – MID(–1) 0 .959534 0 .043452 22 .08242 0 .0000
D(BSK) 0 .498339 0 .028272 17 .62631 0 .0000
C –0 .002882 0 .000482 –5 .978667 0 .0000
R-squared 0 .718572 Mean dependent variable 0 .000788
Adjusted R-squared 0 .716851 SD dependent variable 0 .015434
SE of regression 0 .008213 Akaike information criterion –6 .757225
Sum squared residual 0 .022056 Schwarz criterion –6 .722688
Log likelihood 1117 .942 Hannan–Quinn criterion –6 .743448




Figure A4-1: Residual term of the regression equation with all samples.
Source: Authors’ original .
Table A4-3. Regression equation with the samples before the breakpoint
Dependent variable: D(MID)
Sample (adjusted): 4/05/2016 to 1/19/2017
Observations: 197 after adjustments
variable Coefficient SE t-statistic Prob .
C –0 .001625 0 .000638 –2 .544542 0 .0117
CLOSE(–1) – MID(–1) 1 .127450 0 .058927 19 .13298 0 .0000
D(BSK01) 0 .455855 0 .034447 13 .23341 0 .0000
R-squared 0 .755179 Mean dependent variable 0 .002022
Adjusted R-squared 0 .752655 SD dependent variable 0 .017435
SE of regression 0 .008671 Akaike information criterion –6 .642570
Sum squared residual 0 .014586 Schwarz criterion –6 .592572
Log likelihood 657 .2931 Hannan–Quinn criterion –6 .622330
F-statistic 299 .2072 Durbin Watson statistic 2 .229122
Prob(F-statistic) 0 .000000
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Table A4-4: Regression equation with the samples after the breakpoint
Dependent variable: D(MID)
Sample: 1/20/2017 to 8/08/2017
Observations: 133
variable Coefficient SE t-statistic Prob . 
C –0 .004173 0 .000614 –6 .797155 0 .0000
CLOSE(–1)-MID
(–1) 0 .766417 0 .053334 14 .37004 0 .0000
D(BSK01) 0 .543422 0 .043856 12 .39113 0 .0000
R-squared 0 .728125 Mean dependent variable –0 .001041
Adjusted R-squared 0 .723942 SD dependent variable 0 .011693
SE of regression 0 .006144 Akaike information criterion –7 .324501
Sum squared residual 0 .004907 Schwarz criterion –7 .259306
Log likelihood 490 .0793 Hannan–Quinn criterion –7 .298008





China’s Cross-Border Capital 
Flow Management
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Since the global financial crisis, China has accelerated the process of 
capital account liberalisation and RMB internationalisation. Financial 
openness has increased significantly. However, over the past few years, 
China has used both market intervention and capital flow management 
measures to deal with the shocks resulting from intense capital outflow. 
In the future, China should properly separate macro-management 
and micro-regulation, and establish a dual-pillar cross-border capital 
flow management framework. Additionally, capital flow management, 
especially capital control, should only be temporary measures used to buy 
time for other reforms.
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Part 1: Increasing impact of cross-border 
capital flows
China’s balance of payments is changing from 
‘twin surpluses’ to ‘one surplus, one deficit’
Since the exchange rate unification reforms in 1994 through to 2013, 
China’s current account and capital account both had surpluses (i.e. ‘twin 
surpluses’ until 2013), except in 1998 and 2012 (see Figure 5-1). Since 
the second quarter of 2014, China’s balance of payments has changed 
to the pattern of current account surplus and capital account deficit 
(see Figure 5-2).
Figure 5-1: China’s long-lasting balance of payments ‘twin surpluses’ 
(US$100 million).
Source: State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) (2015) and CF40 (2017) .
177
5 . CHInA’S CROSS-BORDER CAPITAL FLOW MAnAGEMEnT
Figure 5-2: Large capital inflows changing into concentrated outflows 
(US$100 million).
Source: SAFE (2017) and CF40 (2017) .
In theory, a country’s current account should mirror its capital account; 
that is, a surplus in the current account is mirrored in the deficit of the 
capital account (such as in Japan and Germany) or a deficit in the current 
account is mirrored in the surplus of the capital account (such as in the 
United States [US] and United Kingdom [UK]). A country’s international 
payments should be generally balanced. China’s sustained ‘twin surpluses’ 
is a form of external economic imbalance. Ideally, the more trade surplus, 
the larger the capital outflows. However, a capital account deficit does not 
mean that the RMB exchange rate must depreciate, just as a trade deficit 
cannot explain or predict depreciation of the USD. Neither can capital 
inflows be used to explain or predict appreciation of the USD.
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Capital flows have gradually replaced current 
account transactions as the main items determining 
balance of payments conditions
China’s current account has been in surplus since 1993. After joining the 
World Trade Organization, the scale of China’s current account surplus 
kept increasing and played a dominant role in the balance of payments 
surplus. The ratio of current account surplus to gross domestic product 
(GDP) peaked at 9.9 per cent in 2007. After the global financial crisis 
(GFC) in 2008, the ratio of current account balance to GDP began 
to decrease. It has remained within ±4 per cent of the internationally 
accepted reasonable range since 2010. The current level is about 2 per cent 
(see Figure 5-3).
Figure 5-3: China’s current account surplus to GDP ratio gradually 
moving into the range of basic balance (%).
Source: SAFE (2016), national Bureau of Statistics (2016) and CF40 (2016) .
Conversely, the proportion of capital account transactions in China’s 
balance of payments increased. These transactions began to dominate 
against a backdrop of abundant liquidity and low interest rates in developed 
economies and the rapid growth of China’s economy in the post-GFC era. 
Specifically, between 2005 and 2009, the average contributions of current 
account surplus and capital account surplus (including net errors and 
omissions, the same as below) to the growth of China’s foreign exchange 
reserve were 72 per cent and 28 per cent respectively. In 2010, 2011 and 
2013, these were 40 per cent and 60 per cent respectively (excluding 
2012, due to net capital outflows in that year; see Figure 5-4).
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Figure 5-4: The increasing impact of cross-border capital flows on 
China’s balance of payments (%).
note: The proportions in the graph are the ratios of current account and capital account 
balances to the change in foreign exchange reserve (excluding the valuation effect).
Source: SAFE (2016) and CF40 (2016) .
Since the second quarter of 2014, China’s current account has remained 
in surplus, but the capital account has moved from net inflows to net 
outflows (see Figure 5-2). After the ‘8.11’ exchange rate reform in 2015,6 
a trend of capital outflows became increasingly apparent. In 2015, the 
capital account deficit was US$647.5 billion. Foreign exchange reserve 
decreased by US$342.3 billion, even though the current account surplus 
amounted to US$304.2 billion. In 2016, the balance of payments remained 
in significant deficit: the current account surplus was US$196.4 billion 
and the capital account deficit was US$639.7 billion. Foreign exchange 
reserve decreased by US$448.7 billion, US$106.6 billion more than the 
2015 drop (see Figure 5-1).
6  On 11 August 2015, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) announced an adjustment of its RMB 
central parity system. Daily central parity quotes should be based on the previous day’s closing rate 
of the interbank foreign exchange rate market, supply and demand, and price movements of major 
currencies. The PBC decided to make its exchange rate regime more competitive and market oriented, 
leading to a depreciation of more than 4 per cent in the same month.
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A net capital outflow larger than the current account surplus has become 
the main cause of the decline in foreign exchange reserves and the main 
factor influencing the balance of payments situation. The RMB exchange 
rate is no longer a commodity price determined by the trade balance, 
but is an asset price driven by capital flows. A major difference between 
an asset price and a commodity price is that the asset price is prone to 
overshooting relative to the equilibrium exchange rate level.
Short-term capital flows constitute the main part 
of current capital outflows
In theory, short-term capital flows are usually measured by portfolio 
investments, other investments and net errors and omissions in the 
balance of payments (i.e. non–foreign direct investment capital flows). 
The sum of the current account and direct investment balances constitutes 
the basic balance of international payments. This is the main factor 
affecting the balance of international payments. Empirical analysis shows 
that as China’s economy becomes more open, the impacts of short-term 
cross-border capital flows on macroeconomic and financial stability are 
increasingly significant (Li, Wang, Liu & Hao, 2016). Since the exchange 
rate reform in 2005, several aspects of China’s cross-border capital flows 
have changed. These are discussed below.
Regarding the impact of short-term capital flows on all cross-border 
capital flows, 13 of the 24 quarters from the beginning of 2005 to the 
end of 2010 experienced net outflows of short-term capital. Only five 
quarters experienced net outflows for the entire capital account, all with 
simultaneous net outflows of short-term capital. Additionally, 17 of the 
24 quarters from the beginning of 2011 to the end of 2016 experienced 
net outflows of short-term capital, while 15 experienced net outflows for 
the entire capital account, along with simultaneous net outflows of short-
term capital (see Figure 5-5). This occurred because the net outflow of 
short-term capital exceeded the direct investment surplus, such that the 
capital account ended up with net outflows.
From the beginning of 2005 to the end of 2013, the RMB exchange 
rate faced sustained pressure of one-way appreciation; substantial net 
inflows of international capital existed and foreign exchange reserves 
increased significantly during these years. However, since 2011, 
China’s cross-border capital flows have revealed two-way fluctuation 
patterns. During the fourth quarter of 2011 and the second and third 
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quarters 2012 (which were affected by the European and US sovereign 
debt crises), market risk-aversion sentiment increased, RMB depreciation 
expectations were heightened, carry trade transactions began unwinding, 
and short-term capital left China. After this, short-term capital inflows 
and RMB exchange rate appreciation pressure once again became evident. 
Consequently, when discussing capital flow conditions and exchange rate 
pressures from 2011 to 2013, it is important to identify the specific period.
Figure 5-5: The change from cross-border capital inflows to 
concentrated outflows (US$100 million).
Source: SAFE (2016) and CF40 and (2016) .
Short-term capital flows have also had a more significant effect on the 
balance of international payments. In the 24 quarters from the beginning 
of  2005 to the end of 2010, short-term capital flows never exceeded 
the basic balance. However, short-term capital flows exceeded the basic 
balance in 13 of the 24 quarters from 2011 to 2016 (see Figure 5-6). 
Especially after 2014, short-term capital exhibited a pattern of sustained 
net outflows. As seen from annual data, the ratio of net short-term 
capital outflows to the basic balance in 2014 was –69 per cent, reaching 
–192 per cent and –396 per cent in 2015 and 2016 respectively. A net 
short-term capital outflow exceeding the surplus of basic balance is 




Figure 5-6: China’s foreign exchange market entering a state of multiple 
equilibria (US$100 million; %).
Source: SAFE (2016) and CF40 (2016) .
Short-term capital flows are likely to be influenced by changes in 
market sentiments and deviate from the fundamentals; this has led to 
a state of multiple equilibria7 in the domestic foreign exchange market. 
The multiple equilibria means that capital may flow in or out, and the 
RMB may appreciate or depreciate, given the economic fundamentals 
of stable trade surplus, positive economic growth and abundant foreign 
exchange reserves. This is the restraint faced by China’s authorities; 
that is, regardless of whether the RMB exchange rate is at a reasonable 
equilibrium level,  the  market exchange rate cannot automatically 
stabilise at that level. When the market is generally more bullish, it will 
7  As discussed by Obstfeld (1994, 1996) and Krugman (1999), there is a multiple equilibria state in 
the foreign exchange market that goes beyond fundamentals and is determined by market expectations. 
Obstfeld argued that government and market behaviour can be understood by dynamic game models 
in the context of stable macroeconomic fundamentals. As the government’s objective equation contains 
multiple policy objectives, the game process will be affected by different market expectations and result 
in multiple equilibria. Krugman also recognised the existence of such multiple equilibria and analysed 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis based on the model of the corporate balance sheet.
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choose to believe in positive news. Then, the exchange rate may move 
above the equilibrium level and, thus, the currency becomes overvalued. 
When the market is generally bearish, it will choose to believe negative 
news. And the exchange rate may drop below the equilibrium level and, 
thus, the currency becomes undervalued.
Asset diversification is an important channel for 
China’s capital outflows
The capital account consists of assets and liabilities. The assets are external 
investments, including outward direct investment (ODI), portfolio 
investment (such as Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor [QDII], 
the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect and the Shenzhen–Hong 
Kong Stock Connect) and other investment (such as external loans and 
export accounts receivables). The liabilities are the use of foreign capital, 
including inward direct investment, portfolio investment (such as 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor [QFII], RMB Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor [RQFII], the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect 
and the Shenzhen–Hong Kong Stock Connect) and other investment 
(such as external borrowings, deferred payments for imports and foreign 
holdings of RMB assets).
Continuous net outflows have been evident from the asset side since early 
2005, except for two quarters. Specifically, before the second quarter 
of 2014, these outflows included the overseas use of policy funds, such 
as the establishment of sovereign wealth funds, use of entrusted loans 
and foreign  exchange swaps to support overseas acquisitions. After the 
second quarter of 2014, with the changes in the market environment, 
domestic entities increased their overseas investments. In the 11 quarters 
up to the end of 2016, the asset side has always maintained net outflows 
(see Figure 5-7).
Net inflows were evident from the liability side from the beginning of 2005 
to the first quarter of 2014, except for two quarters. During the 11 quarters 
with continuous capital outflows under the capital and financial account 
(from the second quarter of 2014 to the fourth quarter of 2016), only 
four quarters had net outflows from the liability side due to repayment of 
external debt, leaving all other quarters with net inflows (see Figure 5-7). In 
particular, since the second quarter of 2016, the liability side has again seen 
net inflows, as domestic institutions resumed borrowing from overseas and 
foreign entities increased holdings of RMB assets.
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Figure 5-7: ‘Increase of foreign exchange holdings by households’ is the 
main driving force behind China’s capital outflows (US$100 million).
Source: SAFE (2016) and CF40 (2016) .
In terms of annual data, China’s external assets increased by US$462.9 billion, 
US$333.5 billion and US$661.1 billion in 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively. 
External liabilities changed by US$411.5 billion, –US$101  billion and 
US$244.1 billion respectively. This shows that the pressure of capital 
outflow from the liability side was released; the current pressure of capital 
outflows is mainly due to demand for foreign exchange assets or an increase 
of foreign asset allocation by domestic institutions and households. Under 
this circumstance, stabilising domestic entities’ confidence in RMB assets is 
vital to the stability of cross-border capital flows.
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Part 2: International community has 
softened the stance on cross-border capital 
flow management
The International Monetary Fund on management 
of cross-border capital flows
Changes in the International Monetary Fund’s position
Since the establishment of the Bretton Woods system, the international 
community’s attitude towards capital flows has undergone a historical cycle 
from ‘control’ to ‘relaxation’ to ‘pro-control’. This change is closely related 
to the specific economic environment, trends in economic thinking and 
attitudes of important countries to capital controls (see Table 5-1).


































Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2001) and CF40 (2017) .
In the first stage, the IMF supported capital control. There were four 
main reasons for this. The first reason concerns the impact of mainstream 
economic thinking. Under the Bretton Woods system, embedded 
liberalism was the mainstream concept applied to economic activity. 
This approach emphasised domestic interventions within multilateral 
frameworks (Ruggie, 1981).
The second reason concerns the economic mission for the specific period. 
The 1950s saw the post–World War II recovery of the international 
monetary system. Countries’ major economic objectives were to promote 
full employment and balance of international payments. Imposing 




The third reason concerns the implementation of a fixed exchange rate 
system under the Bretton Woods system. According to the impossible 
trinity theory, independence of monetary policy cannot be achieved 
without placing capital controls under a fixed exchange rate regime 
(Krugman, 1995). To ensure implementation of a fixed exchange rate 
system, an economy must control cross-border capital flows.
The fourth reason concerns ideas about international capital flows. 
During this period, the IMF argued that the chaos in international capital 
markets prior to World War II was due to unregulated capital flows. 
Throughout this stage, the IMF’s attitude towards capital control was 
directly reflected in its policymaking. For example, the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement only gave it the right to conduct surveillance over a member’s 
current account convertibility; Article VI allowed IMF member states to 
exercise appropriate controls under certain conditions.
In the second stage (until the 1970s), the IMF’s attitude towards 
capital controls loosened and the IMF began to think that cross-border 
capital flows should not be regulated. There were three reasons behind 
this change. First, changes in economic thinking. During this period, 
neoliberalism replaced embedded liberalism as the guiding principle of 
economic activity. Neoliberalism emphasises the market’s role and seeks 
to reduce government intervention in the market.
Second, a new mission for economic governance. After achieving the 
two goals of full employment and balance of international payments, 
economies began to pursue greater interests—namely, ‘promoting 
free trade, free capital flows, and free entry into the global market by 
multinational corporations’. Under this principle, countries gradually 
relaxed capital controls, and some developed and developing countries 
began to promote capital account liberalisation (Corker & Tseng, 1991).
Third, the position of the US. As the world’s top economic power, the 
US’s position has always had great influence on the IMF and other 
international organisations. During this period, the US opposed capital 
controls. The IMF was influenced by this attitude and began promoting 
capital account liberalisation.
During this period, the IMF made many efforts to promote cross-border 
capital flows. In 1978, it completed a second revision of the Articles of 
Agreement; Article IV clearly stated that the IMF would facilitate capital 
exchange among countries (Kose, Prasad, Rogoff & Wei, 2010). In 1997, 
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the IMF’s Interim Committee proposed to promote the liberalisation of 
capital flows as one of the IMF’s mandates, and would require that member 
states (unless approved by the IMF) not impose restrictions on any type 
of cross-border capital flows. However, due to the outbreak of the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, many key members were reluctant to relinquish 
control of cross-border capital flows, and the proposal was laid aside.
In the third stage, repeated financial crises made the IMF reconsider 
capital control measures. There were four reasons for this. First, the 
outbreak of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2007 US subprime 
mortgage crisis led to a re-examination of capital flows. According to an 
IMF (2011) report, economic regulators, countries and regions began to 
realise that capital flows were posing serious challenges to global economic 
stability. The crucial reason for this was the lack of a global framework for 
managing and overseeing global capital flows.
Second, successful developing countries (such as China, India and Brazil) 
were reluctant to liberalise their capital accounts. They had imposed 
temporary or permanent capital controls, but all had achieved strong 
economic growth. These countries’ success forced others to reconsider 
whether abandoning capital flow management was an inevitable choice 
for economic development.
Third, changes in economic thinking prompted reassessment of capital 
control measures. Neoclassical thinking was overly confident about 
the market, while it had been proved that the market could also cause 
economic instability. This approach was gradually replaced by the idea 
of macroprudential management, which emphasises the need for the 
government to regulate the economy.
The fourth reason concerns the empirical study of capital flows. The 
IMF’s research team conducted a study on the 2008 GFC (IMF, 2009). 
The team determined that the more debt capital and direct financial 
investment inflows grew in a country, the worse its economy performed 
in the GFC. This indicated the high risks associated with these two types 
of capital flows. Regarding capital controls, the empirical results revealed 
that countries with regulations generally performed better than countries 
without them.
During this stage, the IMF first proposed establishing a unified framework 
for managing capital movements in 2005. Additionally, it elaborated 
a specific framework for cross-border capital flow management in the 2009 
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Global Financial Stability Report (Masciandaro, Nieto & Quintyn, 2009). 
However, this change in the IMF’s attitude did not extend to supporting 
implementation of capital controls with no restraints. Instead, the IMF 
still emphasised that capital flow management measures should not 
affect trade-related capital flows. The third clause of the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement Article VI states:
members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate 
international capital movements, but no member may exercise 
these controls in a manner which will restrict payments for 
current transactions or which will unduly delay transfers of funds 
in settlement of commitments.
The IMF hoped to establish a unified capital flow management model, 
but it experienced much resistance. Developing countries did not want 
the IMF to intervene in their capital flow management, and developed 
economies still had doubts about capital controls, believing that the 
cost of maintaining capital controls was too high. This meant that the 
IMF’s position towards capital flow management had to become more 
flexible. Simultaneously, the IMF also deliberately revised the relevant 
terminology. ‘Liberalisation of capital flows’ replaced ‘capital account 
liberalisation’, and ‘capital flow management measures’ replaced ‘capital 
controls’. The former change eliminated unpleasant memories associated 
with a particular vocabulary in developing countries, while the latter 
alleviated (to a certain extent) the concerns of developed economies 
regarding capital controls.
Current account convertibility and cross-border capital 
flow management
Cross-border capital flow management is related to both capital account 
convertibility and current account convertibility. Current account refers 
to payments between countries that are not asset transfers such as those 
for goods, services and unilateral transfers. According to the IMF’s 
Articles of Agreement Article VIII, current account convertibility has the 
following three meanings: 1) ‘no member shall, without the approval of 
the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers 
for current international transactions’; 2) ‘No member shall engage in … 
any discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices’; 
3)  ‘Each member shall buy balances of its currency held by another 
member’. On 1 December 1996, China accepted the obligations stated in 
Article VIII and achieved current account convertibility.
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According to the relevant provisions, current account convertibility only 
covers the outflow of funds; no requirements exist pertaining to the inflow 
of funds. As long as there are no direct restrictions on the acquisition or 
use of foreign exchange for external payments in current transactions, no 
violation of the convertibility commitment exists. In many developing 
countries, even after they become ‘Article VIII countries’, governments 
still take certain capital flow management measures. These commonly 
include restrictions on settlement methods, authenticity checks and 
registration requirements for statistical monitoring and analysis.
From the perspective of China’s capital flow management operation, 
neither the previous mandatory repatriation and surrender nor the current 
stringent authenticity checks for current account payments violate IMF 
rules. Current account convertibility and capital flow management are 
non-exclusive concepts. It is reasonable and necessary to conduct capital 
flow management under the condition of current account convertibility.
Capital controls and macroprudential management
According to the IMF, capital controls, macroprudential regulatory 
policies and macroeconomic policies together constitute the policy 
framework for managing capital flows (Coats, 2009). The IMF suggests 
using different tools for the various circumstances of capital flows. 
First, when capital flows affect the economy through macroeconomic 
channels, macroeconomic policy should be used to reduce the impact 
of capital flows. Second, when capital flows affect the economy through 
financial channels, macroprudential regulation or capital controls should 
be considered.
Regarding the difference between capital controls and macroprudential 
regulatory policies, an IMF working paper (Korinek & Sandri, 2015) 
provides some approaches.
First, targets of the two types of policies are different. Macroprudential 
policies and capital controls both address the rapid flows of capital 
through financial channels, but they affect capital flows in different ways. 
Macroprudential regulation focuses on the source of funds, restricts the 
borrowing ability of domestic entities and regulates borrowers and lenders. 
But it does not differentiate loans from overseas banks from those from 
domestic banks. The policy will increase the financing cost of domestic 
borrowers and restricts excessive borrowing by domestic entities. On the 
other hand, capital control measures identify the real ‘international’ capital 
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and impose quantity control (such as restrictions on transaction volume) 
or price control (such as tax). This will create interest rate differentials 
between the international market and the domestic market.
Second, the timing of implementation can differ. In an open economy, 
a sudden stop of capital flows could cause currency devaluation and, 
subsequently, capital outflows. If capital controls are strengthened, 
domestic entities will reduce lending to international agents due to rising 
costs. On the other hand, if macroprudential regulations are strengthened, 
the cost of speculation will increase. Macroprudential policies can be 
used to combat asset price speculation and prevent the accumulation of 
financial risks, and are forward looking. Capital controls can break the 
vicious cycle of capital outflow and currency devaluation, and can be 
used as a last defence against cross-border capital flow. Macroprudential 
regulatory tools are summarised in Table 5-2.
Table 5-2: Macroprudential regulatory tools
Types of tools Name Brief description
Tobin tax Unremunerated reserve 
requirement
Demand a certain share of capital 
inflows to be deposited in a bank for 
a certain period without interest
Withholding tax Withhold a proportion of the capital 
borrowed by residents from overseas
Foreign exchange tax/
financial transaction tax
Transaction tax on foreign exchange 
transactions
Capital gains tax/income 
tax
Tax on gains of nonresident entities in 
domestic securities markets




Tax on financial institutions’ external 




Prevent over-borrowing through spot, 
forward and derivatives markets for 
foreign exchange loans
Window 
guidance that is 
not administrative 
measures
Authenticity check Demand documents proving the 
authenticity of external payment or 
transfer; non-restrictive measure
Restriction on settlement 
methods
Specify payment forms or payment 
channels
Registration for the 
purpose of statistical 
monitoring and analysis
not for the purpose of restricting 
payment; non-restrictive measure
Source: Compiled by the study group of CF40 .
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It is not reasonable to define the distinction between capital control 
measures and macroprudential regulations based on the traditional 
perspective of whether the policy tool has a direct (quantitative tools) or 
indirect (price-based tools) impact. For example, quantitative restrictions, 
which are generally considered capital controls, can also be used for 
macroprudential regulation. More generally, the difference between 
macroprudential regulations and capital controls can be attributed to 
different motives during formulation and implementation.
Macroprudential regulation and the Tobin tax
In practice, both explicit and implicit taxation exists for cross-border 
capital flows. Explicit taxes include the Tobin tax, income tax and 
withholding tax, while implicit taxes include the unremunerated reserve 
requirement (URR).
In the narrow sense, the Tobin tax refers to a tax on all foreign exchange 
transactions. It can reduce short-term capital flows and alleviate exchange 
rate instability. However, the Tobin tax cannot differentiate between 
‘disruptive transactions’ and ‘normal transactions’. As such, in the long 
term, it will affect capital inflows. Therefore, a ‘two-tier Tobin tax’ 
structure has been proposed. Here, while all financial flows are taxed at 
a low rate, abnormal capital flows are allotted a temporary and punitive 
higher tax rate.
In the broader sense, the Tobin tax refers to all the tools that increase 
the costs of cross-border capital flows, including the aforementioned 
income  tax, withholding tax, repatriation tax and URR. In particular, 
income tax refers to a tax on gains of nonresidents’ holdings of domestic 
asset; it aims to curb certain capital flows. For example, most countries 
and regions impose a tax on gains of nonresidents’ investment in domestic 
securities. Withholding tax refers to a tax that withholds a proportion 
of funds upon receipts; it normally targets the overseas borrowings 
of domestic agents. Repatriation tax is a tax on the principal of cross-
border investment to be repatriated; the tax rate is inversely related to the 
length of domestic habitation. This seeks to combat ‘hot’ money. URR 
requires a certain proportion of cross-border investment to be deposited 
in a central bank without interest accrued. It can freeze part of the capital 
and, thus, increase liquidity cost indirectly.
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Implementation of the Tobin tax generally has the following effects. 
First, it curbs short-term capital flows and maintains exchange rate 
stability. Second, it increases the independence of monetary policy—in 
theory, the Tobin tax can effectively block the channel between domestic 
and international markets and create more room for monetary policy 
implementation. Third, it increases government revenue.
Notably, while the Tobin tax and macroprudential regulatory instruments 
are common tools for cross-border capital flow management, the regulatory 
objectives for implementing the Tobin tax and macroprudential regulation 
are not exactly the same. The Tobin tax’s objective is to limit the flow of 
capital and influence the size and structure of capital flows. Prudential 
management tools are mainly used to prevent the accumulation of 
financial risks and to stabilise financial systems, whether the risk originates 
domestically or internationally.
Notably, from the date of initiation, the Tobin tax was of little concern to 
the international community. Instead, the IMF and other international 
organisations changed their views on the Tobin tax many times, much as 
they had on capital flows. The Tobin tax was first proposed in the early 1970s, 
when the Bretton Woods system had nearly fallen apart. All economies 
were faced with the problem of how to promote international capital 
flows effectively. The famous US economist James Tobin first proposed 
throwing ‘some sand in the well-greased wheels of international finance’ 
(Tobin, 1998). Unfortunately, because the international community and 
the IMF were tolerant and optimistic regarding cross-border capital flows, 
such management measures received minimal attention, and the Tobin 
tax was not discussed at length.
In the early 1990s, successive financial crises exposed the risks of unregulated 
capital flows to the international financial system and economies. The 
IMF began to change its attitude towards capital controls and proposed 
building a cross-border capital flow management framework. The Tobin 
tax was recommended by some economists, including Tobin, and was 
once again raised publicly. With Tobin’s death and relative stability in the 
international financial market at the start of the new century, the Tobin 
tax once again fell from view.
It was not until the outbreak of the 2008 GFC that the Tobin tax once again 
received wide attention. It was generally accepted by European countries 
and, inspired by the notion, Germany, France and 11 other European 
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Union (EU) member states even began to advocate financial transaction 
taxes on stock, bonds and derivatives transactions. Although the EU 
initiative to levy a financial transaction tax in 2014 suffered setbacks, a 
consensus has existed in European thinking and practice regarding the 
Tobin tax and its upgraded version. Each of the three resurgences of this 
tax have been related to a financial crisis at a specific time. Thus, it can be 
said that adopting the Tobin tax is a reaction to financial crises.
International experience and assessment 
of the effectiveness of cross-border capital 
flow management
Some cross-border capital flow management policies and measures are 
shown in Table 5-3.
Table 5-3: Cross-border capital flow management in some countries
Country Period Purpose Measures Specific policies
Chile 1991–1998 Control inflows URR The proportion to the size 
of inflow was 20% (with 
differing application times); 
it was then raised to 30% 
(1 year)
Columbia 1993–1998 Control inflows URR The application time 
was set at 18 months; 
the coverage was then 
extended to trade credit
Columbia 2007–2008 Control inflows Prudential 
regulation
The proportion to inflow 
was set at 40% (6 months), 
then raised to 50%
Brazil 1993–1997 Control inflows Tax Tax on capital inflow
Brazil 2008 Control inflows Tax Capital inflow tax was 
gradually raised from 
1 .5% to 6%
Brazil 2011 Control inflows Prudential 
regulation
non-interest-bearing 
reserves with the central 
bank for banks’ borrowing 
in USD above certain limits
Malaysia 1994 Control inflows Prudential 
regulation
Upper limit on bank’s net 
liabilities, non-interest-
bearing deposit rules
Malaysia 1998 Control outflows Administrative 
regulation
12 months minimum 





Country Period Purpose Measures Specific policies
Thailand 1995–1996 Control inflows URR URR was applied to 
nonresident baht accounts
Thailand 2006 Control inflows URR URR rate of 30% (1 year) 
was applied to foreign 
currency settlement by 
financial institutions
Thailand 2010 Control inflows Tax 15% withholding tax on 
capital gains and interest 
income on foreign held 
domestic bonds
Croatia 2004–2008 Control inflows Prudential 
regulation
Prudential marginal reserve 
requirement for banks’ 
foreign financing
Russia 2004 Control inflows URR Different URR, for example, 
3% (1 year) for foreign 
loans and 20% (1 year) for 
transactions of government 
bonds
Iceland 2008 Control outflows Administrative 
regulation
Compulsory requirement 
on remittance of foreign 
exchange income by 
exporters, restrictions on 
financial derivatives trading 
in the domestic market
Ukraine 2008 Control outflows Administrative 
regulation
5 waiting days for 
nonresidents to convert 
hryvnia into foreign 
currency
Korea 2011 Control inflows Tax 14% withholding tax 
on interest and transfer 
payment on foreign held 
domestic bonds
Indonesia 2011 Control inflows URR URR (6 months) was 
gradually raised from 
1% to 8%
Israel 2011 Control inflows Prudential 
regulation
10% reserve requirement 
for foreign exchange swap 
and forward transactions of 
banks and nonresidents
Cyprus 2013 Control outflows Administrative 
regulation
€300 limit on residents’ 
withdrawal of cash; partial 
restriction on remittance 
of funds overseas by 
importers
note: URR = unremunerated reserve requirement .
Source: IMF (2016a) and CF40 (2017) .
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Success case 1: Malaysia’s response to capital outflows 
in 1998
In the 1970s and 1980s, Malaysia accelerated the liberalisation of the 
capital account. This increased potential macroeconomic and financial 
risks, including insufficient foreign exchange reserves, increased 
financial system vulnerability and disequilibrium in the real exchange 
rate. Malaysia implemented controls on capital inflows in 1994, which 
resulted in positive outcomes over a short period, preventing excessive 
capital inflows and eliminating economic bubbles. However, the control 
measures did not improve capital flow structure effectively. Thus, when 
Malaysia experienced political turmoil in 1998, many investors developed 
a pessimistic outlook on Malaysia’s future. Exposure to potential 
macroeconomic risks led to the rapid withdrawal of foreign capital, which 
eventually resulted in a sharp increase in exchange rate volatility.
The government immediately launched a new round of capital controls, 
which included a ban on all offshore trading of the ringgit and a 12-month 
waiting period before nonresidents could convert the proceeds from 
selling domestic securities to foreign currency.
After implementing these controls, Malaysia’s exchange rate remained 
stable and foreign exchange reserves increased. Restrictions on capital 
flows provided policy space within which the Malaysian Government 
stabilised the exchange rate, accumulated foreign exchange reserves and 
reduced interest rates to revive the domestic economy.
Malaysia’s success in cross-border capital flow management was due to two 
reasons. First, Malaysia had previously implemented cross-border capital 
flow management and, thus, had practical experience. Foreign investors 
also had confidence in the successful handling of capital outflows by 
the Malaysian Government. Second, along with the implementation of 
financial controls to obtain monetary policy independence, the Malaysian 
Government had also implemented financial and corporate restructuring 
to stimulate the economy. The government’s policy focused on short-
term capital flows, especially selling of domestic securities by nonresident 
holders, and tried to curb speculation by offshore hedge funds to prevent 
currency devaluation. Simultaneously, the government also made a long-
term commitment to trade and investment liberalisation, and encouraged 




Malaysia’s capital flight in 1998 was largely due to scepticism about the 
country’s political stability and pessimistic views of its macroeconomic 
future. The Malaysian Government adopted the policy toolkit of control 
over capital flows in the short term and support for foreign investment 
in the long term. Foreign investors’ confidence was restored and their 
worries alleviated, hence problems were solved at the source.
Success case 2: The Icelandic experience of dealing with 
capital outflows in 2008
The 2008 GFC led to the bankruptcy of Iceland’s three largest commercial 
banks. These three banks held an enormous amount of short-term foreign 
debt, a total of about six times the country’s GDP.
The Icelandic Government took the following measures to deal with the 
subsequent capital outflows. First, the government prohibited all types 
of cross-border capital flows; second, it prohibited foreign exchange 
transactions in the offshore market; third, exporters were required to 
repatriate their income in foreign currencies; and fourth, limitations were 
placed on financial derivatives transactions in the domestic market.
With this intervention, capital outflow was curbed and the krona’s 
exchange rate was stabilised quickly. These capital outflow measures 
achieved early results. Capital flow restrictions enabled the Icelandic 
Government to reduce interest rates and revitalise the domestic economy. 
Iceland exited from this seven-year restrictive policy with the imposition 
of a ‘stability tax’ in June 2015.
Failure case 1: Ukraine’s approach to capital outflows 
in 2008
Before the 2008 GFC, Ukraine had experienced large-scale capital 
inflows, which triggered domestic credit and asset price booms. The 
loan-to-deposit ratio was at one time more than 150 per cent; signs of 
economic overheating were apparent. After the GFC, Ukraine suffered 
a  serious banking and currency crisis under the impacts of both the 
current account deficit and capital outflows.
A banking crisis could easily lead to systemic financial crisis. At that 
time, domestic bank deposits had fallen by more than 20 per cent and 
the government had reduced the capital adequacy ratio of many banks 
to below minimum regulatory requirements. In the meantime, Ukraine’s 
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long-term pegged exchange rate system could not be maintained; even 
with the loss of 25 per cent of foreign exchange reserves, the currency was 
still forced to depreciate by about 35 per cent.
In response to the currency crisis, the Ukrainian central bank adopted the 
following measures. First, the central bank revised the method for banks 
to move bad foreign currency loans from the balance sheet and foreign 
exchange positions. This led to many banks (especially foreign banks) 
selling a significant amount of foreign exchange in the market. Second, 
more stringent banking practices were applied, including limiting early 
withdrawal of time deposits and prohibiting early repayment of foreign 
currency loans and currency exchange by non-domestic banks. Third, 
the banks suspended the deposit reserve requirement on banks’ short-
term foreign borrowings. Fourth, the bank implemented controls on 
foreign investment, especially the five-day compulsory waiting period for 
nonresidents’ exchange of domestic currency into foreign currency. Fifth, 
other measures were implemented including prohibiting foreign currency 
loans to unhedged borrowers and a monthly quota on foreign exchange 
allowed for natural persons.
These measures gave only temporary relief. The hryvnia depreciated by 
50  per cent in two months and foreign exchange reserves decreased 
by 30 per cent in six months, while nominal interest rates soared four 
times. The main reason for the policy’s failure is that the effectiveness 
of the control measures was weakened by inherent contradictions between 
the policies. The inconsistency between the aforementioned first, second, 
fourth and fifth measures undermined confidence in the financial system. 
The third measure, which was intended to inject liquidity into banking 
institutions, instead boosted capital flight.
Failure case 2: Thailand’s efforts to stop capital outflows 
in 1997
Thailand pegged its currency to the USD in 1984. From 1984–1994, 
as the USD continued to depreciate against other major currencies, the 
baht also depreciated, which increased Thailand’s export competitiveness. 
Simultaneously, Thailand opened its capital account relatively early; by 
1996, its capital account convertibility had largely been realised. This 
brought a large amount of active capital into Thailand, among which was 
a large amount of short-term capital in the form of loans that flowed into 
the real estate and stock market. This created significant asset bubbles, 
foreshadowing the future currency crisis.
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By 1995, the USD had started to appreciate continuously. The baht also 
strengthened, greatly weakening Thailand’s export competitiveness. The 
decline in exports led to the rapid expansion of Thailand’s trade deficit. 
Simultaneously, due to appreciation of the USD, a large amount of 
short-term capital was withdrawn from the capital market and Thailand’s 
asset prices began to fall. In 1996, the real estate market bubble burst, 
causing severe problems for commercial banks and financial companies. 
The banking system accumulated a large number of non-performing 
loans related to the real estate sector. In the following year, Thailand’s 
stock index fell more than 60 per cent. Financial market turmoil and 
a  deteriorating real economy exacerbated market expectations that the 
baht would depreciate.
Moreover, Thailand was hit not only by domestic financial turmoil, but 
also by international ‘hot’ money from Soros and others, and a significant 
amount of foreign capital began to flee from the country. The Thai 
Government needed to fight these capital outflows. However, it was also 
concerned that an interest rate rise would hurt the economy. As a result, 
Thailand took a series of capital flow management measures in early 
1997, including restrictions on forward transactions, restrictions on the 
surrender of bills of landing in exports and a requirement that proceeds 
from securities sales be converted at the onshore rate.
Although the Thai Government addressed capital outflows actively, 
these measures did not bring about the desired results. Instead, the 
baht depreciated by 50 per cent, foreign exchange reserves declined by 
20 per cent in six months, domestic interest rates continued to rise, and 
large spreads between onshore and offshore exchange rates resulted in 
evasion of regulations.
Thailand’s capital flow management failed for three reasons. First, the Thai 
central bank raised interest rates to keep the pegged exchange rate with the 
USD. Higher interest rates further curbed investment and consumption 
demand, accelerating the economic recession. Due to high interest rates, 
enterprises had to seek low-cost capital in international financial markets, 
further expanding the scale of external debt and initiating a vicious cycle. 
The Thai Government was finally forced to abandon the fixed exchange 
rate system in July 1997. Second, Thailand’s external debt reached 
US$90 billion in 1997, equivalent to 50 per cent of GDP, of which 60 per 
cent was short-term external debt. This undoubtedly exacerbated external 
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risks to the Thai economy, particularly as the Thai Government lacked 
effective tools to prevent capital outflows. Third, Thailand had foreign 
exchange reserves of US$32 billion in June 1997, but US$30 billion were 
from foreign exchange swap transactions, and US$25 billion had to be 
paid off within a year. With interest expenses and external debt, Thailand’s 
foreign exchange reserve was unable to meet these financial commitments. 
Even if the Thai Government had suspended foreign exchange forward 
transactions promptly, the existing swap transactions would still have 
been difficult to address.
Main conclusions
Maintaining the independence of monetary policy requires strengthening 
cross-border capital flow management. After the 2008 GFC, major 
developed economies implemented quantitative easing policy and 
injected significant liquidity into the international market. Sun and Li 
(2017) argued that not all this liquidity entered the real economy; some 
entered global financial markets through cross-border capital flows. These 
funds were significant, highly mobile and very unstable, leading to an 
increased importance of capital flows versus the other elements of the 
impossible trinity (i.e. ‘capital flow–fixed exchange rate–independent 
monetary policy’). In the past, it was possible to abandon the fixed 
exchange rate system and realise the free flow of capital and monetary 
policy independence. However, even if governments abandon the fixed 
exchange rate system, this may not be sufficient to guarantee monetary 
policy independence under increased volumes of capital flows. To ensure 
the independence of a country’s monetary policy, governments should 
not only make certain concessions on the fixed exchange rate system, but 
also actively realise the effective management of cross-border capital flows 
to reduce their impact on the economy. Transnational capital flows are 
becoming more frequent and rapid, and the scale is increasingly large. 
Because of this, the IMF and other international organisations, as well as 
various economies, are becoming aware of the rationality and necessity 
of cross-border capital flow management. It is likely that capital flow 
management will be a topic of discussion in the future.
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Implementing cross-border capital flow management reduces the 
negative impact of short-term exchange rate fluctuations on the domestic 
economy. Capital flow management and macroprudential policy adhere 
to the same idea; both focus on reducing volatility and preventing risks 
to alleviate the impact of capital flows on an economy. Especially for 
developing countries, the prevalence of underdeveloped financial markets 
and currency mismatches constitute the ‘original sin’: a high probability 
exists that liberalising capital flows without careful planning will result in 
both currency and financial crisis. This is undoubtedly relevant to China’s 
situation. If a country seeks rapid opening up to the outside world, while 
also attempting to maintain macroeconomic and financial stability, it 
must use capital flow management tools comprehensively and rationally.
Cross-border capital flow (especially capital outflow) management must 
follow several principles (Viñals & Moghadam, 2011):
1. Once a country opens its capital account, a certain degree of capital 
outflows and fluctuations are normal; these do not require the use of 
specific capital flow management measures.
2. Macroeconomic and financial policies should be the main tools for 
dealing with capital outflows.
3. To smooth fluctuations in capital flows, capital inflow management 
measures can be adopted in advance, following the IMF policy 
framework.
4. Faced with large capital outflows, currency depreciation and 
depletion of foreign exchange reserves during a crisis or imminent 
crisis, temporary capital outflow management measures must be 
undertaken to allow time for fiscal policy adjustment and financial 
sector stabilisation.
5. Priority should be given to control measures with no discrimination 
based on residence, such as those tailored to different types of 
currencies.
6. When formulating management measures, consideration should be 
given to specific national circumstances, such as administrative and 
regulatory capacity, as well as the degree of openness to capital flows.
7. Capital flow management measures should only be used to complement 
policies in response to a crisis. When the macroeconomic situation 
stabilises, market confidence is restored and foreign exchange reserves 
begin to rise, these controls should be abolished.
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Additionally, regarding the use of specific policy instruments, governments 
must ensure the measures are non-discriminatory, transparent and 
temporary (Brockmeijer, Marston & Ostry, 2012). This is to avoid capital 
controls in the name of capital flow management. Simultaneously, it must 
be realised that capital flow management is not the fundamental solution 
to address the shocks of cross-border capital flows; it can only provide 
time for domestic structural reform and macroeconomic recovery.
Finally, the effective management of cross-border capital outflows 
requires certain conditions. The IMF proposes three key conditions: 
strong macroeconomic fundamentals, effective institutions and existing 
comprehensive restrictions (Saborowski, Sanya, Weisfeld & Yepez, 2014). 
Capital outflow restriction will be effective if at least one of these three 
conditions is met. When none of these are met, restrictions on capital 
outflows will be ineffective.
Part 3: The wave-like development of 
China’s financial opening in recent years
Review and summary of China’s capital account 
opening and RMB internationalisation in the 
new century
Capital account liberalisation
In the first stage, before 2003, reform was relatively cautious. Direct 
investment was the main area of opening during this time. Also, 
management of foreign currency loans was reformed and QFII investors 
were allowed to invest in domestic securities markets.
In the second stage, from 2003–2009, the pace of reform gradually 
accelerated. In 2003, for the first time, the Third Plenary Session of the 
16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (2015) clearly 
stated the goal of the ‘gradual realization of capital account convertibility’. 
Since then, China’s capital account opening has accelerated. First, 
liberalisation was promoted in all areas; that is, areas of opening were 
expanded from direct investment to external credit and liability, 
securities investment and other cross-border capital and financial account 
transactions. Second, liberalisation was more balanced; that is, against the 
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background of large-scale inflows, the idea of ‘loose regulation on inflows 
and strict regulation  on outflows’ was gradually substituted with more 
balanced regulation on  inflows and outflows. Third, the opening speed 
was adjusted based on domestic and international economic and financial 
conditions. During this period, China introduced about 40 capital account 
reform measures, including improvement of external debt management, 
the introduction of the QDII scheme, and the relaxation of regulations on 
QFII investment and overseas investment of insurance funds.
In the third stage, after 2009, reforms were further deepened. This period 
is characterised by ‘reducing existing restrictions’ and ‘establishing new 
rules’. The former refers to the reduction of exchange restrictions on 
cross-border capital and financial transactions—convertibility for direct 
investment was basically realised—while convertibility for portfolio 
investment was steadily promoted through various channels, including 
QFII, RQFII, QDII, RMB Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor, 
the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect and the Shenzhen–Hong Kong 
Stock Connect (Pan, 2017). Simultaneously, new means of capital account 
regulation were explored, and cross-border capital flow was included in 
the framework of macroprudential management (see below).
RMB internationalisation
The pilot stage of RMB internationalisation was from 2003–2009. At the 
end of 2003, China’s central bank issued a circular to provide clearing 
arrangements for banks with personal RMB deposits, currency exchange, 
bank cards and remittance services in Hong Kong. This was done to 
meet the needs of the market and standardise business development. This 
began a new stage of RMB internationalisation. In 2004, the central bank 
officially began to provide clearing arrangements to banks with personal 
RMB businesses in Macao. However, in this period, RMB businesses in 
Hong Kong and Macao were mainly for use by individuals, and only 
involved a small number of sporadic capital account transactions; trade 
and investment transactions were not yet covered (Tian, 2003).
The rapid development stage of RMB internationalisation was from 2009 
to August 2015. In 2009, approved by the State Council, the central 
bank raised the curtain on RMB internationalisation with RMB cross-
border trade settlement. First, the use of RMB in cross-border trade 
settlement was expanded to the whole country; the transactions covered 
were expanded from trade in goods to trade in services and other current 
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account items. Second, the use of RMB in cross-border capital account 
transactions was liberalised significantly. A number of reform measures 
were introduced in relation to direct investment, portfolio investment 
and other investment. Third, offshore RMB centres represented by Hong 
Kong grew rapidly. Fourth, a breakthrough was made on the RMB’s 
function as an international currency. Substantial progress was achieved 
not only in terms of bilateral currency swaps, but also the role and weight 
of RMB as the ‘anchor currency’, as a number of countries now included 
RMB assets in their reserves (PBC, 2016).
The period from August 2015 to the present is a new starting point for 
RMB internationalisation. In November 2015, the IMF announced the 
inclusion of the RMB in the special drawing right (SDR) currency basket 
at a weight of 10.92 per cent. On 1 October 2016, the IMF officially 
announced that the RMB had become the fifth currency in the SDR 
basket (in addition to the USD, euro, British pound and JPY). However, 
the RMB is facing new challenges after joining the SDR basket, especially 
regarding how to turn this into a policy dividend for real economic 
development (Wen, 2016).
Several important principles of financial opening
Several principles of financial opening exist. First is the principle of 
steady opening up. Under the premise of properly controlling risks—
and following the general guidelines of step-by-step progress, overall 
planning, addressing easier issues before difficult ones and keeping 
options open—regulation of the capital account was relaxed gradually 
and selectively. RMB internationalisation was promoted steadily, ensuring 
the compatibility of the opening-up process with economic development, 
financial market conditions and financial stability.
Second is the principle of facilitation. Following market demand, the 
government streamlined administration, delegated government powers, 
clarified regulatory boundaries and abolished unnecessary administrative 
approvals to facilitate trade and investment.
Third is the principle of national treatment. The government gradually 
abolished the long-existing super-national treatment of foreign investment 
and unreasonable barriers to foreign investment. It also explored a pre-
establishment national treatment and negative list approach, and created 
a fair business environment for enterprises with all types of ownership.
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Fourth is the principle of balanced management. The government made 
an effort to facilitate the entry of foreign companies into China, as well 
as Chinese companies’ expansions abroad. It also implemented regulatory 
policies to encourage two-way capital flows.
Significant progress in financial opening
As of the end of 2016, China had achieved partial convertibility8 for 
37  items under the capital account, three more items compared to 
the end 2012. The proportion of the total increased from 85 per cent 
to 92.5  per  cent during the same period, leaving only three items 
nonconvertible (see Table 5-4). Moreover, as opening increased, China not 
only improved trade and investment facilitation, but also revamped the 
management of cross-border capital flows from a previous focus on pre-
approval to an emphasis on operational and post-operational oversight. 
It also constantly improved macroprudential management tools, so that 
the market could play a more important role. After years of development, 
RMB use has expanded from the traditional regional use (that is, mainly in 
cross-border trade) to the financing and investment field. The circulation 
area has expanded to include the whole world and circulation volumes 
have continued to grow (see Figure 5-8). The RMB was admitted to the 
SDR currency basket at the end of 2015, an acknowledgement of its freely 
usable level and international currency status. According to the IMF, the 
global holdings of RMB reserve assets were US$84.5 billion by the end of 
2016, accounting for 1 per cent of the total reserves. The yuan has become 
the seventh international reserve currency.
8  The IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions classifies 
the 40 items under seven types of capital account transactions into four degrees of convertibility: 
nonconvertible, partially convertible, basically convertible and fully convertible.
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Figure 5-8: Cross-border RMB payments and receipts (2010–2016).
Source: SAFE (2016) and CF40 (2017) .
Controversies and reversals of opening in recent years
Controversy exists over the timing and speed of China’s capital account 
liberalisation and RMB internationalisation. Some scholars argue that 
China is facing a rare opportunity to promote the convertibility of its 
capital account. Several reasons are given for this: China’s overall national 
strength is increasing, the fiscal situation and the financial system are 
basically stable, the market-oriented reforms of exchange rate and interest 
rate regimes are steadily advancing, the ability of international discharging 
is adequate, macro-control ability is significantly enhanced, and profound 
changes occurred in the global economy after the 2008 GFC. Therefore, 
China should accelerate capital account liberalisation and propel RMB 
internationalisation. In 2012, the PBC (2012) issued a report that deemed 
‘the conditions for China to speed up capital account opening are basically 
mature’. However, scholars such as Lin (2013) and Yu (2016) contend 
that the conditions for China to further promote financial liberalisation 
are not yet mature, as China’s financial markets must evolve further to 
reach parity with developed countries. Further, implicit government debt 
is large, macro-control and financial regulation need to be improved, both 
the internal and external environments remain uncertain, and the risk of 
cross-border capital outflow has increased. In this context, rapid capital 
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account opening and RMB internationalisation is similar to drinking 
poison to quench one’s thirst—it may increase the vulnerability of China’s 
financial system and induce cross-market arbitrage activities.
Recently, China’s financial opening has shown certain signs of reversal. 
Especially after the ‘August 11th’ exchange rate reform in 2015, China’s 
financial market experienced turbulence. RMB internationalisation 
indicators also fluctuated. SWIFT data show that the RMB’s ranking 
in international payments fell from fifth in 2015 to sixth by the end of 
2016, and its proportion in total payments declined from 2.31 per cent 
in December 2015 to 1.67 per cent in December 2016. At present, 
cross-border capital flow management has again shifted towards 
encouraging inflows and regulating outflows. One lesson here is that 
the earlier financial opening did not propel market-oriented exchange 
rate reform, but the absence of this hindered further financial opening. 
To promote further opening of the capital account, the following should 
be considered: the influence of internal and external factors; identifying 
the key points, rhythm and steps at different stages; promoting orderly 
reform; strengthening policy support; and ensuring that risk is basically 
controllable. The National Financial Work Conference held in July 
2017 laid out plans for expanding financial opening and reaffirmed the 
stance of making progress with capital account liberalisation and RMB 
internationalisation while ensuring stability, with a particular emphasis 
on proper sequencing of opening policies.
Current policy measures on strengthening cross-
border capital flow management
In an open economy, the ‘impossible trinity’ exists, which states that 
the use of either price tools (floating exchange rate) or quantitative tools 
(market intervention and capital flow management) is required in dealing 
with the shocks of excessive capital inflows or outflows. It is impossible 
to use neither (Guan, 2016). From 1998–2000, during the Asian 
financial crisis, China kept exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves 
stable by strengthening foreign exchange management. At present, 
when once again facing capital outflows, China has adopted a policy 
mix of floating the exchange rate, market intervention and capital flow 
management. Regarding specific policy instruments, China has further 
opened up its domestic financial market to encourage capital inflows 
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and relaxed settlement restrictions, while also placing capital flows under 
macroprudential management. China has also strengthened authenticity 
and compliance checks on capital outflows.
Continue to promote the opening of domestic 
financial markets and relax restrictions on foreign 
exchange settlement
China further opened the domestic bond market, allowed foreign 
financial institutions including mid- and long-term institutional investors 
such as pension funds to invest in the interbank bond market through 
the registration system and determine their own size of investment. 
Simultaneously, China implemented macroprudential regulation in 
relation to foreign institutional investors. China also relaxed restrictions 
on foreign exchange settlement for capital account transactions, allowed 
the voluntary settlement of corporate external debt, unified the policy 
for domestic entities on the voluntary settlement of foreign exchange 
income from capital account transactions, and adopted a negative 
list management approach on the use of income from capital account 
items. It also simplified foreign exchange regulation for QFII, cancelled 
the investment limit for each investor, allowed investors to obtain their 
basic investment quota by registration, abolished the requirement for the 
investment principal to be received within a certain period, and reduced 
the lock period from one year to three months. It substantially relaxed 
entry barriers to the service sector, manufacturing and mining industries, 
and promoted fair competition between domestic and foreign entities. 
It launched the Shenzhen–Hong Kong Stock Connect, improved the 
Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect mechanism, abolished the quota 
on total investment and retained only the daily limit. Additionally, a bond 
connect mechanism is being launched.
Introduce and improve the macroprudential management 
of cross-border capital flows
China implemented macroprudential management of cross-border 
financing, linked market entities’ borrowing limit with their capital 
strength and debt repayment ability, and managed leverage ratios 
and currency mismatch risks through adjusting macroprudential 
parameters. It also improved the reserve requirement for nonresidents’ 
RMB deposits, established a long-term mechanism for counter-cyclical 
adjustment of cross-border RMB flows, and guided foreign financial 
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institutions to strengthen RMB liquidity management. Additionally, 
it established self-discipline mechanisms for the foreign exchange market, 
standardised quotation behaviour for the central parity rate, developed 
and implemented a code of conduct for the interbank market and over-
the-counter foreign exchange sale and purchase and cross-border RMB 
businesses. It also dealt with transaction disputes between members 
and improved standardisation of the foreign exchange market by use 
of both self-discipline and outside discipline (Chen, 2016). China also 
implemented risk reserve requirements on foreign exchange transactions, 
requiring financial institutions to fulfil a 20 per cent reserve requirement 
on their forward purchase contracts (including options and swaps) to 
curb short-term arbitrage activities.9
Strengthen authenticity checks and compliance review on 
cross-border capital outflows
China has urged banks and enterprises to implement strict authenticity 
checks and compliance reviews for current account transactions, required 
enterprises to collect their export proceeds in a timely manner, continued 
to implement management on the repatriation of direct investment 
profits, further clarified the procedures for domestic institutions to 
register ODI and remit out funds, and strengthened the information 
reporting requirements for domestic institutions to retain overseas their 
foreign exchange proceeds from export or trade in services. China has 
also strengthened regulations of ODI. Four government departments 
have stressed the need to prevent risks with ODI, especially irrational 
investments in real estate, hotels, entertainment and other areas. The 
same approach was taken to the hidden risks associated with large non-
core business investments, investment by limited partnership companies, 
‘small parent, large subsidiary’ and ‘fast out fast in’ investment activities. 
China also improved the information reporting requirements for 
individuals’ foreign exchange purchases, detailed the reporting content 
and reiterated that individuals could only use foreign exchange purchases 
for current account transactions and not for capital account purposes, 
while maintaining the annual purchase limit. It also strengthened the 
management of cross-border RMB outflows, and required enterprises to 
register overseas lending activity with the foreign exchange authority.
9  The ratio has been lowered to 0 per cent since 11 September 2017.
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Achievements and problems of the cross-border 
capital flow management
The direction of financial opening has not changed but the 
focus and content have been adjusted
China will continue to move in the direction of making the RMB into 
a convertible and freely usable currency. However, in recent years, with 
the change in the foreign exchange market, the focus of financial opening 
has changed from a balanced management of inflows and outflows to 
encouraging inflows. Opening of the domestic financial market has been 
accelerated and restrictions on external financing have been loosened. 
The Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect and Shenzhen–Hong Kong 
Stock Connect mechanisms have promoted two-way opening of the 
stock market and supported the marketisation and internationalisation 
of the A-share market. In June 2017, MSCI included China’s A-shares 
in its key Emerging Markets Index. Moreover, China increased the speed 
of infrastructure building, including launching the RMB cross-border 
interbank payment system, introducing more RMB clearing banks, 
expanding RMB currency swaps, and further facilitating the holding and 
use of RMB abroad.
Regulations on cross-border capital outflows have been 
tightened, but have not moved beyond the existing 
policy framework
Overall, the measures introduced in recent years have mainly required 
market entities to comply with existing requirements and exercise self-
discipline. They are not new controls on exchange or cross-border 
payment and receipt activities. For example, in improving the information 
disclosure requirements for individuals’ purchases of foreign exchange, 
the annual quota remains unchanged. Additionally, policies on using 
foreign exchange for personal reasons, such as studying abroad or travel, 
also remain unchanged. In the case of domestic residents’ purchase of 
insurance products abroad, no restrictions apply to current account 
transactions (such as purchase of travel insurance), but the purchase of 
investment and participating policy under the capital account is not 
allowed. In the past two years, some overseas insurance companies tried 
to sell large investment insurance products with ‘capital flight’ features 
to mainland residents through various means. This not only seriously 
interfered with the domestic foreign exchange market order, but also 
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led to bubbles in the overseas insurance market and active underground 
bank activities. The SAFE has reiterated the bank card regulation policy 
that was first implemented in 2003. It has also strengthened category 
and quota management on using bank cards to purchase insurance 
products, ensuring the effective enforcement of regulatory policies and 
business rules.
Measures have been effective in balancing capital flows 
in the short term
China’s further opening of the domestic interbank bond market, the 
implementation of full-calibre macroprudential management of cross-
border financing and a few other measures have all helped expand capital 
inflows. In 2016, foreign investors’ holdings of RMB bonds increased by 
RMB151.3 billion. From the second to fourth quarter of 2016, China’s 
total external debt increased by US$89.2 billion, reversing the overall 
decline in external debt since 2015. With regard to risk prevention, 
several measures curbed the excessive (or even illegal) foreign exchange 
demand. These included stricter authenticity checks and compliance rules, 
strengthened monitoring and early warning of cross-border capital flows, 
and improved the self-discipline mechanisms of banks. In the first half of 
2017, net inflows of direct investment were US$11.4 billion, compared 
with net outflows of US$17.7 billion for the same period in the previous 
year. During the same period, pressure on capital outflows gradually eased. 
Foreign exchange reserves rebounded by US$46.3 billion, compared with 
a decrease of US$125.2 billion a year earlier. Foreign exchange assets net 
of valuation effect increased by US$29.4 billion, compared to a decrease 
of US$163.6 billion a year earlier. This has stabilised market expectations 
and created the conditions for relaxation of capital flow management.
Capital flow management needs to be more effective
First, capital flow management still mostly resorts to administrative 
means; as such, it is prone to a one-size-fits-all solution. At times, it 
may restrict normal investment and reduce market efficiency. Window 
guidance and other administrative measures are not transparent and 
difficult to supervise. Additionally, excessive reliance on administrative 
means will likely result in policy reversal. For example, the policy on 
ODI has changed from encouraging enterprises to ‘go out’ to a tightening 
of controls. Second, the policy may fail. For example, the government 
wants to attract more capital inflows through financial opening, and the 
key would be for market participants to collect and settle more foreign 
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exchange. However,  this is difficult, because the enterprises decide for 
themselves how much to collect and settle. As another example, the 
marginal effect of authenticity checks and compliance review tends to 
diminish over time. Third, encouraging capital inflows has side effects. 
Capital outflows all start from earlier capital inflows—encouraging 
overseas financing, opening the bond markets and facilitating foreign 
investment in securities may all increase financial market volatility and 
vulnerability.
Part 4: Establishing a dual-pillar capital flow 
management framework
The trend of China’s cross-border capital 
flow management
The ‘13th Five-Year Plan’ clearly proposed promoting the marketisation 
of  exchange and interest rates, realising RMB capital account 
convertibility in an orderly way, making the RMB a more convertible 
and freely usable currency, and steadily facilitating international use of 
the RMB. By 2020, with market-based exchange and interest rates and 
the gradual implementation of financial opening, China’s international 
influence should extend from traditional trade and investment areas to 
the monetary and financial fields. The following sections describe possible 
trends in China’s capital flow management framework.
Trend 1: The macroeconomic adjustment function of capital 
flow management will be less important
At present, the most important function of China’s capital flow management 
is to serve macro-control goals, and the focus is on maintaining the balance 
of international payments. From the perspective of policy choices, capital 
flow management is a function of monetary policy independence and 
exchange rate marketisation. Monetary policy independence is China’s 
priority, so it can be viewed as an exogenous variable. As a result, the 
higher the degree of exchange rate marketisation, the less the government’s 
demand for capital flow management. China’s dependence on capital flow 
management is largely decided by the progress of the market-oriented 
reform of the RMB exchange rate regime. Implementing capital flow 
management is only to buy time for the RMB exchange rate to realise 
215
5 . CHInA’S CROSS-BORDER CAPITAL FLOW MAnAGEMEnT
a clean float. In the future, temporary use of cross-border capital flow 
management (balance of payments safeguard measures) will be required 
only in extreme cases (Rey, 2015). These may include situations in which 
global risk aversion is beyond a critical state, so that the flexible exchange 
rate system is insufficient to adjust external imbalances, or if exchange rate 
volatility is too high. Otherwise, the government should surrender the 
macro-control function to the market.
Trend 2: The micro-regulation function of cross-border 
capital flow management will be separated from the macro-
control function
At this stage, the macro-control function of China’s capital flow 
management is achieved through micro-regulation. This is not just 
a violation of ‘Tinbergen’s Rule’ (that is, it is difficult for cross-border 
capital flow management tools to meet the policy objectives of currency 
convertibility and maintaining a balance of payments). Also, repeated 
changes in micro-regulation policy has distorted resource allocation, 
increased the cost of market entities, affected policy credibility and 
undermined China’s national image. In the future, with a market-based 
exchange rate in place, capital flow management will focus on its original 
mandate. That is, it will promote RMB capital account convertibility, 
vigorously develop the foreign exchange market and promote RMB 
exchange rate marketisation. Simultaneously, it will strengthen micro-
regulation; establish a new mechanism of anti-money laundering, anti-
terrorism financing and anti-tax avoidance (based on international 
practice); and establish a new system of national security review 
and  prudential and behaviour supervision (based on authenticity and 
compliance review).
Trend 3: Diversification and decentralisation will be a future 
reform direction of capital flow management
First, a single objective should be substituted by multiple objectives. 
Instead of one objective (i.e. maintaining balance of payments), multiple 
objectives should be developed to include preventing systemic financial 
risks and external shocks from international financial crises. At the 
micro level, objectives include not only review of the authenticity and 
compliance of capital flows, but also that of anti-money laundering, 
anti-tax avoidance and anti-terrorism financing, along with national 
economic security reviews on foreign mergers and acquisitions.
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Second, the focus will shift from regulation of currency exchange to 
regulation of transactions. Capital flow management covers both exchange 
and transaction activities. As the balance of payments is closely related 
to cross-border capital flows, the management focuses on exchange and 
payment activities. In the future, with diversified objectives, regulation 
will cover the entire process of currency exchange and transactions, based 
on specific objectives, objects and characteristics, and, more importantly, 
on supervision of transactions.
Third, centralised regulation should be replaced by decentralised regulation. 
Currently, the monetary authorities (including the PBC and SAFE) are 
responsible for centralised cross-border capital flow management. In the 
future, with the diversification of management functions, regulatory 
agencies will become more diversified and decentralised. Monetary 
authorities will focus on anti-money laundering, tax departments will 
focus on anti-tax avoidance, national security departments will focus on 
anti-terrorism and the Ministry of Commerce and National Commission 
of Development and Reform will focus on national security reviews of 
foreign investment. Additionally, the monetary authority, China Banking 
and Insurance Regulatory Commission and China Securities Regulatory 
Commission will work on prudential supervision. This will help build 
supervisory synergy with division of labour and cooperation.
Establish a dual-pillar framework of cross-border 
capital flow management
The future framework of capital flow management will properly separate 
macro functions from micro-supervision. The macro-management tools 
will aim at a balance of payment and prevention of systemic financial risks. 
Micro-management tools will help promote capital account convertibility, 
exchange rate marketisation and diverse regulatory objectives. The two are 
relatively independent but closely linked, constituting a dual-pillar system 
for cross-border capital flow management.
Pillar 1: A two-dimensional macro-management framework 
for cross-border capital flows
The future of macro-management of cross-border capital flows is two-
dimensional. The first is the policy transmission mechanism that serves 
the balance of payments objective (capital control). The second is the 
policy transmission mechanism that serves the risk prevention objective 
(macroprudential management).
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To design a two-dimensional framework, the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism offers a lesson. The basic logic is that the regulators use certain 
tools to implement counter-cyclical adjustment or set up risk reserve, and 
assess the policy effects on the final goals (economic growth, full employment 
and price stability) through observing changes in intermediate objectives 
(e.g. balance of payments and systemic financial risks). Identifying the final 
goal, intermediate objective, operational objective and operational tools is 
at the core of this two-dimensional framework.
Under the two dimensions of capital control and macroprudential 
management, the goals are consistent: to promote economic growth, 
maintain price stability and achieve full employment. In other words, 
internal balance is the final goal. Balance of payments is not regarded as a 
final goal for several reasons. First, the balance of payments is important 
under a fixed exchange rate system, where it determines whether the foreign 
exchange market is cleared. In the context of free float exchange rates and 
free capital flows, international payments can reach an automatic balance, 
except during crisis periods. This is why Samuelson and other mainstream 
scholars in the West do not mention the four goals of macro-control. 
Second, China is a large open economy; internal objectives always have 
priority over external objectives, and, thus, monetary policy independence 
(sovereignty) is the highest policy objective. Too much emphasis on the 
importance of balance of payments is not consistent with China’s status 
as a large economy.
Balance of payments could serve as an intermediate objective for the capital 
control dimension. In an open economy, balance of payments conditions 
could directly affect supply and demand in the foreign exchange market, 
changing the amount of funds outstanding for foreign exchange and base 
money, thus having a significant impact on money supply. Therefore, 
balance of payments is closely and directly linked to the final goals such as 
economic growth and price stability.
The structural indicators that reflect cross-border financial risks can 
serve as the intermediate objectives of the macroprudential dimension. 
Macroprudential management mainly aims to prevent systemic financial 
risks related to cross-border capital flows. From a policy perspective, risk 
in the financial system is central, whereas risks associated with specific 
businesses and individuals are not the focus of attention. China has just 
started to implement macroprudential management, and many indicators 
have been incorporated into the framework. Which indicators are more 
suitable as the intermediate objectives requires further study.
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The tools for cross-border capital flow management can be organised as 
an inverted tree-like structure (see Figure 5-9). Of these, those that serve 
the macro-management function include macroprudential regulation 
in Area 1 (see Table 5-5) and capital control measures in Areas 2 and 3 
(see Table 5-6).
Table 5-5: Macroprudential capital flow management tools
Asset-side tools Liability-side tools Capital-related tools Market tools
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note: Grey shading indicates areas in which China has implemented the measures .
Source: Bruno, Shim and Shin (2015) .
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Figure 5-9: Cross-border capital flow management toolkit.
Source: Authors’ original .
Pillar 2: Micro-management framework for cross-border 
capital flows
Based on the separation of macro- and micro-functions, the future micro-
management of cross-border capital flows will no longer include the 
macro-control function of maintaining balance of payments. Instead, it 
will focus on capital account convertibility reform. This can help avoid 
policy reversals, provide a stable policy environment for the market, and 
improve policy transparency and credibility.
Gradually realise RMB capital account convertibility. The authorities 
should continue to push forward liberalisation of the capital account. 
In  view of the potential risks, opening should be promoted steadily 
based on domestic and international situations. The liberalisation of 
capital inflows should be prioritised. Learning from the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development’s approach, capital account 
convertibility can be achieved while the authorities retain prudential 
supervision or capital control over some high-risk transactions.
Increase the depth and breadth of the foreign exchange market. 
To better satisfy market needs for management of foreign exchange assets 
and liabilities, foreign exchange derivatives such as forwards, swaps and 
options should be improved. Increasing the variety of foreign exchange 
options and introducing foreign exchange futures in due course will meet 
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market needs for more trading instruments. Introducing foreign currency 
exchange traded funds, margin trading and other transactions will increase 
the depth of the foreign exchange market. Other measures could also be 
implemented. These may include supporting domestic individuals’ orderly 
participation in the foreign exchange market to meet investors’ needs to 
diversify investments and manage exchange rate risks, relaxing restrictions 
on non-bank financial institutions (including securities firms and funds) 
so they may trade in the interbank foreign exchange market, and allowing 
qualified foreign entities to enter the domestic foreign exchange market.
Construct a new micro-management system based on the negative 
list approach. Current administration of foreign exchange should 
be streamlined. Based on the pre-established national treatment and 
negative list approach, most administrative procedures, such as approval 
requirements, should be abolished. Exchange restrictions on cross-border 
investment and financing should be cancelled gradually and the negative 
list reduced. On the other hand, operational and post-operational 
supervision should be strengthened, registration requirements for cross-
border capital flow and financial transactions should be retained, the 
registration of contract information should be bolstered, and micro-agent 
solvency information should be collected periodically. In the future, 
negative list management will mainly apply to the following:
1. Foreign exchange business of financial institutions. Based on the 
risk  levels of different businesses, no prior approval is required 
for  low-risk businesses, while necessary thresholds should be set for 
higher-risk innovative businesses.
2. High-risk cross-border transactions. External debt, derivatives trading 
and other high-risk, high-leverage transactions should remain part of 
the negative list.
3. Improving the classified management of market entities, facilitating 
foreign exchange use by enterprises with good compliance records 
and implementing stricter prudential regulations over enterprises with 
poor compliance records, or those suspected of illegal activities.
Strengthen capacity building. This will be achieved through improving 
the operational and post-operational regulatory framework, strengthening 
the monitoring and early warning of abnormal and suspicious cross-border 
capital flows, implementing strict supervision and punishment measures, 
and increasing the cost of violating authenticity and compliance rules. 
To this end, future micro-supervision should focus on improving the four 
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aspects of capacity building: 1) basic capacity (statistical reporting, process 
management, assessment and evaluation); 2) data analysis capacity (build 
irregular transaction screening capacity based on unified cross-border 
data platform and big data analysis tools, and detect the entities, items 
and territory of irregular transactions in a timely manner); 3) compliance 
regulation (self-discipline of banking institutions, regulators’ meetings 
with financial institutions and window guidance); 4) capacity to gather 
information on the operation of systemically important financial 
institutions (regulators implement the principle of ‘know the customers, 
know the business, and due diligence’ and conduct on-site supervision 
of systemically important financial institutions and large multinational 
corporations to ensure comprehensive understanding of their operations).
Main conclusions and recommendations
First, the liberalisation and management of cross-border capital flows are 
connected. The ‘13th Five-Year Plan’ gives a comprehensive summary 
on this topic. From an opening perspective, its intention is to ‘facilitate 
two-way opening of the financial sector, realise RMB capital account 
convertibility in an orderly way, improve the convertibility and free 
usability of RMB’. From a management perspective, its intention is 
to ‘strengthen the balance of payments monitoring’ and ‘improve the 
prudential management framework for external debt and capital flows’.
Second, with the implementation of market-oriented reform of the 
exchange rate regime, the importance of the macro-control function of 
cross-border capital flow management will be much reduced. Reform 
must focus on separating macro-management and micro-regulation 
functions and build a dual-pillar framework for cross-border capital 
flow management. During this process, both the policy transmission 
mechanism and the toolbox should see increased improvement.
Third, at the macro level, a macro-management framework for cross-
border capital flows (see Figure 5-10) must be constructed. This should 
include the two dimensions of capital control and macroprudential 
management, while also accelerating improvements in the policy toolbox 
that serves macro objectives (see Table 5-7). These could include assessing 
the feasibility of adopting the Tobin tax (or similar measures) and other 
cross-border capital flow management systems. The Tobin tax has fewer 
distortions of resource allocation. This tax and similar approaches can not 
only enrich the policy toolbox, but also transform the foreign exchange 
management system and improve policy transparency. Additionally, 
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a balance between macroprudential management and capital control 
should be maintained. Macroprudential management does not directly 
deal with imbalance of international payments, but has a significant role 
in addressing domestic and external economic balance. The monitoring, 
evaluation and stress testing for macroprudential management must 
be improved, and measures such as the Tobin tax and capital controls 
maintained as counter-cyclical adjustment and ex-post management tools.
Figure 5-10: Transmission mechanism of the macro-management 
framework for cross-border capital flows.
Source: Authors’ original .
Table 5-7: Policy tools for macro objectives
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Fourth, the micro-management of cross-border capital flows should 
differentiate between regulation from macro control. Regulation should 
not include ‘macro-control functions’ and the regulatory system should 
be kept relatively stable. Future micro-management should focus on 
‘facilitation’ and ‘improvement’. Facilitation will promote capital account 
convertibility, facilitate trade and investment, and ensure the decisive role 
of the market in resource allocation. On the other hand, the approach of 
foreign exchange management should be improved to emphasise ‘strict’ 
regulation, change the focus from prior approval to operational and post-
operational supervision, and strengthen authenticity and compliance 
rules. Other measures could include efforts to balance principle-based 
and rule-based supervision; improve banks’ self-discipline and external 
supervision; enhance monitoring, analysis and early warning capacities; 
strengthen foreign exchange inspection; crack down on illegal activities; 
and build cross-departmental supervision and cooperation mechanisms.
Fifth, the micro-management of cross-border capital flows should 
differentiate between regulation and capital control. Capital controls 
should be temporary measures. Any such measure will lead to market 
distortion and increase transaction costs. Cross-border capital flow 
management should be used to buy time for other reforms. These may 
include reforms to improve monetary policy independence and achieve 
stable and rapid economic growth, curb capital outflows and dispose of 
financial risks, and help the private sector better adjust their assets and 
liabilities to adapt to more flexible exchange rates.
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Market Reform and Innovation 
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Reform and opening are mutually reinforcing. Reform inevitably 
requires opening and vice versa. Opening consists of two levels. The first 
is to attract foreign institutions and encourage domestic institutions to 
go overseas. The second is to develop domestic financial markets based 
on the development pattern of mature financial markets and adapt to 
international market rules and practices. This will ensure ultimate 
integration with the international financial market. The second level is 
actually a higher level of openness. China’s financial market was established 
and developed after reform and opening was launched in 1978. Adhering 
to a market-oriented development philosophy and international patterns 
are the drivers for China’s financial market prosperity. The first level of 
opening will not be successful without the second. And promoting the 
first level will propel the second level.
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As China’s four decades of practice shows, the development of financial 
markets is faster when the development patterns of advanced 
financial  markets and international rules are followed. Without these, 
development will be problematic and may reverse. Over the past four 
decades, China’s financial market has grown from humble beginnings 
to achieve remarkable growth. This shows that China can only integrate 
with the international market through an understanding of the country’s 
practical needs. With the continuous expansion and deepening of China’s 
markets, the importance of opening is increasing—opening has become 
an indispensable part of reform.
Currently, it is particularly important to institute reform and open 
China’s  financial market. Only an open financial market can possess 
real breadth and depth. Such a financial system can form effective price 
signals, attract more capital and investors, and support development 
of the real economy. China has almost completely integrated into the 
global economy. The country also requires a stable and open financial 
market at every stage of development in order to fully integrate into the 
international financial market.
China is committed to becoming an advanced economy. This requires 
China to resolve structural problems in its financial market and establish 
an advanced financial system that matches its global status and supports 
sustainable development of the real economy. This financial system 
must be all-encompassing, well structured, efficient, stable, inclusive and 
competitive. To this end, China should promote reform and development 
through opening, respect and abide by the rules and norms of the 
international market, emphasise top-level design and policy coordination, 
and strengthen macroprudential regulation. On this basis, China should 
aim to open further and establish a healthy development pattern that 
pushes forward both domestic reform and liberalisation.
Part 1: Key drivers of China’s financial 
market development
To construct a socialist market economy, China’s financial market began 
from nothing after the reform and opening launched in 1978. China 
has since achieved remarkable success. It has formed a comprehensive 
multilevel financial system that covers the money, bond, stock, insurance, 
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gold, foreign exchange and derivatives markets. As of the end of March 
2017, bonds in custody amounted to CN¥65.9 trillion, ranking third 
globally and second in Asia. The amount of outstanding corporate bonds 
is the second largest globally and the largest in Asia. The interbank bond 
market has a complete series of products and diversified trading tools. 
It has become the main element of China’s bond market, and perhaps its 
entire financial market. As of the end of 2016, the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges listed a combined total of 3,052 companies. Of these 
companies, A-share stocks numbered 3,034, with a total market value of 
CN¥55.68 trillion. According to statistics from the World Federation of 
Exchanges, the total market capitalisation of China’s stock market in 2015 
was second only to that of the United States (US).
China’s financial market takes a different 
development path from developed countries
The development of China’s financial market has been a successful 
process of promoting reform and development through opening. 
This opening process largely followed international financial market 
development patterns. Initially, China made some ineffective decisions 
and did not follow international patterns. The country encountered some 
problems and had to begin again. To analyse the current situation more 
effectively and determine the future prospects of China’s financial market 
development, it is necessary to understand the history of China’s financial 
market. Lessons can then be drawn from its experiences and mistakes.
Over hundreds of years, the financial markets of developed countries 
have encountered various problems and experienced both crises and 
improvements. In the US, the Glass–Steagall Act (introduced after the 
Great Depression in 1930) separated investment banking business from 
commercial banking in a strict sense. In the 1980s, the US passed the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act in response 
to the savings and loan crisis. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act was passed in 
the 1990s after the Enron scandal to strengthen corporate governance 
and audit standards and improve accounting guidelines. At the turn of 
this century, the rollout of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act marked the US 
financial industry’s entry into an era of mixed operation. The Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was introduced after the 
2008 global financial crisis to control systematic risks. History shows 
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that US financial market legislation always follows crises or problems. 
The  regulatory authorities analysed the causes of problems and then 
improved regulation at the legislative and institutional level.
China’s financial market has taken a different development path from that 
of more mature countries and, therefore, it has its own characteristics. 
First, China started its development late. Only four decades have passed 
since the launch of economic reform in 1978. Second, the development 
is government led. China did not follow the steps of financial market 
evolution in other countries, instead following the requirements of its 
own economic and financial development. Third, the financial market 
is focused on serving the government’s economic agenda. The Chinese 
Government was short of capital at the beginning of the reform and 
opening. When the government tried to issue bonds, this could only be 
done through compulsive apportionment. In the early 1990s, when the 
government attempted to reform state-owned enterprises, the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges were established to support the reform. 
Fourth, the development of China’s financial market differs from its 
economic reform. Economic reform began outside the system. It was 
driven by the market and then expanded to other areas. However, 
China’s financial market has taken a few wrong turns while serving the 
government’s economic needs.
China’s financial market was established in the absence of a sound 
credit system. According to economist Richard Hicks, the commercial 
prosperity of Western countries relies on three factors—currency, law and 
credit. In  the early days of China’s reform and opening, only collective 
credit, rather than individual credit, existed. Departments with more 
power had more creditworthiness. However, the development of financial 
markets must be built on individual credit, or significant problems will 
result. Notably, collective credit also played a vital role in the transition 
from a planned to a market economy. During this process, the individual 
credit system had not yet been fully established. With the continued 
development of accounting, credit reporting, credit rating and other 
systems in recent years, the individual credit system is gradually progressing, 
creating beneficial conditions for financial market development. Many 
problems arising in today’s financial market are connected to deficiencies 
in individual credit and related supporting systems, such as accounting, 
auditing and rating.
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Respecting market law is the key to financial 
market development
A review of some cases in China’s financial market development history 
clearly shows that this development would have been more rapid if 
common patterns and international rules had been followed. Without 
these elements, the development process can encounter severe problems 
or even fail. When China’s bond market was first established, the 
original intention of issuing bonds was to support the reform of state-
owned enterprises. Some mistakes were made that led to major risk 
events in the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1980s, government bonds were 
administratively apportioned, and a unified national bond market had not 
yet been established. At that time, market prices and transaction prices of 
government bonds varied in different places. The Wuhan exchange and 
repurchase transactions in Tianjin both witnessed major risks. In terms of 
corporate bonds, the earliest issuers were enterprises affected by ineffective 
management and a lack of capital and needed guarantee by banks. This 
kind of bond issuance is not based on enterprises’ creditworthiness, 
and the pricing was not market-oriented but administrated pricing, 
which clearly contrasts with the bond markets of developed countries. 
The  earliest issuances of corporate bonds were conducted over bank 
counters. If  a  company defaulted, bondholders would ask banks for 
repayment even though such requests were unreasonable.
A typical case was the ‘March 27 government bond futures incident’ in 
1996 before the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Wanguo Securities’s investment 
in futures led to the company’s collapse. It was the largest bond company 
at that time. The incident showed that the rollout of financial products 
did not fully consider market conditions or take a gradual approach. 
Rather, it was based on the arbitrary decisions of regulatory authorities. 
Several reasons lie behind the incident. First, China’s interest rate was not 
market based. Second, the discount rates stipulated by the Ministry of 
Finance were not transparent. Third, the securities exchanges lacked an 
understanding of the risks related to bond futures. In short, the market 
was not ready for bond futures.
Such incidents drove the Chinese Government to develop a more unified, 
healthy and transparent market. In 1997, the State Council approved 
the establishment of the interbank bond market. The government paid 
more attention to experiences from the international market and followed 
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the rules of market development. China’s domestic bond market was 
dominated by natural persons and characterised by collective deal-making. 
Per the government’s aim, the interbank bond market consisted mainly of 
institutional investors and that engage in over-the-counter transactions, 
and the market emphasised financial reporting, information disclosure, 
credit rating and other disciplinary mechanisms. In the past two decades, 
the market has developed rapidly and is now the world’s third largest.
China’s bond market achieves development through 
deepening reforms
The development of China’s bond market is generally driven by social 
needs, not administrative authorities or ideologues. Progress was made 
through deepening reforms, not administrative intervention. The 
experience over the past two decades shows that a time of great challenges 
is usually the best time for reform. Only in difficult times can people 
reach consensus on reform more easily. The real solution is to deepen 
reform, rather than to step back—this is an important lesson drawn from 
the practice of China’s bond market development.
First, if the bond market is to evolve to a higher level, it must adhere 
to a market-oriented direction. Administrative approval or other types 
of restrictions should not be imposed. Reducing administrative approval 
procedures does not mean relaxing market regulation. Instead, issuing 
corporate bonds strengthens, rather than relaxes, discipline on enterprises. 
In the past, companies only obtained loans from banks, but now they can 
have multiple investors. Historically, companies could default on debt, 
but now they cannot operate without good credit. If a company defaults 
on its debt, it will be difficult for the company to issue new bonds. 
If  an issuer releases false information, investors may sell their bonds 
immediately and the issuer may not find new investors. While reducing 
administrative approvals, the government should also strengthen market 
regulation—these can be achieved simultaneously. An important lesson 
for the development of the bond market is to reduce implicit guarantee 
of repayment by the government. In the past, whoever approved bond 
issuance had to bear the risks. Later, the regulators began to exercise 
control and essentially stopped approving new issuance. No approval 
means no risk. However, other problems arose. Companies could not raise 
capital from the financial market. To address the underdevelopment of 
direct financing in China, the PBC established the National Association 
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of Financial Market Institutional Investors (NAFMII) in 2007. The aim 
was to promote the development of corporate credit bonds using market 
forces. The direction of development was to strengthen market discipline 
while reducing administrative approvals. Such market constraints include 
information disclosure, auditing of financial statements and various 
arrangements for bond custody and clearing.
Second, a significant breakthrough in the past 10 years is the development 
of institutional investors. Individual investors can invest in bonds through 
funds, asset management products offered by banks and other institutional 
investors. Institutional investors can manage their risks more effectively 
and obtain higher returns. Institutional investors can identify the risks 
of financial products and bond products in a more professional manner 
than can most retail investors. The easiest way for retail investors to invest 
is to purchase government bonds at banks, but these rarely achieve high 
returns. With the help of institutional investors, consumer savings can 
be channelled to the interbank bond market through a wide range of 
products. The bond market can achieve faster development and retail 
investors who lack knowledge about the bond market can avoid being 
cheated. As bond investors are mostly institutional investors, the bond 
market differs from the stock market in the custody, trading, clearing 
and settlement approaches.
Third, bond market development should comply with and serve the 
diversified needs for investment and financing of the real economy. 
Although China’s bond market has a great number of products, it still 
falls short of the needs of the real economy. To meet these needs, new 
types of corporate credit bonds have been rolled out, including capital 
supplement bonds for the banks along with credit and asset-backed 
bonds. These products are not innovation for innovation’s sake; they have 
been introduced to meet the needs of the real economy and to improve 
the financial market’s ability to serve the real economy. This is also a major 
difference between China’s bond market and some Western bond markets.
Additionally, in the interbank bond market the government has minimal 
influence. More intermediaries and self-regulatory organisations have 
been empowered to take on more important roles. For example, NAFMII 
was established in the banking industry and bond market in 2007. 
NAFMII currently has more than 3,000 members. Some important 
financial products are not developed by the PBC or other regulators, but 
by market participants. All market participants meet with lawyers and 
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accountants to discuss proposals of new products. After balancing all 
interests and conflicts and assessing the risks, the design and rules of the 
product will be developed and registered with the regulators. Regulators 
mainly review the procedures of product development and the new 
product’s compliance with risk control regulations. Regulators will also 
check whether the product proposal reflects a consensus among all market 
players. Market forces play an increasingly important role in innovation. 
There is no administrative approval during the registration process, 
only issuers and investors are involved. Issuers require more convenient 
financing, investors require more secure protection, and a balance between 
the various interests will be reached in the end. Such a products design 
process is more sophisticated and mature than one led by government 
officials. This is also an important factor that led to the success of the 
Chinese bond market. China should continue in this direction and aim 
for greater innovation in bond products.
Overall, China’s bond market has basically followed the development 
patterns of the world’s major bond markets over the past 30 years. This is 
why China has achieved substantial progress. Despite these achievements, 
China’s financial market has prominent structural problems compared 
to the markets in developed economies. To develop its financial market 
further, China must promote reform and development continuously 
through opening, while also adhering to the market-oriented philosophy 
and development patterns of international financial markets.
Part 2: Assessing the opening of the major 
financial submarkets
China’s financial market does not have a long history and neither does the 
opening process. The bond and foreign exchange markets were opened 
up relatively late (in 2005 and 2004 respectively). Although the stock 
market opened up first (in the early 1990s), the degree of its openness 
was quite limited and the primary market remains closed. Although the 
bond market has had a higher degree of openness, it is still well below 
the level of openness of the bond markets in developed countries. This 
part summarises the openness of the bond, stock and foreign exchange 
markets and analyses problems in the opening process of each market.
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The bond market
China’s bond market began to open in 2005, when international 
development institutions such as the International Finance Corporation 
and the Asian Development Bank were approved to issue RMB bonds 
in the interbank bond market. The Pan Asia Fund and Asian Debt Fund 
were also allowed to invest in the interbank bond market.
After the 2008 global financial crisis, the USD and other major currencies 
experienced drastic fluctuations. To reduce exchange rate risks, there 
was an increasing demand from domestic and foreign enterprises to 
use the  RMB  for cross-border trade settlement. In this context, cross-
border RMB business began to thrive. The rapid development of 
cross-border  RMB settlement created a need to invest offshore RMB 
back into China. In 2010, the PBC allowed foreign central banks and 
monetary authorities, RMB clearing banks in Hong Kong and Macao, 
and foreign participating banks to invest in China’s interbank bond 
market. When these institutions were approved to invest, they were 
able to engage in interbank market bond business, but within a certain 
limit. With the development of cross-border RMB business, the scope 
of overseas institutions that are allowed to invest gradually expanded 
to include sovereign wealth funds; international financial institutions; 
RMB clearing banks in regions other than Hong Kong and Macao; and 
insurance companies in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore.
Since 2013, as the scope of RMB cross-border business and international 
use gradually expanded, the RMB’s international status rose significantly. 
The bond market opened at a quicker rate and adopted a more market-
oriented approach.
In terms of bond issuance, international development institutions, overseas 
non-financial enterprises, financial institutions, foreign governments 
and issuers have issued RMB bonds in the interbank bond market. 
In 2013, Daimler issued CN¥5-billion worth of RMB bonds in China, 
demonstrating that foreign non-financial institutions could raise money 
with RMB bonds. In 2015, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation Limited and the Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited 
were allowed to issue RMB bonds in the interbank bond market, a first-
time issuance by international commercial banks following international 
development institutions and foreign non-financial enterprises. In 2015, 
Canada’s British Columbia and South Korea completed registration for 
THE JInGSHAn REPORT
238
CN¥9 billion of RMB bonds. In 2016, the World Bank issued special 
drawing right (SDR)–denominated bonds of CN¥500 million. This 
is strategically significant for expanding SDR use, promoting RMB 
internationalisation, and opening China’s financial market. At the end 
of April 2017, foreign issuers of all types had issued a total of CN¥7.81 
billion of RMB bonds. Domestic institutions issuing bonds overseas are 
also making progress.
Regarding investment, the scope of foreign institutions and variety of 
products in the domestic bond market are expanding constantly, and 
management is becoming more market oriented. The Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor (QFII) and RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investor (RQFII) schemes allowed foreign investors to conduct spot 
transactions in the interbank bond market in 2013. In 2015, policies 
were introduced to facilitate overseas banking institutions’ entry into the 
interbank market. The entry process was simplified to a filing system; 
the investment cap was lifted; and the investment scope was extended 
to include spot transaction, bond repurchase, bond lending and bond 
forwards, interest rate swaps, forward rate agreements and other business 
approved by the PBC. In 2016, the PBC issued Notice No. 3, allowing 
all types of financial institutions registered legally overseas and long-term 
institutional investors such as pension funds to invest in the interbank bond 
market through the filing system. The notice also allowed issuers to decide 
on the size of their investment independently. Currently, the secondary 
interbank bond market has been opened completely to qualified foreign 
investors. And the same standards are applied to domestic and foreign 
institutions. As long as they have the proper licences and their products 
fulfil all requirements, they can enter the interbank bond market through 
the filing system without approval from administrative departments. 
Moreover, there are no quotas on a single foreign institution or on the total 
investment of all foreign institutions. The size of investment is decided 
entirely by foreign institutions themselves, and the PBC implements 
only macroprudential management. Additionally, no restriction exists 
regarding the source of RMB funds for foreign institutions to invest 
in the interbank bond market. They can be derived from RMB cross-
border business, or the onshore or offshore foreign exchange markets. 
However, if foreign institutions want to obtain RMB from the onshore 
foreign exchange market, they must follow foreign exchange regulations 
regarding remittance, repatriation, purchase and settlement procedures. 
Currently, there are about 480 foreign investors in the market, with a total 
investment of over CN¥800 billion.
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As China’s bond market continues to open, major bond indices across 
the world have begun to consider including the Chinese market in 
their coverage. In March 2017, Bloomberg launched two new hybrid, 
fixed income indices that include RMB-denominated China bonds and 
global  indices: the Global Aggregate + China Index, which combines 
the Global Aggregate Index with the treasury and policy bank bond 
component of the China Aggregate Index; and the EM (Emerging Market) 
Local  Currency Government + China Index, which combines the EM 
Local Currency Government Index and the treasury bond component of 
the China Aggregate Index. Earlier, in 2004, Bloomberg had introduced 
the China Aggregate Index, which included China’s onshore bonds, but 
the aforementioned hybrid indices were the first time that onshore RMB 
bonds were included in Bloomberg’s global indices offering. Citigroup 
later announced that China’s onshore bonds were qualified to enter its 
emerging markets and regional government bond indices, including 
the Emerging Markets Government Bond Index (EMGBI), Asian 
Government Bond Index (AGBI) and the Asia Pacific Government Bond 
Index. Citigroup also announced that if Chinese bonds continued to 
meet the necessary criteria over the next three months, Citigroup would 
eventually include China in the three indices (i.e. by February 2018) and 
introduce EMGBI-Capped and AGBI-Capped due to the large size of the 
Chinese market, with Chinese bonds weighing up to 10 per cent and 20 
per cent respectively. According to Goldman Sachs, if Chinese bonds were 
included in all three major global bond indices (Citigroup, JP Morgan 
Chase and Barclays), the ratio of foreign holdings would increase from 
about 4 per cent at present to about 15 per cent, and US$250 billion 
would be expected to flow into the Chinese market.
In May 2017, the PBC and Hong Kong Monetary Authority jointly 
announced plans to connect the Hong Kong and mainland bond markets 
in the ‘Bond Connect’. Bond Connect signifies that China’s interbank 
bond market is opening further, but is still subject to existing capital 
account management, qualification requirements for medium- and long-
term institutional investors, requirements on the collection of investment 
and trading information, and other regulations. Bond Connect provides 
a new channel for foreign institutions to enter the market more efficiently. 
It can do so with the help of increased connectivity between domestic and 
foreign infrastructures in a mode that is well accepted in the international 
bond market. The experience of other countries shows that foreign 
investors can either enter the market by opening accounts in the domestic 
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market, or by investing in the country’s bond market through the 
connectivity of infrastructure. The first model places higher requirements 
on foreign investors who need to possess a comprehensive and in-depth 
understanding of a country’s bond market regulatory system and market 
environment. The second model has become common practice globally. 
It enables foreign investors to access the global bond market conveniently 
via infrastructure connectivity and multilevel custody. Bond Connect 
operates according to the second model. By connecting the infrastructure 
of two bond markets, international investors can participate easily in 
the mainland bond market without changing their business practices, 
provided they comply with the regulations of the mainland market. Bond 
Connect will be implemented step by step with the overall planning and 
deployment of China’s financial market liberalisation. To meet the current 
needs of international investors to invest in the mainland bond market, 
the current priority is ‘Northbound’ trading, which will be expanded to 
‘Southbound’ trading in the future.
Compared with international practice, China’s bond market still has a long 
way to go. At the end of 2016, overseas holdings of US Treasury bonds 
accounted for about 38.1 per cent of the total investment, and Japanese 
Government bonds for around 10.5 per cent. Foreign holdings in China’s 
bond market accounted for less than 2 per cent and the lack of diversity 
in product structures is reflected in the high proportion of treasury and 
policy bank bonds. China’s bond market has yet to be included in major 
international bond indices.
The stock market
China’s stock market started to open in the early 1990s when the 
country’s capital account was not yet open. To develop a channel for 
domestic companies to raise funds from overseas and facilitate foreign 
investors to invest in the domestic market, the State Council approved the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges to test issuing B-shares. In 1992, 
the B-share market was officially established. B-shares, also known as 
special RMB shares, are denominated in RMB and subscribed and traded 
in foreign currencies at the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
Companies listed in the B-share market are all registered in China. Before 
February 2001, the B-share market was only open to foreign investors. 
It was then opened to domestic investors.
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To further expand the channel for overseas financing and enhance 
the status of Chinese enterprises abroad, the Joint Working Group on 
Mainland–Hong Kong Securities Affairs was established in July 1992 
with the approval of the State Council. Its main task was to provide 
consultations on state-owned enterprises going public in Hong Kong. 
After concluding the negotiations and completing the corresponding 
institutional arrangements, Tsingtao Brewery successfully issued H-shares 
and was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in July 1993, becoming 
China’s first state-owned enterprise to list overseas. Since then, China has 
experienced a wave of mainland enterprises going public in the overseas 
market. In December 2012, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) issued the ‘Regulatory Guidelines in Relation to the Document 
Submission and Review Procedure for Overseas Stocks Issuance and Listing 
by Joint Stock Companies’, which further strengthened supervision on 
domestic companies applying to issue shares and publicly list overseas.
With the gradual opening of the capital account, China introduced the 
QFII and Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) schemes. 
As transitional arrangements, QFII and QDII are special ways to open the 
securities market orderly and prudently in countries and regions where 
the capital account is not yet fully opened. In December 2002, the CSRC 
and the PBC jointly issued the ‘Interim Provisions on the Administration 
of the Domestic Securities Investments by Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors’, and the first trade by QFII was made in July 2003. To open 
the capital account further, achieve a more balanced RMB exchange rate 
and give domestic investors the opportunity to participate in the global 
market, the QDII scheme was officially put into practice in July 2006, 
when the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) approved 
a US$500 million quota to the Bank of Communications. In recent years, 
regulatory authorities have gradually eased qualification requirements 
and foreign exchange management and have raised investment quotas 
continuously. By the end of March 2017, SAFE had approved 280 QFIIs 
with an investment quota of US$90.3 billion and 132 QDIIs with an 
investment quota of US$90 billion.
In recent years, with the accelerated internationalisation of the RMB and 
liberalisation of the capital account, the depth and breadth of China’s 
stock market opening has increased rapidly. In December 2011, the 
CSRC, PBC and SAFE jointly issued the ‘Measures for Pilot Domestic 
Securities Investment Made by RQFII of Fund Management Companies 
and Securities Companies’. This allowed the Hong Kong subsidiaries 
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of qualified fund and securities companies to conduct RQFII business. 
The early pilot quota was set at about CN¥20 billion. By the end of 
2016, RQFII global pilot zones had been increased to 18, with a quota 
cap of CN¥1.5 trillion. By the end of March 2017, 182 RQFIIs had 
been approved and their investment quota reached CN¥541.4 billion. 
In November 2014, the PBC issued the ‘Notice of the People’s Bank of 
China on Matters Concerning the Overseas Securities Investment by 
RMB QDIIs’, allowing qualified investors to invest in RMB-denominated 
products in overseas financial markets with their own or RMB funds 
raised onshore. Different from the approval system for QDII’s quota, 
RMB Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor’s (RQDII) quota is based 
on the amount of funds they actually raise.
To promote two-way opening and the sustainable development of the 
mainland and Hong Kong capital markets and increase the overall level 
of openness while integrating with the international market, the State 
Council approved the ‘Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect’ in April 
2014. After six months of preparation, the CSRC and Securities and 
Futures Commission of Hong Kong (SFC) issued a notice to officially 
launch the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect in November 2014. 
Further, to strengthen financial cooperation between the mainland and 
Hong Kong markets and to capture the regional advantages of the Shenzhen 
and Hong Kong stock exchanges, the State Council officially passed the 
‘Implementation Plan for Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect’ in 
August 2016. In December 2016, the CSRC and SFC issued a notice to 
officially launch the Shenzhen–Hong Kong Stock Connect. Since then, 
qualified domestic individuals and institutional investors can trade stocks 
directly in the Hong Kong market, and foreign investors can trade stocks 
directly in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Currently, both 
the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect and Shenzhen–Hong Kong 
Stock Connect are operating in a smooth and orderly manner, and cross-
border capital inflows and outflows are approximately equal. China has 
achieved a cross-border trading system with proper regulation.
As the mainland and Hong Kong markets continue to deepen cooperation 
in financial products and services, in May 2015, the CSRC and the SFC 
announced plans for the joint development of the fund market. They 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Recognition of 
Funds (MRF) between the mainland and Hong Kong, and the CSRC 
simultaneously issued the corresponding ‘Interim Provisions on the 
Administration of Recognized Hong Kong Funds’. In December 2015, 
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the first seven mainland–Hong Kong MRFs were registered with the 
CSRC and SFC. In January 2017, the mainland–Hong Kong MRF service 
platform was launched. As new initiatives to open the capital market, the 
MRF, Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect and Shenzhen–Hong Kong 
Stock Connect could complement each other, attract long-term capital 
and deepen capital market opening. By the end of February 2017, Hong 
Kong funds issued and sold on the mainland had generated a net outward 
remittance of CN¥7.3 billion, and mainland funds issued and sold in 
Hong Kong had a net inward remittance of CN¥97.45 million.
With increasing capital account convertibility, China’s stock market is 
becoming more open, and its structure and mechanisms are becoming 
more diversified. In terms of the primary market, B-shares and H-shares 
have provided channels for domestic enterprises to raise capital overseas 
and for foreign investors to invest in domestic companies. Regarding the 
secondary market, schemes like QFII and RQFII have facilitated capital 
inflows, while QDII and RQDII schemes have facilitated capital outflows. 
Mechanisms like the MRF, Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect and 
Shenzhen–Hong Kong Stock Connect have facilitated the two-way flow 
of capital, catering to the needs of various types of investors.
However, China’s stock market is not as open as its international 
counterparts. At the end of 2014, the total market capitalisation of 
companies listed in London was £1.7 trillion, of which 54 per cent was 
held by overseas investors, a significant increase from 30.7 per cent in 
1998. Foreign holdings reached 16 per cent in the US stock market, the 
world’s largest stock market. Shares held by foreign investors in the South 
Korean stock market have remained at a constant level of over 30 per 
cent. Although foreign capital can now enter China’s A-share market, the 
combined shares held by foreign investors through schemes such as QFII, 
RQFII, the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect and Shenzhen–Hong 
Stock Connect totalled less than 5 per cent in 2017.
The foreign exchange market
China’s interbank foreign exchange market began to open in 2004, with 
the Bank of China (Hong Kong) and the Macau branch of the Bank of 
China entering the market first. With the introduction of cross-border 
RMB settlement business in 2009, the interbank foreign exchange market 
opened to foreign clearing banks with offshore RMB business. In 2015, the 
PBC allowed foreign central banks (monetary authorities), other official 
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reserve management institutions, international financial organisations 
and sovereign wealth funds to participate in China’s interbank foreign 
exchange market through agents, direct market access and other channels. 
They were allowed to conduct various types of foreign exchange trading, 
including spot, forwards, swaps and options, without quota restrictions. In 
January 2016, the PBC allowed internationally influential and regionally 
representative foreign banks involved in large-scale RMB selling and 
buying business to enter the interbank foreign exchange market. These 
banks could now participate in various types of foreign exchange trading, 
including spot, forwards, swaps and options. In February 2017, to help 
foreign investors participating in China’s interbank bond market better 
manage their foreign exchange risk, qualified settlement agents were 
allowed to conduct foreign exchange derivatives business for foreign 
investors. They had to follow the principle of conducting trading based on 
real needs; however, foreign investors were only allowed to hedge foreign 
exchange risk exposure caused by investing in the interbank bond market 
with inward remittances. So far, China’s interbank foreign exchange 
market has achieved varying degrees of openness for different types of 
investors. It now covers a full range of trading products and is more 
internationalised than ever. The entry of foreign investors has not only 
helped trading entities in the interbank foreign exchange market become 
more diverse, but is also an important force that enhances market liquidity 
and integration. By the end of May 2017, 66 foreign institutions were 
participating in China’s interbank foreign exchange market, including 
18 overseas RMB clearing banks, 19 foreign participating banks and 29 
foreign central banks.
Apart from the introduction of different types of investors, China has 
also focused on developing direct and regional trading to further open 
the interbank foreign exchange market. To support RMB cross-border 
trade settlement, direct trading between the RMB, Malaysian ringgit 
and Russian ruble was launched in 2010, bypassing the USD cross rates. 
In 2014, RMB–Kazakhstani tenge interbank trading was launched. This 
bilateral direct exchange rate formation mechanism reduced trading costs 
and improved market transparency. To facilitate RMB internationalisation 
and implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative, in 2016, the interbank 
foreign exchange market launched direct trading mechanisms between 
the RMB and 11 currencies, including the United Arab Emirates dirham, 
South African rand and Saudi Arabian riyal. At present, 25 currency pairs 
exist in the interbank RMB foreign exchange market. This covers not only 
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major international reserve currencies like the British pound and Japanese 
yen, but also the currencies of countries involved in the Belt and Road 
Initiative. In 2016, the trading value of these currencies amounted to 
nearly CN¥50 billion, twice the size of the previous year.
The interbank foreign exchange market is opening at a steady pace. 
It is cooperating with international mainstream institutions to construct 
a  community of common interests and achieve gradual deployment in 
the global financial market. In 2015, following the Sino–US Economic 
and  Strategic Dialogue and discussions between Chinese and German 
leaders, the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) signed 
agreements with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group and the 
Deutsche Bank. These agreements clarified the shared objectives of 
achieving interconnectivity in financial infrastructure and financial 
products (such as exchange rate products) and of developing RMB-
denominated offshore spot and derivative exchange rate products.
The interbank foreign exchange market is also actively promoting the 
internationalisation strategy, aiming at building a global service network, 
improving international financial service infrastructure and establishing 
a market with a higher degree of openness. Since January 2016, trading 
time in the market was extended to 23:30 Beijing time, covering 
European trading hours and part of US trading hours. This has facilitated 
the involvement of foreign investors. The service support time for all types 
of markets was also extended accordingly, enhancing the ability to serve 
global participants. Since 2015, the CFETS has released RMB exchange 
rate data based on the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Special Data 
Dissemination Standard and RMB reference rates, providing pricing 
references to the IMF and other international organisations. In particular, 
since December 2015, the CFETS has compiled and issued the CFETS 
index, which has gained a widespread influence in the domestic and 
international markets.
The openness of China’s foreign exchange market is much lower than that 
of advanced economies. For example, about 70 per cent of the trading 
volume in London’s foreign exchange market—the world’s largest—
comes from foreign institutions. Seven out of the top 10 traders are non-
British institutions, and the participants are very diversified and include 
multinational corporations, investment banks, mutual funds, hedge 
funds, foreign exchange funds and insurance companies. As for China, 
foreign investors participating in the interbank foreign exchange market 
THE JInGSHAn REPORT
246
only account for around 10 per cent of total investors, and their trading 
volume is less than 1 per cent. Further, the variety of foreign participants 
in the Chinese market is very limited, with banks being the only type of 
commercial institution participating.
Assessing the openness of China’s financial market
Overall assessment
Although China’s financial market is less open compared to other 
developed markets, its pace of opening has attracted worldwide attention.
In terms of the onshore market, China’s stock, bond and foreign exchange 
markets have all opened up, but the degree of openness varies. The bond 
market has the highest degree of openness, followed by the stock market 
and then the foreign exchange market. In the primary market, although 
nonresidents cannot issue shares in the domestic stock market, various 
types of nonresidents (such as international development institutions, 
foreign non-financial enterprises, financial institutions and foreign 
governments) can issue bonds in the interbank market to raise funds. 
In the secondary market, the stock market introduced the QFII scheme 
in 2002, and then the RQFII scheme, Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock 
Connect and Shenzhen–Hong Kong Stock Connect. The interbank bond 
market has been fully opened to qualified foreign investors. The same 
entry standards are applied to both overseas and domestic institutions. 
Investors are not subject to any quota, but are subject to macroprudential 
management implemented by the PBC. Foreign investors participating 
in the interbank bond market can also participate in foreign exchange 
derivatives trading based on real demand.
The scale and geographic scope of the offshore market is expanding, 
and the products and participants in the offshore market are becoming 
increasingly diversified. Since 2010, the overseas offshore RMB market has 
developed steadily and rapidly with Hong Kong as the centre. A variety of 
RMB products have emerged, including credit, foreign exchange, bonds, 
funds and forwards. Trading activities are also very dynamic. The balance of 
RMB deposits in major offshore markets totalled about CN¥1.12 trillion 
at the end of 2016 (People’s Bank of China, 2017). Fourteen locations, 
including New Zealand, London, Frankfurt, Seoul, Paris, Luxembourg, 
Doha, Toronto and Sydney, now have RMB clearing banks, covering Asia, 
Africa, America, Europe and Oceania. However, there is a spread between 
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onshore and offshore RMB products and RMB exchange rates, which 
shows that capital control still exists and that financial market openness 
is still limited.
Regarding capital account convertibility, an increasing number of items 
under the capital account are gradually becoming convertible, and 
investment in the primary market is being liberalised at a steady pace. 
According to the classification of capital account transactions by the IMF’s 
‘Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions’ 
(seven major categories and 40 items), 37 items in China are fully 
convertible, basically convertible or partially convertible, accounting for 
92.5 per cent of all items (see Chapter 5). Inconvertible items concentrate 
in the domestic primary financial market, which is still off-limits to 
nonresidents. Partially convertible items with more restrictions mostly 
relate to trading in the secondary market, which is not yet fully opened to 
the outside world.
Problems of the major financial submarkets in the process 
of reform and opening
Overall, the financial submarkets have different levels of openness, and 
China’s financial market still has plenty of room to open to foreign 
investors. Market access for foreign investors and capital flows are still 
subject to many restrictions. Moreover, China’s market system, market 
rules and regulations still need to gear up to international standards, 
which directly affects the participation of foreign investors in China’s 
domestic market.
The bond market. Although the bond market is the most open market in 
China’s financial system, the breadth and depth of its openness is still far 
from desirable. In particular, the rules and institutions of China’s financial 
market differ significantly from those in the international market, and 
foreign issuers and investors often find it inconvenient to participate in 
the Chinese market. Some deep-rooted problems are hidden beneath 
the surface, damping the spirit of issuers and investors both at home 
and abroad.
First, China’s accounting and auditing standards have caused much 
inconvenience for foreign issuers and have raised the cost of issuing 
bonds in the domestic market. According to existing regulations, the 
financial statements disclosed by overseas institutions should follow 
China’s accounting standards, or equivalent standards as approved by the 
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Ministry of Finance. They should also be audited by accounting firms with 
securities and futures business qualifications in China, unless their country 
or region of origin has signed an agreement on the equivalence of public 
oversight over CPAs and auditing with China’s Ministry of Finance. As 
Hong Kong is the only place that meets the aforementioned accounting 
and auditing requirements, foreign issuers from other countries or regions 
have to re-prepare their financial statements if they want to issue bonds in 
China. This has greatly constrained market development.
Second, China’s rating industry lacks credibility. Therefore, it cannot 
meet the needs of international investors. China’s rating services began 
late and are plagued by problems such as insufficient inspection on default 
rates, unrealistically high credit ratings and lack of ability to differentiate 
between bonds of varying quality. It is common practice for rating agencies 
to ‘assign the rating based on the price’ and to ‘set the price based on the 
rating’. In China, enterprises with high ratings make up a significantly 
high proportion of the total. For example, enterprises with AA– or above 
constitute 97.13 per cent of all enterprises, much higher than the levels 
in the US, Japan and other countries. Conversely, enterprises with low 
ratings comprise a very small proportion of the total. As more enterprises 
end up with high ratings, enterprises with the same credit rating can 
have different risk levels, and it is difficult to distinguish the credit risks 
of enterprises with the same credit rating. When international investors 
allocate their assets globally, they develop their risk control system based 
on global rating standards. These are not shared by Chinese rating 
agencies. Concerns over China’s rating quality prevent investment in 
China’s bond market. In regard to bond issuers, as foreign issuers are 
usually experienced issuing entities, requiring them to hire unfamiliar 
Chinese rating agencies to undertake another rating would increase the 
cost of issuing bonds in China.
Third, market participants are subject to entry filing, one-level custody 
and centralised trading in China’s bond market, which differs significantly 
from the international practice of investor suitability system, multilevel 
custody and decentralised trading. This situation has led to many 
technical obstacles for foreign investors investing in China. When the 
bond market opened up in 2005, foreign investors were required to 
comply with domestic regulations regarding market entry, trading, 
custody and settlement. Due to differences in the legal system, as well as 
in trading and settlement habits, foreign investors have encountered many 
technical problems, resulting in a slow pace of opening. In terms of filing 
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for entry, foreign investors can only open an account after they submit 
a filing notice with the PBC’s Shanghai headquarters via a settlement 
agent. In terms of transactions, the natural evolution of overseas markets 
has led to the formation of a hierarchal structure of dealer-to-dealer and 
dealer-to-customer trading. Within this structure, ordinary investors 
trade mainly through dealers. However, the Chinese market is flat and 
market makers have not developed enough, meaning that the ratio of 
one-on-one transactions among investors is especially high. In terms of 
settlement, the international market has adopted a multilevel custodian 
system, in line with the structure of trading. Investors need to open 
a nominal account in a custodian bank, and the custodian bank opens a 
custodial account in a central depository. With this model, the custodian 
bank can provide investors with a series of post-trade services, such as 
custody, clearing and settlement, and accounting reconciliation. In the 
one-level custodian system in China, investors must open an account 
directly at a central securities depository, and the settlement agents will 
provide trading and settlement services, but not all post-trade services. 
As the central depository deals directly with all investors, it is unable to 
cater to every investor’s need. In terms of the settlement cycle, the overseas 
market is generally around T + 3, due to layered trading and multilevel 
custody, while the domestic market is generally T + 0, as the flattened 
structure enables higher settlement efficiency. This also creates unease 
among foreign investors.
Fourth, there is a limited variety of foreign exchange and derivative 
products related to bonds, which has slowed the opening process. Foreign 
institutions lack hedging instruments against exchange rate and interest 
rate risks when they invest in RMB bonds. Meanwhile, China’s derivatives 
market is still at an early stage of development, with a small market 
size, homogenous participants and many technical obstacles for foreign 
investors. When foreign institutions invest in fixed income products, they 
usually develop a systematic trading strategy (called FICC) that integrates 
fixed income products, commodities and currency products. However, 
in China, different products have different levels of openness to foreign 
investors. The bond market opened up ahead of the derivatives market 
and the foreign exchange market. In this case, foreign investors cannot use 




Fifth, international cooperation on financial market infrastructure can be 
improved further. Foreign institutions involved in the domestic market 
have to deal with very complex technical details due to the lack of unified 
and transparent rules and institutions. The adoption of a case-by-case 
model can destabilise foreign investor expectations. Further, China’s 
financial market infrastructure cannot fully meet the needs of foreign 
institutions. International electronic trading platforms are very developed 
after years of market competition, through which foreign investors can 
monitor market movements, place orders and conduct transactions. 
However, China’s trading terminals lag behind in terms of language service 
and convenience. The major international bond markets have formed 
a multidimensional network with multilevel custody arrangements, 
enabling investors to access the global market easily, while providing them 
with services such as margin trading, data and research. In the process of 
opening, China must integrate further with international infrastructure.
The stock market. Securities investment has adopted a channelled 
approach to opening and is yet to open up completely. Although A-shares 
have been included in MSCI’s EMs review list since 2014, it was not 
until June 2017 that MSCI announced that it would incorporate A-shares 
into the MSCI EM Index starting in June 2018 (MSCI, 2017). The 
A-shares will only account for 0.7 per cent of the index, far below China’s 
proportion of economic size, trade volume and stock capitalisation 
globally (14 per cent, 14 per cent and 15 per cent respectively).
In terms of investment, although the stock market introduced QFII as 
early as 2002 and gradually extended to RQFII, the Shanghai–Hong 
Kong Stock Connect, the Shenzhen–Hong Kong Stock Connect and 
other mechanisms, foreign investors entering China’s stock market are 
still subject to many restrictions. The QFII scheme imposes a quota for 
monthly capital redemption, and pre-approval by exchanges is required 
for financial products related to A-shares. Moreover, the QFII and RQFII 
schemes do not share unified standards for market access. The requirements 
for entry are high, and the scope of investors qualified to apply is limited. 
Long-term foreign capital that entered the domestic market through the 
QFII or RQFII schemes is restricted in areas such as quotas and liquidity. 
Such restrictions may reduce the enthusiasm of long-term investors and 
affect the abilities of such schemes to improve investor structure, promote 
long-term investment and enhance the governance of listed companies. 
251
6 . PROMOTInG CHInA’S FInAnCIAL MARKET REFORM AnD InnOvATIOn
Individual investors abroad can only invest in underlying stocks listed 
in the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges via the Shanghai–Hong Kong 
Stock Connect and Shenzhen–Hong Kong Stock Connect.
In terms of financing, the development of bi-directional cross-border 
financing is not balanced. Foreign enterprises are not yet allowed to 
engage in equity financing in the A-share market. Although domestic 
enterprises can now raise money overseas through the H-share market 
without much obstruction, the approval system for overseas refinancing 
is not capable of seamless convergence with fast tracks such as lightning 
placement. The B-share market has basically lost its financing capability 
for now.
The foreign exchange market. The principle of ‘trading on real needs’ 
has somewhat limited further opening of the foreign exchange market. 
At present, the domestic foreign exchange market is a regulated market 
based on the principle of servicing real demand, while the international 
market has no such principle. Data analysis shows that less than 
10 per cent of trading volume in the international market is driven by 
real trade. Based on the principle of real needs, the interbank foreign 
exchange market has been prudent when engaging foreign investors. 
Although foreign central banks and clearing banks can now enter the 
market, investment banks, commercial banks, insurance institutions, 
pension funds, hedge funds and large enterprises are still not allowed. 
This problem is also reflected in the structure of domestic investors, which 
is dominated by commercial banks, with non-bank financial institutions 
and non-financial enterprises accounting for a relatively small proportion. 
The limited type and number of market participants leads to similar 
trading behaviour. It also homogenises market demands and lowers the 
demand for foreign exchange derivatives. Further, the volume of trading 
in the domestic market lags far behind the international level.
To facilitate initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative launched in 
recent years, the CFETS introduced dozens of new currency pairs 
in a  short period. However, the participants have not been very active, 
leading to a low trading volume and liquidity shortage. The trading 
between the RMB and non-US currencies accounted for a market share 
of less than 5 per cent. Small currencies that saw active trading was 
concentrated in China’s neighbouring countries or developed economies, 
while the remaining small currencies remained quiet. Regional currencies, 
such as the Kazakhstani tenge, were basically not traded at all.
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Financial infrastructure. The organisation of China’s financial 
infrastructure is markedly different from that of the international 
market. The international market usually uses a multiple-level custodian 
system and a more developed market maker system. China’s financial 
infrastructure is replete with Chinese characteristics and tailored to China’s 
national condition, such as the fact that China’s market is still at an early 
developmental stage and the governance of companies remains imperfect. 
Because of this, China’s financial infrastructure is relatively centralised. 
To address the imperfections of companies’ governance structures and 
the risk of clients’ securities being misappropriated, as well as enhance 
information monitoring, improve transparency and provide a normalised 
trading platform, the interbank bond market has constructed a unified 
electronic trading platform for bond custody and settlement, implemented 
real-name centralised custody and one-on-one bidding. Therefore, China’s 
centralised infrastructure is well adapted to the country’s economic and 
financial environment. Additionally, this system showed its merits during 
the 2008 global financial crisis. Even the regulatory reforms introduced 
after the crisis were directed towards infrastructure centralisation.
However, in the process of opening, these Chinese characteristics have 
not been very compatible with international conventions and technical 
operation, especially in areas such as opening accounts, custody, 
transactions and settlements. This inconsistency has negatively affected 
investment from foreign institutions in the domestic market. Since China’s 
bond market started to open up in 2005, only 480 foreign investors have 
invested in the market and their holdings amount to CN¥800 billion, only 
1.2 per cent of the total. This is not only far lower than the proportion 
of 30–40 per cent in developed European countries and the US, but is 
also lower than the 10 per cent in Russia, Malaysia and other emerging 
economies.
Part 3: Promoting a higher level of openness 
of the financial market
At present and in the near future, further development of the financial 
market through opening is necessary for China to enhance its international 
competitiveness. Only an open financial market can possess real scope 
and depth. Such a financial system can form price signals that are truly 
representative and effective, attract more capital and investors, and support 
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development of the real economy. China has now consolidated its position 
as the world’s second-largest economy after the US and its economy has 
entered a ‘new normal’ phase. For now, China’s market reforms on interest 
rates and exchange rates have entered the final stage, capital account 
liberalisation has basically been achieved, and the international status of 
the RMB has been further improved with its inclusion in the SDR basket. 
However, it should also be noted that China does not have the ability to 
completely reshape the rules of the global financial system and still needs 
to conform to international standards. In the process of opening, China 
should seek inclusion and cooperation, rather than putting its own needs 
first. By actively adapting to international rules and gradually integrating 
into the international financial order, China can establish a healthy pattern 
that combines domestic reform with opening-up to the outside world.
Solve the structural problems of China’s financial 
market in the process of reform and opening and 
uncover market potential
Since its reform and opening up, China has established a financial market 
and institutional system that aligns with the socialist market economy 
and that has made important contributions to the sustained and healthy 
development of the Chinese economy. However, China’s financial market 
has only played a limited role in promoting capital formation, optimising 
resource allocation and enabling economic transition and structural 
adjustment. Compared to advanced market economies, China’s financial 
market has prominent structural problems. First, the proportion of direct 
financing is too small. Second, shadow banking is putting pressure on 
the bond market, a situation similar to ‘bad’ money driving out ‘good’ 
money. Third, the structure of the bond market needs to be improved. 
Fourth, equity financing is underdeveloped, and retail investors are 
its main participants. Fifth, the financial derivatives market remains 
underdeveloped. In the future, China should persist in respecting and 
adapting to international market rules and practices. The reforms of the 
domestic financial market should be deepened on the basis of opening. 
Further, the financial regulatory framework should be improved to 
achieve coordinated development between direct financing and indirect 
financing, between equity financing and debt financing, and between 
basic products and derivatives products. Only in this way can China 
establish an advanced financial market system that matches its economic 
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status and supports sustainable development of the real economy. This 
financial market system needs to be all encompassing, properly structured, 
efficient, stable, inclusive and competitive.
Open the financial market through overall 
coordination and improve the framework of 
macroprudential management
China should open its financial market in a methodical way, following 
a  suitable roadmap and sensible timetable. First, there must be an 
overall plan and the process can be adjusted as required. Factors that 
should be considered include domestic and international economic and 
financial situations, China’s foreign debt serving capacity and balance 
of payments position, the real economy’s demands on financial services, 
and the impact of two-way financial opening. Cross-border regulatory 
capacity should be strengthened. A roadmap and a timetable for two-way 
opening should be prepared. Second, domestic financial development and 
opening policy should be better coordinated. For now, China should aim 
for a higher level of openness based on respecting international market 
rules and practices. It should simultaneously open the foreign exchange 
derivatives markets in a coordinated manner. In the process of opening, 
authorities should focus on integrating domestic rules with international 
standards and avoid overemphasising Chinese characteristics.
China should improve the macroprudential management framework 
and control the risk of cross-border capital flows. The macroprudential 
policy framework for foreign debt and cross-border capital flows should 
be improved to strengthen the risk management capacity under enhanced 
convertibility. The match of currency types and maturity of assets and 
liabilities should be considered, the size of foreign debt should be subject 
to adjustment and the structure of foreign debt should be optimised. It is 
important to monitor foreign debt and keep risks under control. It is also 
necessary to curb short-term speculative capital shocks through market-
based measures and strengthen regular monitoring and risk warnings about 
foreign investor behaviour and large amounts of abnormal cross-border 
flows. Alongside these measures, China should also urge participants to 
perform obligations such as monitoring and information reporting to 
prevent illegal transactions and control the risk of abnormal cross-border 
capital flows.
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Open the credit rating market in an orderly manner
First, China should allow the entry of international rating agencies 
into the domestic bond market for credit rating business. Detailed 
requirements should be clarified in respect of international rating 
agencies. Unified administrative rules for rating agencies should be 
established and improved, and a unified registration and supervision 
system should be established. As long as ratings are released ‘for regulatory 
purposes’, an agency should be subject to regulation, regardless of whether 
it is domestic or foreign. Meanwhile, an investor- and market-oriented 
evaluation mechanism should be established, and a mandatory exit 
mechanism introduced. Additionally, as rating agencies have entered 
the market in different ways, they should also be regulated differently. 
International rating agencies that have engaged in rating business by 
building a commercial presence in China should be treated in the same 
way as domestic agencies. International rating agencies that provide cross-
border rating business services must learn from international experience 
and coordinate with regulators in their country of origin. It is necessary 
to refrain from overregulation and avoid regulatory conflicts, as rating 
agencies may feel uneasy and confused and their business may decline. 
It  is also important to avoid oversights and loopholes so that rating 
agencies will have no opportunity to conduct arbitrage activities. In the 
early stage of opening the rating industry, it is viable to only consider 
supervising the business of international rating agencies conducted in 
China. Possible regulatory measures could be inquiries and access to their 
working papers. Ultimately, it is necessary to strengthen cooperation with 
international regulators and achieve coordinated supervision by signing 
cooperation agreements.
Second, China should take advantage of international rating agencies 
and gradually liberalise the domestic bond rating business. The bond 
market should reduce its reliance on credit rating and stop treating 
ratings as a prerequisite for issuing bonds. Historically, China has been 
overprotective of the rating industry and required all bonds be rated 
before being issued. This was an administrative intervention that helped 
rating agencies gain dominance. As China’s bond default rate is very 
low, it is almost impossible to effectively verify the accuracy of ratings. 
This has prompted rating agencies to prioritise market share over their 
own credibility. Once mandatory rating requirements for bond issuance 
are lifted, rating agencies will focus more on their credibility to gain 
recognition from investors, and international rating agencies will play 
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a bigger role in improving the quality of domestic ratings. It is also vital 
to coordinate the global rating system with the local rating system and 
to open the domestic rating  industry methodically. International rating 
agencies use global rating standards. These specify that the ratings 
of  Chinese enterprises cannot surpass China’s sovereign rating (A+ or 
AA–). However, the highest rating given by domestic rating agencies to 
domestic enterprises is AAA. In this context, the same issuer may have 
very different ratings at home and abroad. In the early stages of opening, 
attention should be paid to the coordination between the two systems to 
avoid pricing confusion. In this sense, it is necessary to gradually liberalise 
the rating business. At an early stage of the process, foreign institutions 
planning to issue Panda bonds or domestic institutions that have raised 
funds overseas can be rated by international rating agencies.
Implement multilevel management to offer foreign 
issuers greater flexibility in terms of auditing 
and accounting
First, China should allow foreign issuers to choose their own accounting 
standards to prepare financial reports. Most participants in China’s bond 
market, especially in the interbank bond market, are qualified institutional 
investors with the capacity to identify risks and make judgements about 
the financial statements of foreign institutions. Foreign institutions 
that issue bonds to qualified institutional investors can be allowed to 
prepare their financial statements based on accounting standards that 
align with China’s accounting standards for business enterprises or are 
recognised by China’s Ministry of Finance. However, they should note 
the differences between their own and China’s accounting standards. 
Regarding the statement of important differences, foreign government 
agencies (including sovereign governments and local governments), 
international development institutions and other foreign institutions with 
high credit worthiness and international influence only need to disclose 
the major differences. Financial institutions, non-financial enterprises 
and other foreign commercial institutions must make adjustments on 
the differences between their accounting and China’s standards while 
disclosing reconciliation statements. Moreover, in the case of foreign 
institutions issuing bonds to certain qualified institutional investors, 
considering the limited number of investors involved and their familiarity 
with the issuers, the two sides may be allowed to negotiate the type of 
accounting standards between themselves.
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Second, China should allow qualified foreign accounting firms to 
provide auditing services to foreign institutions issuing bonds to qualified 
institutional investors in China. International practice shows that when 
Chinese institutions issue bonds to qualified investors in the US market, 
they often refer to the audit opinions issued by Chinese accounting 
firms. US regulators had never asked to sign a cooperative agreement 
on audit regulation with China. At present, the legal framework for the 
capital market’s opening is still under development. Signing cooperative 
agreements on audit regulation with countries where the overseas 
accounting firms are based can help China improve its regulation and 
facilitate cross-border recourse efforts in relation to bond default. For now, 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is the only jurisdiction 
that has signed such a cooperative agreement with China. This lack of 
agreements has increased the cost and dampened the spirits of foreign 
institutions issuing bonds in China. It is proposed that China accelerates 
the process of reaching agreements with other countries and regions 
on audit regulation, while simultaneously allowing accounting firms to 
proceed with their audit service after filing with the Ministry of Finance. 
No filing procedure is required for accounting firms based in Hong 
Kong; they only need to follow the guidance of the signed cooperation 
agreement.
Finally, China should issue a set of unified administrative rules for foreign 
institutions participating in China’s bond market as soon as possible. It is 
important to clarify the requirements, including accounting and auditing 
policies, for foreign government agencies, international development 
institutions and foreign business institutions that plan to issue bonds in 
China. Such requirements should be more transparent and standardised.
Clarify tax codes for foreign investors planning 
to enter China’s bond market
First, China’s finance and taxation departments should immediately 
clarify the tax details for foreign investment in China’s bond market so 
that more foreign institutions will be willing to invest in China. On issues 
such as whether and how to levy corporate income tax and value-added 
tax, China could learn from international practice and develop highly 
operable, clear and specified tax policies. The requirements concerning 
withholding tax should be made clear for registration and custody agencies 
in the interbank market.
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Second, China should clarify regulations concerning preferential tax 
policies in international agreements and tax treaties. For example, 
the suitable objects, application methods and procedures should be 
specified clearly.
Third, regarding foreign investors’ interest income and the spread income 
from investing in Panda bonds in China’s interbank bond market, it is 
necessary to exempt these types of income from corporate income tax and 
value-added tax to avoid double taxation and enhance transparency.
Additionally, the tax department should promote the publicity of tax 
policy, creating a fairer and more transparent policy environment for 
foreign institutions investing in China’s interbank market.
Construction of financial infrastructure should 
consider China’s actual conditions and 
international practice
A practical approach for adapting to the different habits and characteristics 
of investors would be to adopt a centralised custody system for domestic 
investors and a multilevel custody system for foreign investors. The 
former suits China’s actual conditions, while the latter aligns with 
international practice.
The Bond Connect launched in July 2017 is characterised by multilevel 
custody, nominal holdings, centralised trading and ‘penetration 
supervision’. Such institutional arrangements are a reasonable and 
effective way to further open the bond market and attract international 
investors. From a macro perspective, the Bond Connect essentially helps 
foreign investors to conveniently and effectively allocate RMB bond assets 
through internationally accepted arrangements that they can understand 
and accept. Bond Connect can lead to smoother capital inflows and 
debt outflows. It can also help with China’s balance of international 
payments, support economic and financial deleveraging, reduce financing 
costs and consolidate financial security. From a micro perspective, Bond 
Connect, which introduced multilevel custody into Chinese banks, offers 
a historic opportunity for Chinese financial institutions to participate 
in international custody business. This can enhance their global 
competitiveness and ability to safeguard financial security.
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Building China’s Overseas 
Investment and Financing 
Cooperation
Zhu Jun,1 Guo Kai,2 Ai Ming,3 Bai Xuefei4  
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Introduction
The 2008 global financial crisis reshaped the global economic and 
investment  landscape. Outbound investment of developed economies 
decreased, and China’s proportion steadily rose (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 2016). In 2015, 
China ended the surplus in foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow that had 
lasted for more than 30 years, and its outward foreign direct investment 
(ODI) exceeded FDI inflow for two consecutive years (Ministry of 
Commerce [MOFCOM], National Bureau of Statistics [NBS] & State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange [SAFE], 2017).
According to statistics from the MOFCOM, NBS and SAFE, in 2016, 
China’s utilisation of foreign capital reached CN¥813.2 billion (US$126 
billion). The country’s ODI flows amounted to CN¥1.1299 trillion 
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(or US$170.1 billion), ranking second globally, only after the United 
States (US). China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which has drawn global 
attention, is linked strongly to the previously launched ‘go global’ strategy 
and international cooperation on industrial capacity. Both of these 
strategies regard overseas investment as vital. The scale of China’s overseas 
investment and construction projects is likely to expand further at a rapid 
pace. With continued promotion of the ‘go global’ policy, international 
industrial capacity cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative, the room 
for growth is tremendous.
Enterprises cannot ‘go global’ without appropriate financial support, and 
the rapid development of overseas investment and project construction 
poses greater demands on China’s overseas investment and financing 
system and corresponding cooperation.
Meanwhile, many host countries of China’s overseas construction 
projects and investments are developing and emerging economies with 
tremendous capital demand. However, financial systems in some of these 
countries and regions remain underdeveloped and unable to provide 
adequate financing to meet investment needs. Given the huge demand for 
investment and financing in related projects, any single country is unable 
to provide sufficient funding purely from its own sources and China is 
no exception (Zhou, 2017). To meet such investment needs and ensure 
the sustainability of China’s overseas interests, China should establish an 
investment and financing cooperation framework to facilitate enterprises’ 
‘going global’, encourage international industrial capacity cooperation 
and promote financial integration.
To address the aforementioned concerns, China should follow the basic 
principles of market-oriented operation and have enterprises play the 
primary role in overseas investment and financing. It should also clarify 
the roles of market, government and international institutions in the 
process. Although on an international scale there is no lack of capital in 
the private sector overall, enthusiasm remains relatively low for projects 
with long cycles, slow payback and uncertain profitability. This requires 
the government to play a guiding role and help eliminate institutional 
constraints and information asymmetry faced by the supplier and 
demander of funds. If necessary, the government should use public funds 
to leverage funds from the private sector and international institutions.
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Specifically, the role of government and the market should vary in relation 
to different investment and financing projects. In general, three project 
categories exist. First, projects that can be operated entirely on a profit-
oriented basis should be undertaken by the private sector. Second, in terms 
of projects that are profitable but face certain information asymmetries 
and defects in the regulatory environment, the government should 
facilitate private investment by improving the investment climate, instead 
of intervening directly. It should eradicate institutional obstacles and 
reduce information asymmetries. Third, with projects that are extremely 
capital intensive, highly susceptible to political situations and impossible 
for the private sector to take on alone, but that also possess some strategic 
benefits—such as those with high risk and slow payback elements and 
those in definite need of public and concessional funds—the government 
should play a leading role. It should deliver support through credit 
enhancement, guarantees and other services, and leverage capital fully 
from international development institutions, private sector and financial 
institutions at home and abroad. Regarding highly strategic and policy-
based projects that are still operating in the red despite public backing, as 
they can no longer be viewed as commercial investments they will not be 
discussed in this chapter.
Additionally, the role played by public funds in investment and financing 
cooperation should vary in different host regions. When investing 
overseas in Europe, the US and other developed economies where the 
market is completely competitive and the legal, institutional, investment 
and financing systems relatively sound, Chinese-funded enterprises 
should be allowed to compete freely with their international counterparts 
and gain project funding from the market. Conversely, overseas projects 
in developing and emerging economies may find it difficult to use local 
funds. It is highly possible that investment and financing services formerly 
covered by the private sector are now in short supply, and government 
engagement is needed. Public funds can be used to attract and obtain the 
required capital.
Starting with the characteristics and problems of overseas investment and 
financing cooperation, this chapter studies how the government could 
facilitate investment and financing cooperation, especially for large-scale 
and long-term projects in underdeveloped regions that lack private sector 
support, while adhering to market-oriented operations.
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Part 1: An assessment of China’s overseas 
investment and financing cooperation
Chinese enterprises ‘going global’ and investing abroad are experiencing 
a period of fast development, with the level of investment flow and stock 
at record-high levels. Alongside this, problems have developed in relation 
to China’s overseas investment and financing cooperation framework. 
Taking the Belt and Road Initiative as an example, most countries 
in the relevant regions are emerging and developing economies  with 
a  shortage of capital and an excess of historical burdens associated 
with  infrastructure and interconnection projects. These countries rely 
heavily on external funding and are in urgent need of international 
support. They also have certain expectations about concessional rates of 
funding. Meanwhile, although China’s overseas investment is expanding 
rapidly, it had a late start. The investment and financing framework still 
requires improvement. Investment and financing cooperation is also 
facing various challenges. This part briefly introduces the basic features 
of China’s overseas investment and financing, evaluates the opportunities 
and risks of overseas investment and financing cooperation, and conducts 
an in-depth analysis of existing problems.
Basic features of Chinese enterprises’ 
overseas investment
First, despite its late start, China’s overseas investment is expanding 
rapidly, and the growth outlook is highly optimistic. China’s ODI has 
soared in the past decade. The NBS estimates that the average annual 
growth rate of China’s newly added non-financial ODI from 2000–2016 
reached 33.9  per cent. The ODI stock of Chinese mainland reached 
US$1.0979 trillion, exceeding the trillion-USD mark for the first time 
in 2015. China’s ODI grew to US$1.281 trillion in 2016, ranking China 
sixth globally after the US, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom (UK), 
Germany and Japan (see Table 7-1). The flow of China’s ODI in 2016 
(see Figure 7-1) stood at US$170.1 billion, second only to the US. 
Although China has the highest growth rate and largest stock of overseas 
investment among emerging economies, the gap between China and the 
major advanced economies remains large. At the end of 2016, China’s 
ODI stock was equivalent to 11 per cent of its gross domestic product 
(GDP), significantly lower than the US’s 34 per cent, Japan’s 28 per cent, 
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Germany’s 39 per cent, France’s 51 per cent and the UK’s 55 per cent. 
When compared to other countries, China’s potential for ODI growth 
is great. This is due to the advancement of China’s reforms and opening, 
as well as continuous integration with its neighbouring countries.
Figure 7-1: China’s ODI flow since 2000 (US$100 million).
Source: MOFCOM, nBS & SAFE (2017) .
Table 7-1: Comparison of ODI between China and major countries/regions
Countries/regions ODI stock (US$100 million)
2000 2010 2016
US 26,940 48,096 63,838
Hong Kong China 3,793 9,439 15,279
UK 9,402 16,863 14,439
Japan 2,784 8,311 14,007
Germany 4,839 13,646 13,654
China 278 3,172 12,810
France 3,659 11,730 12,594
netherlands 3,055 9,681 12,560
Canada 4,426 9,985 12,200
Switzerland 2,322 10,413 11,309
US 26,940 48,096 63,838
Source: UnCTAD (2017) .
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Second, the focus of investment and financing cooperation has gradually 
expanded from Asian economies to developed countries in Europe and 
the US. In the past decade, advanced economies have remained a major 
destination for global FDI, and they received 59 per cent of total global 
FDI in 2016 (UNCTAD, 2017). However, as international experience 
indicates, in the initial stage of overseas investment, a country prefers to 
invest in surrounding regions and in economies at a similar developmental 
stage. As a country’s economy grows, the destination of its overseas 
investment gradually extends to developed economies. This experience 
reflects the trajectory of China’s outbound investment. The stock of 
China’s foreign investment in Asia reached US$768.9 billion at the end of 
2015, 70 per cent of China’s total foreign investment. Most of this flowed 
into developing economies. In the same period, only 10 per cent of China’s 
total overseas investment went to Europe and the US. Notably, although 
the share of investment outflow to developed countries is still relatively 
small, it shows an upward trend. This is occurring because Chinese-
funded enterprises are becoming increasingly competitive internationally 
and their appetite for advanced technologies and entry into the markets 
of developed countries continues to grow. Advanced economies in Europe 
and the US are gradually becoming popular destinations for Chinese 
investment and acquisitions. China’s investment in Europe and the 
US accounted for 25 per cent of its total outbound investment flow in 
2015. As the Boston Consulting Group (2015) highlighted in its report 
on China’s overseas mergers and acquisitions (M&As) over the past 
decade, the focus and target of China’s overseas M&As has shifted and 
is increasingly aimed at acquiring technology, brands and market share.
Third, a noticeable shift has occurred in the distribution of target 
industries. Mining has traditionally been a major recipient of China’s 
overseas investment, accounting for 48.4 per cent of the total outflow 
in 2003. However, Chinese outbound investment has been gradually 
diversifying as Chinese enterprises accelerated their pace of ‘going global’ 
and participation in international industrial capacity cooperation. Some 
countries reduced FDI restrictions to attract foreign capital after the 2008 
global financial crisis. Sectors such as business services, financial services 
and manufacturing have also witnessed substantial growth. In terms of 
ODI  flows, the three industries that received the highest proportion 
of China’s ODI in 2015 were leasing and business services, financial 
companies and manufacturing companies, accounting for 24.9 per cent, 
16.6 per cent and 13.7 per cent respectively. ODI in the manufacturing 
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sector has grown rapidly, while ODI in the mining sector has dropped 
out of the top three. In terms of ODI stock, the leasing and business 
sector came first with US$409.57 billion at the end of 2015, 37.3 per cent 
of the total stock. This was followed by the financial sector with US$159.66 
billion, 14.5 per cent of the total stock. The mining sector came third 
with US$142.38 billion, or 13 per cent of the total stock (see Figure 7-2). 
These statistics reveal that China’s overseas investment is experiencing an 
obvious structural transformation. Apart from traditional industries, such 
as infrastructure and energy and resources, business services, financial 
services and manufacturing sectors are all developing fast. Increasing 
diversification in target industries is evident.
Figure 7-2: Distribution of China’s overseas investment stock by industry 
in 2015.
Source: MOFCOM, nBS & SAFE (2017) .
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Figure 7-3: Distribution of China’s overseas investment stock by ownership 
in 2015.
Source: MOFCOM, nBS & SAFE (2017) .
Fourth, non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) have become the 
dominant driving force for China’s outward foreign investment. 
At the end of 2006, the share of ODI stock by state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) was 81 per cent, whereas that held by non-SOEs (including 
limited liability companies, companies limited by shares, and private 
enterprises) was 19 per cent (see Figure 7-3).
At the end of 2015, the share of SOE investment in ODI stock dropped 
to  50.4 per cent, whereas that of non-SOE investment increased to 
49.6 per cent. In terms of flow and the number of investment entities, 
non-SOEs (especially companies with limited liabilities) have already 
become the main driving force in China’s ODI. Clearly, China’s overseas 
investment is becoming diversified and multi-layered.
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China’s foreign investment is characterised by 
its long cycle, large scale and high risks, and 
opportunities and challenges coexist in investment 
and financing cooperation
In general, many Chinese ODI projects have long cycles, are large scale 
and  face relatively high risks. First, in terms of regional distribution, 
although China’s investment in developed countries has grown rapidly in 
recent years, developing countries in the vicinity have still absorbed most of 
China’s ODI. In fact, 80 per cent of China’s ODI stock goes to projects in 
developing economies, including many major cooperation projects along 
the Belt and Road regions (MOFCOM, NBS & SAFE 2017). In most 
of these countries and regions, financial markets are still underdeveloped 
and the level of marketisation requires further improvement.
Second, in terms of industry distribution, although business and financial 
services take up a relatively large share of China’s ODI, infrastructure 
construction, energy and resources, and equipment manufacturing are 
still important target sectors (Wang & Li, 2017). Investments in these 
areas are typically large, long term and have slow payback. Such projects 
have relatively high demands for long-term equity funds. However, the 
financial market can only offer a limited amount of medium- and long-
term equity funding.
Third, in terms of industry sensitivity, energy and resources, one of the 
major target sectors of China’s outbound investment, is highly sensitive 
and protected. Host countries increasingly prefer to reserve the benefits 
of exploitation and subsequent increments to local firms and, therefore, 
impose strict regulatory and supervisory requirements on the entry, 
shareholding ratio, export and taxes of foreign investors (Li, 2015).
The aforementioned characteristics of China’s overseas investment not 
only pose challenges, but also create opportunities for China to conduct 
investment and financing cooperation with other countries. Enterprises 
that ‘go global’ often face many difficulties and constraints in overseas 
financing. For example, many Chinese enterprises lack sufficient credit 
records in host countries, making it difficult for them to obtain funds 
from local financial institutions. Additionally, the credit records of newly 
established subsidiaries of Chinese enterprises are often relatively brief 
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and, thus, they cannot access funds at low costs. Meanwhile, it takes 
time for enterprises to adapt to overseas financing procedures and legal 
environments.
Conversely, as developing and emerging economies are the major 
destinations for China’s overseas investment, where capital shortage is 
a common issue, private sector investment and financing services are 
often absent. Chinese-funded enterprises can also face bottlenecks and 
constraints when seeking funds through domestic financial institutions or 
their overseas branches. For example, these branches are distributed mostly 
in developed economies instead of emerging or developing countries 
where most Chinese outward investment is destined. Taking the Bank 
of China (BOC) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
as examples, these two Chinese banks have the largest overseas branch 
networks, but cover only 40 countries or regions, overlapping minimally 
with the distribution of China’s overseas investment. Conventional 
commercial financial institutions can only provide short-term loans, 
which are typically due in less than five years. They seldom offer medium- 
and long-term financing. Domestic banks in general do not accept foreign 
property as collateral. They tend to ‘favour the rich and disdain the poor’ 
and are more likely to refuse lending requests from non-SOEs for overseas 
investment projects out of risk management considerations.
In terms of opportunities, transnational corporations from advanced 
economies have already begun to seek market opportunities and resources 
across the globe, occupying relatively mature markets and sectors. Because 
of the aforementioned features of China’s target regions and industries, 
Chinese-funded enterprises have the opportunity to break into regions 
and industries where developed countries have traditionally found entry 
difficult. As such, with good planning and a reasonable cooperative 
framework for overseas investment and financing, China has a real chance 
to achieve ‘corner overtaking’ in its ODI.
In practice, rather than performing well, some Chinese-funded enterprises 
have suffered setbacks and frustrations in the overseas investment process. 
For example, of the 106 Chinese-funded companies that hold shares 
abroad, only three made a profit at the end of 2014 (Wang, 2015). The 
China Mining Association notes that 80 per cent of Chinese enterprises 
incurred losses for overseas mine purchases (China Mining Association, 
2014). Additionally, statistics from the All-China Federation of Industry 
and Commerce show that 67 per cent of private enterprises venturing 
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abroad experienced disappointments and only 10 per cent made a profit. 
Such poor performances can be partially attributed to risk factors such as 
political, legal and cultural differences, along with management, project 
selection and economic cycle issues. However, in some cases, the failure 
of an enterprise is linked directly to unreasonable and inflexible financing 
arrangements. For example, some Chinese-funded enterprises use cash 
instead of stock as consideration in overseas M&A transactions, and a lot of 
capital is raised through external debts. Additionally, the underdeveloped 
direct financing systems in China and the dominant role of bank 
credit in financing such investments have each partially contributed to 
this phenomenon. More notably, there is a tendency among Chinese 
enterprises to overpay because most of their transnational M&A deals are 
pro-cyclical and conducted across industries. The long running-in period 
after M&As and comparatively high debt leverage could also lead to 
potential risks. To address the problems and risks faced by enterprises, the 
government should provide guidance and develop innovative institutional 
arrangements. The ultimate goal is to improve the sustainability of 
overseas investment and create a favourable financial environment for 
Chinese enterprises to ‘go global’ and engage in international industrial 
capacity cooperation.
The capital demand of developing and emerging economies for 
construction projects is massive and can hardly be satisfied by China 
alone, thus, a sound investment and financing cooperation framework 
is needed.
Developing and emerging economies are the primary host countries of 
China’s overseas projects and investment. Their demand for capital for 
economic and social development is tremendous. The Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) estimates that the demand for infrastructure investment in 
Asia will amount to US$26 trillion between now and 2030, equivalent 
to US$2.5 trillion per year. According to the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority, the annual capital requirement for construction-related 
infrastructure along the Belt and Road regions is between US$0.8 and 
US$1 trillion. In a report published in 1994, the World Bank proposed 
a policy objective that set the share of infrastructure investment at no less 
than 5 per cent of GDP (Yuan, 2016). Based on this target, the authors 
have conducted a simple linear prediction of the annual investment 
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We divide the infrastructure investment to GDP ratios into three 
categories—low, medium and high—and set their values at 3 per cent, 
5 per cent and 6 per cent respectively. The size of investment demand is 
then obtained by multiplying the GDP forecasted by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) by the infrastructure investment to GDP ratio. 
As shown in Table 7-2, the annual demand for infrastructure investment 
in Belt and Road regions is likely to reach US$0.8 to US$1.6 trillion 
between 2017 and 2021.
In sharp contrast, according to MOFCOM data, China’s total 2016 
investment in the Belt and Road regions was US$14.53 billion, lagging 
far behind the demand for investment and financing indicated above. 
Most of China’s investment goes to developing and emerging economies, 
where the financial systems are underdeveloped and neither public nor 
private financing can satisfy local capital needs. Conversely, as the world’s 
second-largest economy, second-largest foreign investor and largest holder 
of foreign exchange reserve, China is widely considered to hold large 
amounts of capital. Concessional funds from China are also expected. 
Therefore, to conduct overseas investment and financing cooperation 
more effectively, including infrastructure construction projects along the 
Belt and Road regions, and to meet the huge demand for investment 
and capital, China must fully mobilise resources from all stakeholders. 
This will not only promote economic growth in host countries, but 
will also facilitate the ‘going global’ of Chinese enterprises, equipment 
and technologies. In  doing this, Chinese investors can also achieve 
better returns.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that developing funding platforms 
and facilitating financial integration to help enterprises ‘go global’ and 
attain international industrial capacity cooperation does not mean one-
way financial support or unilateral interest concessions (Zhou, 2017). 
In a reasonable investment and financing cooperation framework, funds 
must be operated in accordance with market and commercial principles, 
with risks and losses borne by the institutions themselves. Behaviour 
must also reflect self-discipline; that is, all parties’ resources must be 
fully mobilised, with each party both undertaking responsibilities and 
enjoying the benefits. In this way, a positive incentive mechanism can be 
formed and sustainable development secured. Additionally, due to limited 
government resources, overseas investment and financing cooperation 
cannot rely mainly on public funds. Instead, it needs to reinforce the 
division of responsibilities and cooperation between the government and 
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market, only using public funds to free up and leverage other funds. China 
should follow the leading principles of market-oriented operation and 
primary role of enterprises to secure sustainable investment and financing.
Existing problems in China’s overseas investment 
and financing cooperation
With the continuous integration of China into the world’s economy, 
the potential for China’s overseas investment and financing is enormous. 
However, in the process of ‘going global’, Chinese-funded enterprises face 
increasing conflicts and problems. Some of the most pressing challenges 
confronting Chinese financial institutions and enterprises are detailed 
below.
First, disorderly competition occurs when some financial institutions 
compete for projects. For example, many financial institutions have 
reported that it is common for domestic financial institutions to rush 
to fund the same high-quality overseas projects. Overheated competition 
and a lack of proper incentive mechanisms then cause lending conditions 
to be excessively relaxed. Chinese-funded financial institutions should 
base their overseas funding and expansion decisions on specific project 
requirements and their own specialties. To address hasty expansion and 
disorderly competition, financial regulatory authorities should provide a 
favourable environment, improve market access conditions and tighten 
the supervision of overseas operations. It is necessary to strengthen top-
level design and create a mechanism for the unified coordination of 
major projects. The goal is to integrate the respective advantages of, and 
create solidarity among, Chinese enterprises and financial institutions for 
overseas investment.
Second, some enterprises have overlooked the risks and invested blindly. 
Poor understanding of local environments and social norms may lead 
to environmental pollution and violations of religious, labour and 
cultural customs, damaging the business and reputation of the financial 
institutions and corporations involved in an investment. For example, 
according to media reports, the State Power Investment Corporation 
initiated the Myitsone Dam project in December 2009 with the 
Myanmar Government’s permission. However, in September 2011, the 
Myanmar Government halted the project, citing public concerns as the 
main reason. Many thought this project could destroy Myitsone’s natural 
scenery and local culture, affect the harvest of local rubber plantations and 
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crops, and lead to various climate and environmental problems. Although 
the Myanmar Government later established an inquiry committee to 
determine an appropriate solution, the project remains suspended at the 
time of writing and Chinese investment of more than US$2 billion is 
facing grave uncertainty. As it is uncertain when the project may resume, 
any possible return on investment appears distant (Bao & Li, 2015).
Third, monitoring and accountability mechanisms for public and 
concessional funds are inadequate. Only when capital provider values 
return will they focus on the effectiveness of capital utilisation instead of 
investing blindly and wilfully (Yin, 2017). Taking the light rail project 
in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, as an example, the Chinese listed company 
China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) won the bidding 
for this project in 2009. At that time, a Saudi Arabian corporation more 
familiar with the local engineering specifications submitted a quotation of 
US$2.7 billion, compared to the quotation of US$1.7 billion by CRCC. 
Although the project was delivered on time, was high quality and was well 
received after operation began, CRCC’s misjudgement of the project’s 
costs, along with mistakes made during the project management process 
and contract alterations, caused a total deficit of 4.15 billion RMB by 
the time of completion in 2010. To reduce shareholder losses, CRCC 
(the parent corporation) covered the shortfall. Although the Mecca light 
railway project won a good reputation for Chinese railway projects abroad 
and created favourable social effects, financially it brought about an 
unexpected and massive loss. Throughout the process, risk management 
and accountability mechanisms had clearly failed to fulfil their intended 
role (Bao & Li, 2015).
Fourth, enterprises also encounter some bottlenecks and constraints when 
they seek financing from domestic financial institutions or their overseas 
branches. To begin with, Chinese financial institutions have yet to extend 
their operations to cover a large number of developing and emerging 
economies. In terms of coverage, Chinese enterprises have already spread 
across 180 countries or regions. However, the overseas branches of 
Chinese commercial banks cover only 60 or so countries or regions and 
are concentrated in advanced economies. They are yet to form a global 
network and, as such, are unable to fully support Chinese enterprises’ 
overseas financing needs. Regarding investment banks, their coverage 
is even smaller, and their overseas branches are similarly clustered in 
advanced economies. Overseas branches serve important purposes as they 
allow financial institutions to play a frontline role. Therefore, whether 
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better coverage can be achieved will significantly influence the ability 
of Chinese financial institutions to support the enterprises’ overseas 
investments.
Moreover, the capability and services of existing overseas branches of 
Chinese financial institutions must improve. In recent years, as the ‘going 
global’ efforts of Chinese enterprises have taken increasingly various 
forms, needs have developed for more diverse financial services. Besides 
traditional services, such as financing, payment and settlement, and bank 
guarantees, there is growing demand for M&As, equity investment, 
derivatives transaction, investment consulting and other investment 
bank services and insurance-related financial services. Although Chinese 
financial institutions have gained remarkable expertise in recent years, 
they are still relatively inexperienced in international operations compared 
with their long-established international counterparts. They have yet to 
develop the ability to navigate the international financial market and 
integrate domestic and foreign financial resources with ease. For example, 
with limited capital reserve, financial institutions’ overseas branches enjoy 
little advantage in terms of financing size and interest rates. They are also 
less knowledgeable about the compliance risks in host countries than local 
financial institutions. Their ability and efficiency in helping enterprises 
circumvent supervision and avoid legal risks remains underdeveloped. 
Gaps also exist with foreign financial institutions in terms of providing 
innovative and comprehensive products and services. Increasing the 
competitiveness of overseas branches of Chinese financial institutions is 
an urgent task.
Fifth, the scale of Chinese enterprises’ cross-border M&As is expanding 
rapidly, and a high proportion of these are backed by debt financing. 
ODI is divided into cross-border M&As and green field investment. The 
former has grown rapidly in recent years. In 2016, Chinese enterprises 
conducted 742 cross-border M&As with a total transaction value of 
US$107.2 billion, achieving a year-on-year growth of 167 per cent. With 
such explosive growth, debt financing has also become common, leading 
to an increase in corporate leverage and a subsequent rise in overseas 
operational risks. Statistics jointly released by the MOFCOM, NBS and 
SAFE show that, on average, 28.9 per cent of China’s ODI capital from 
2009 onwards came from loans and other types of debt financing from 
domestic banks (see Table 7-3). Given that some projects may secure debt 
financing overseas, and that the newly added capital stock of subsidiary 
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corporations is likely secured partially through parent corporations’ 
debt financing in China, the de facto share of debt financing may be 
even higher.
Table 7-3: Financing method of China’s ODI (2009–2015)




Loans, etc. from 
domestic banks (%)
2009 30 .5 28 .5 41 .0
2010 30 .0 34 .9 35 .1
2011 42 .0 32 .8 25 .2
2012 35 .5 25 .6 38 .9
2013 28 .5 35 .5 36 .0
2014 45 .3 36 .1 18 .6
2015 66 .4 26 7 .6
Average 39 .7 31 .3 28 .9
Source: MOFCOM, nBS & SAFE (2016) .
Additionally, according to statistics from Thomson Reuters, in international 
M&As the median debt to EBITDA ratio6 is around 3.0 globally, whereas 
that of Chinese enterprises involved in overseas M&As in 2015 was 5.4. 
This is a telltale sign of high leverage. This can be partially explained by 
the dominant position of banks in China’s financial system and the high 
threshold of equity financing. It is also closely related to the fact that 
China’s financial system remains underdeveloped.
China’s overseas investment is placed mainly in developing and emerging 
economies. These investments are characterised by long cycles, large 
scales and high risks. Government bodies and official funds should make 
targeted efforts to facilitate overseas investment. It is necessary to refine 
the cooperative framework of overseas investment and financing; leverage 
capital from various parties with governmental funds; and address the 
financing difficulties and financial risks instigated by the mismatch of 
risk, return and duration of projects. The Chinese Government should 
also provide a favourable macroeconomic and financial environment for 
Chinese enterprises to participate in international economic competition 
and collaboration and should actively integrate itself into global 
production and value chains. Moreover, the flow of capital should be 
6  Debt to EBITDA ratio reflects the corporation’s ability to sustain and support its debts with 
profits. The smaller the value, the greater the solvency of the corporation.
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directed into overseas investment projects that are important for China’s 
industrial upgrading and strategic positioning within the international 
production chain. Additionally, China should uphold a market-oriented 
approach and maintain the dominant role of enterprises, improve risk 
management and accountability mechanisms for concessional funds, 
optimise the financing structure of enterprises’ overseas investment, and 
support qualified domestic enterprises to conduct authentic and legitimate 
investment abroad. This will ensure the sustainability of investment and 
financing.
Part 2: Guidelines for conducting overseas 
investment and financing cooperation
The key to overseas investment and financing cooperation is diversification 
of interests and decentralisation of risks. From a long-term perspective, 
one-way fund support from China to developing and emerging 
economies is hard to sustain. An effective mechanism must be established 
for all parties to share costs, risks and returns. This mechanism should use 
market force to mobilise all available resources, ensure the sustainability 
of funds and maximise the interests of overseas investment. Based on the 
aforementioned considerations, we argue that China should uphold the 
following principles in overseas investment and financing cooperation.
Mobilise various parties to participate in overseas 
investment and financing cooperation
As mentioned previously, it is impossible for a single country to meet 
the capital need for overseas projects and international industrial capacity 
cooperation. Therefore, collaboration is essential. China should engage 
a broad range of stakeholders and mobilise various resources to use global 
capital effectively, alleviate China’s financing strains and diversifying 
investment risks.
Engaging more stakeholders helps mobilise capital from more sources. 
A number of overseas cooperation projects in which China has participated 
featured long construction periods and slow returns. Without the 
timely commitment of funds, project implementation may be delayed 
and economic benefits reduced. This may also cause negative political 
influence. Therefore, investment and financing should be sustainable, 
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which requires collaboration between all parties and sharing of costs and 
interests. To this end, the government and market should work together to 
mobilise the resources of stakeholder countries to provide multi-channel, 
medium- to long-term, sustainable funding for projects and reduce the 
burden on China.
Engaging more stakeholders also helps with risk prevention. Capital users 
will only seriously consider how to place funds where they are needed 
most  when they bear the cost of the capital (Yin, 2017). Therefore, 
introducing capital from host countries helps to reduce project risks. 
Apart  from collaborating with host countries, China could also foster 
common interests with some competitors to promote the sustainability 
of  overseas projects. For example, the Myanmar Government 
suspended the Myitsone Dam project (in which China invested) out 
of environmental concerns, but the China–Myanmar Oil Pipeline 
project was not affected because of the joint participation of Myanmar, 
South Korea, India and other countries. This pipeline started pumping 
successfully in June 2017 (China Economic Net, 2017). As such, China 
should establish a framework of overseas investment and financing, and 
encourage countries with the capital, experience or demand for projects to 
collaborate. In this situation, each party can exert its strength based on the 
principle of mutual benefits, to share both risks and benefits.
Building on international experience, China should adhere to the following 
principles. First, for major projects, Chinese enterprises may cooperate 
with entities from other countries, including financial institutions in 
advanced economies, to share costs, risks and profits. It could also relieve 
concerns and increase international pressure on borrowers in relation 
to debt default. Major projects generally require significant amounts of 
funds, meaning they cannot be bankrolled by a single financial institution. 
Instead, these projects could be raised through international syndicated 
loans, with the participation of financial institutions in developed 
economies. In this way, the integration of funds and distribution of risks 
can be achieved, and long-term, large-scale, stable funding support and 
matching financial services for major projects secured. China can also 




Moreover, China may enhance cooperation with commercial banks in 
host countries to share benefits and risks. By encouraging the contribution 
of capital stock from local investors, financial institutions and investors 
in host countries will attach more importance to the operation and 
profitability of projects, thus ensuring the safety of Chinese investment.
Finally, multilateral development institutions—which have been working 
extensively in host countries for many years—often bring obvious 
advantages and are more experienced with risk control. Thus, cooperation 
with multilateral development institutions in investment and financing 
should be reinforced. This may include establishing joint investment 
funds and conducting co-investment business.
Optimise industry layout and conduct overseas 
investment and financing based on regional 
comparative advantages
In recent years, Chinese enterprises have sped up their ‘going global’ 
efforts. They have established various industrial parks abroad, transferred 
production capacities where needed and expanded their overseas markets. 
As each region is unique, with its own distinctive comparative advantages, 
China should pay attention to the choice of industry and location for 
overseas investments to optimise the spread of China’s industries.
Since the reform and opening, China has successfully developed labour-
intensive industries by making use of its comparative advantage of cheap 
labour. This has made a significant contribution to China’s economic 
growth and employment. Nonetheless, after decades of rapid development, 
the situation has changed. In terms of demographic structure, China’s 
working-age population has begun to shrink. In  terms of wage levels, 
China’s annual per capita GDP has increased from US$300 in the early 
stages of reform and opening to the current level of US$8,000. GDP per 
capita in coastal regions, where export industries are concentrated, has 
approached or reached the level of high-income economies. There has been 
a clear increase in labour costs. These data suggest that China’s comparative 
advantage of cheap labour, which once propped up its labour-intensive 
industries, is disappearing. Conversely, after years of investment China’s 
capital stock has increased substantially, with progress in education and 
research. Technology and labour quality have also advanced remarkably.
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Compared with the early stages of reform and opening, or when China 
joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), there has been substantial 
change in the quantity and price of labour, capital and technology in 
China. The shift in comparative advantage and industrial upgrading is 
not only a natural outcome of China’s economic development, but is 
also necessary for sustaining relatively high growth. With this change, 
some industries could move overseas to countries and regions with 
complementary conditions to China. Against this backdrop, to maximise 
returns on overseas investment, Chinese enterprises should pursue 
a differentiation strategy and choose target industries and locations based 
on local characteristics and complementary comparative advantages.
Clarify the positions of the market and government 
in overseas investment and financing cooperation
In the process of overseas investment and financing cooperation, the 
market should play a decisive role in resource allocation. Only through 
allocating capital under market-oriented and commercial principles will 
investors and projects be self-disciplined, take responsibility for risks and 
losses, and pursue a balance between benefit and risk. In this way, the 
efficiency of financial resource allocation will be improved and sustainable 
development realised. Additionally, given the huge scale of the capital 
required by China for outward investment, it is essential that the market 
should play a decisive role in capital allocation. It should provide well-
tailored financial services on a case-by-case basis to improve the effective 
integration of resources.
As previously mentioned, some host countries require much improvement 
in terms of marketisation and financial systems. From an industry 
perspective, infrastructure, energy and resources, and equipment 
manufacturing industries all have long investment cycles and slow payback 
schedules. As a result, market failures sometimes occur. For example, 
a  lack of investment and financing services in the private sector may 
hinder some public welfare projects that have slow cost-recovery periods, 
long investment cycles and great risks. Despite the positive externalities 
of such projects, they are hindered by uncertain profit outcomes or the 
long period required to reach profitability. Therefore, the government 
should play a supportive role and also be a sweeper—using public funds 
to leverage other types of funds, reducing or eliminating obstacles that 




However, special attention should be paid to efficiency when public funds 
play a supplementary role. It is only when the fund provider pays due 
attention to benefits, instead of providing financial resources wilfully, 
that such funds can be invested where they are most needed. If funds are 
used inefficiently, problems such as moral hazards in the host country 
and an over-reliance on preferential funds may arise. This will not boost 
the economic growth of developing countries and may restrain their 
development and hinder further cooperation (Zhou, 2017). Therefore, 
before using government resources for investment and financing, the 
following issues should be considered. First, is it possible for the project to 
be fully financed by the private sector through the market or commercial 
means? Second, if no private sector companies are willing or able to provide 
financing due to problems such as high levels of risk or market failure, 
is it possible for the government to introduce corresponding policies 
or conduct-related reforms to reduce investment risks and improve the 
market environment, thereby providing a more welcoming environment 
in which the private sector can participate? Third, if government funds 
must be used, this should primarily be to reduce risks and should leverage 
resources from all possible parties, including funds from the private sector.
Given the limited government resources, it is not appropriate to rely 
mainly on them for overseas investment and financing cooperation. 
Instead, it is necessary to strengthen the division of responsibilities and 
cooperation between the government and market. The market should 
play a decisive role in resource allocation, and official funds can be used to 
leverage resources from other sources if necessary. Meanwhile, adherence 
to the principles of market-oriented operation and having enterprises 
play the primary role will ensure the sustainability of investment and 
financing. Additionally, strategic projects should also be differentiated 
from commercial projects. In terms of strategic projects (that are necessary 
and possess significant positive externalities), emphasis should be placed 
on quality over quantity so that public funds are most effectively allocated 
and used.
With a well-designed mechanism in place, some medium- and long-term 
strategic projects will also gain economic benefits. First, it is necessary 
to identify project users effectively and impose reasonable charges to 
generate economic returns. Second, due to factors such as large scale, long 
cycles and various uncertainties, some projects may have unapparent or 
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minimal economic benefits in their early stages. In these circumstances, 
it is advisable to reduce uncertainties in project investment, construction 
and operation through reasonable mechanism designs, appropriate 
risk diversification and well-tailored financial tools to improve the 
economic returns.
Utilise overseas investment and financing 
cooperation to facilitate RMB internationalisation
Currently, many enterprises that have ‘gone global’ reflect that most of 
their foreign investments are financed in USD or RMB. Meanwhile, 
proceeds are received in the local currency. Due to unstable political and 
economic conditions and imperfect foreign exchange mechanisms, local 
currencies can fluctuate violently, leading to high exchange risks. Many 
projects have comparatively long construction periods, sometimes even 
spanning one or two decades. Yet, in general, the longest term of hedging 
tools for managing exchange rate risk is five years. Moreover, a majority 
of the Belt and Road countries have underdeveloped financial markets. 
Risk hedging tools in these countries are severely inadequate, making it 
difficult for Chinese corporations to hedge exchange rate risks.
In 2016, the RMB was officially added to the IMF’s basket of currencies that 
make up the special drawing right, thus gaining status as an internationally 
recognised reserve currency. Increasing the RMB’s use in the investment 
and financing of overseas Chinese projects can not only mitigate currency 
exchange risks, but also promote RMB internationalisation. Promoting 
international use of a domestic currency through investment and financing 
cooperation is not a new concept. From 1986–1991, Japan launched 
a US$65-billion capital recycling program in three phases (Liu, 2012). 
The goal was to alleviate international pressure on the current account 
surplus and, in the meantime, promote internationalisation of the JPY. To 
a certain extent, this program was successful (see Box 7-1).
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Box 7-1: Japan’s capital recycling program
Since 1980, the sharp increase in Japan’s current account surplus has placed it under 
substantial international pressure. At that time, Japan could not promote the outflow 
of the JPY through trade . To promote internationalisation of the JPY, ease trade friction 
and take advantage of the financing needs of developing countries in Asia, Latin 
America and other regions, Japan designed a program to return part of the surplus to 
developing countries. It did this by providing them with official development assistance 
(ODA) and commercial loans . As surplus is recorded on international balance sheets in 
black, this program was dubbed the ‘capital recycling program’ .
The capital recycling program was conducted from 1986–1991 in three phases, 
covering a total of US$65 billion. The first phase was initiated in September 1986, 
focusing on contributing capital to the IMF and establishing the Japan Special Fund 
in the World Bank and the ADB . The total amount introduced in this phase was 
US$10 billion . This was mainly used to encourage international development agencies 
to issue JPY-denominated bonds in Japan, promote the participation of Japanese 
banks in syndicated loans of international development agencies and provide 
developing countries with JPY loans as a form of bilateral aid . The second phase 
began in May 1987, with a total commitment of US$20 billion . The third phase was 
launched in July 1989, with the total contribution in this phase reaching US$35 billion . 
The goal was mainly to support the US in implementing the Brady Plan and help 
manage the Latin American debt crisis .
Funding for the program came mainly from ODA budgetary fund and private capital, 
with latter accounting for 71 per cent of the funding (i .e . US$46 billion) . Loans provided 
through the capital recycling program include project and non-project loans . Project 
loans targeted firms in the infrastructure, energy and raw material export sectors 
in developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region. These loans had relatively high 
concessional rates, longer repayment terms and fewer auxiliary conditions . non-
project loans were granted through the IMF and other international financial institutions, 
primarily to assist borrowing countries improve their international payment position 
and adjust domestic industrial structure .
Japan achieved substantial financial, political and diplomatic gains through the capital 
recycling program . It not only reduced trade friction and improved foreign relations, 
but also accelerated internationalisation of the JPY, supported the globalisation of 
Japanese firms and financial institutions, and increased Japan’s international influence.
At present, many developing countries are in great need of funds, and 
urgently need to develop their domestic manufacturing industry and 
infrastructure. Therefore, a huge demand exists for full sets of equipment, 
project construction and other products and services from China. 
Additionally, overseas projects constructed by Chinese companies will also 
increase the demand for equipment from China. These demands have laid 
a solid foundation for the RMB’s use in overseas investment and financing 
cooperation. Foreign parties can use the RMB earned through China’s ODI 
to import Chinese goods and services. In this way, RMB flow back will 
be facilitated. RMB investment in suitable industries can further release 
the growth potential of other developing countries, while promoting the 
purchase of Chinese goods and services, export of Chinese equipment 
and RMB internationalisation. Additionally, investing and financing 
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in RMB could reduce dependence on the USD and other currencies, 
boost confidence in and increase the attractiveness of the RMB, promote 
the development of offshore RMB markets, reduce the risks created by 
exchange rate fluctuations, and maintain stability in the foreign exchange 
rate and financial market. An important future direction for China to 
pursue is to use the RMB more frequently in overseas investment and 
financing cooperation. China should always uphold a market-oriented 
approach and the dominant role of enterprises in this process.
To date, China has made several attempts to explore RMB use for overseas 
investing and financing. First, at the Belt and Road Forum for International 
Cooperation held in May 2017, China announced that it would inject 
another CN¥100 billion into the Silk Road Fund. China also encouraged 
financial institutions to conduct overseas RMB fund business, which is 
estimated to total CN¥300 billion. Second, China has founded a number 
of RMB investment and loan funds, such as Sailing Capital International, 
to provide commercial investment plans and financial support to Chinese 
enterprises in their overseas investment and M&A activities. The total 
scale of Sailing Capital International has reached CN¥50 billion, of which 
CN¥12 billion came from the first round of fund raising. The fund also 
mobilised capital from other sources through various methods such as 
fund of fund, combination of investment and loans, and issuance of bonds. 
Third, development and policy-based financial institutions, such as China 
Development Bank (CDB) and Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC), 
have already issued many cross-border loans in RMB. For instance, loans 
granted by EIBC in RMB account for more than 60 per cent of its total 
overseas loans. Moreover, the proportion of overseas financing in RMB 
undertaken by EIBC has increased continuously. Fourth, commercial 
financial institutions have also begun to make loans in RMB in accordance 
with market-oriented approaches.
Part 3: Seize current strategic opportunities 
and build China’s framework for overseas 
investment and financing cooperation
The Belt and Road Initiative and international cooperation of industrial 
production capacity have initiated ample strategic opportunities for 
creating a framework for China’s overseas investment and financing. With 
the guidelines proposed above, we argue that China should encourage 
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innovation in the design of investment and financing mechanisms; reduce 
uncertainty in overseas investment; and improve economic benefits through 
introducing sound financing arrangements, risk-sharing mechanisms 
and appropriate financial instruments. More specifically, China should 
use development finance effectively, refine policy-based financial tools 
such as export credit and promote the formation of an overseas financial 
operation network. It should also fully mobilise government and market 
funds, financial resources from host countries and the international 
capital market, and capital from multilateral development institutions. 
China should also make better use of equity funds and develop a market-
oriented, sustainable framework of overseas investment and financing.
Promote development finance
According to international practices, enterprises that ‘go global’ mainly 
receive three types of financial support. The difference between them lies 
in the different value orientation towards market profits and national 
strategies. Commercial finance pursues profits following market principles. 
Policy-based finance serves national interests instead of market profits. 
Development finance, while aspiring to fulfil national strategies, also seeks 
to achieve breakeven or narrow profits to ensure sustainability (Zhou, 
2015). There is a corresponding cost gradient, with commercial finance 
incurring the highest cost of capital and policy-based finance the lowest.
Of the three types, policy-based finance may face problems of low capital 
efficiency and increased fiscal burden. Additionally, its effect is relatively 
limited while there is a vast demand for capital by overseas investment 
and financing. Commercial capital performs well in terms of providing 
medium- and short-term financial support. However, it does not offer 
much long-term financing. The effectiveness of market-driven resource 
allocation in this field is less than ideal. Meanwhile, the actions of 
commercial financial institutions are typically pro-cyclical and ‘favour the 
rich and disdain the poor’.
In such circumstances, development finance has its own advantage. 
It can fill the gap between policy-based finance and commercial finance. 
Development finance is an extension of traditional policy-based finance. 
It serves national strategies and relies on the credit worthiness of projects, 
rather than government subsidies. Run autonomously, it operates under 
market principles, emphasises long-term commitment and seeks financial 
sustainability with zero or modest profits. It is a financial model between 
287
7 . BUILDInG CHInA’S OvERSEAS InvESTMEnT AnD FInAnCInG COOPERATIOn
policy-based finance and commercial finance, but leans towards the 
commercial side (Zhou, 2017). Currently, China’s overseas investment and 
financing programs, including those along the Belt and Road Initiative, are 
characterised by slow payback timelines and a large capital requirement. 
In these cases, development finance could make significant contributions 
by exerting its strength in market-oriented operations, financial 
sustainability and medium- to long-term commitment. Indeed, existing 
practices have shown that development finance is advantageous in many 
aspects. With the support of government credits, it can secure long-term, 
stable funds at a relatively low cost through the issuance of policy-based 
financial bonds. Accordingly, it can provide long-term financial support 
for programs of its choice. Thus, the needs of medium- and short-term 
overseas investment can be met through commercial finance (market 
capital). However, commercial finance may avoid long-term programs 
with a slow return on investment (even if they are profitable) or if the 
cost of capital is too high to accept. This opens investment and financing 
services for the involvement of development finance.
Over the last few years, as long-term public resources have fallen short, the 
world’s major development institutions are in the process of transforming 
their business models and increasingly emphasise the commercial 
feasibility and financial sustainability of projects. They are also seeking 
to leverage investment from the private sector through capital raised at 
a low cost from the international bond market, fully mobilise resources 
and support the economic development of all concerned countries. China 
has already been leading the world in this field, with the CDB and EIBC 
playing vital roles in enterprises ‘going global’. The CDB is the largest 
investment and financing cooperation bank in China and the largest 
development financial institution in the world. Taking advantage of its 
medium- to long-term investment and financing capability, the CDB had 
extended over US$160 billion worth of loans to countries in the Belt and 
Road regions by the end of 2016, with an outstanding investment balance 
of US$110 billion. It has over 500 projects in its investment portfolio. 
Most projects are concentrated in the areas of infrastructure, energy and 
resources, and industrial production capacity cooperation, all of which 
require long-term financing. Apart from supporting international trade, 
government concessional loans and preferential buyer’s credit, the EIBC 
has also established a special investment fund to participate actively in the 
investment of overseas projects. Development capital from the two banks 
is mainly provided in the form of loans. Recent years have also witnessed 
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the involvement of equity investment in some overseas investment 
projects with high capital demands, long construction periods and slow 
return schedules. These projects have both a demonstration effect and 
positive externality. Thus, they share some common features with public 
goods and development finance. According to the authors’ estimation, 
China possesses a development capital pool of US$200–300 billion for 
supporting the ‘going global’ of enterprises, international cooperation of 
production capacity and projects in the Belt and Road regions.
Considering the characteristics and costs of various funds (see Table 7-4), 
we may conclude that development funds will become the main support 
for overseas investment in the priority projects of developing countries. 
Meanwhile, from the perspectives of market development and project life 
cycle, the functions of policy-based, development and commercial funds 
in relation to each other can be described as ‘incubation—laying the 
groundwork—follow-up’. Together, these form a sustainable framework 
of investment and financing.
Table 7-4: Estimation of cost of external funding for ‘go global’ enterprises
Policy-based funds
Financial subsidies, soft loans, etc . The cost of capital is negligible since profit 
maximisation is not the goal . 
Government concessional loans and 
preferential buyer’s credit
The annual interest rate is around 2–3% .
Development funds
CDB and EIBC loans The annual interest rate of export credit is 
about 4–5% . The annual interest rate of an 
overseas loan is about 6–7% .
various equity-based funds In the case of equity investment, the cost 
of capital equals its return on equity .
Commercial funds
Medium- and long-term export credit 
of commercial banks
The annual interest rate is usually above 7% .
Medium- and long-term loans of 
commercial banks
The annual interest rate is usually above 7% .
Source: Authors’ original calculations based on data extracted in early 2017 from 
open sources .
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For important overseas investment projects eligible for government 
policy support, different types of funds can be introduced and play 
a  complementary role in providing financial support at different stages 
of a project’s life cycle. Given their low capital cost and indifference to 
profit, policy-based funds could engage in unprofitable yet indispensable 
projects that have significant positive externalities and provide fiscal and 
interest subsidies. Nevertheless, excess fiscal burden should be avoided. 
Meanwhile, development funds can assist projects at low-profit stages. 
They can provide capital support at a low cost, help the project grow 
and subsequently partake in the growth dividends. Commercial funds can 
become involved when projects are mature and generating steady returns. 
At this stage, projects would already have been running for some time, 
accumulating a certain level of credibility. Therefore, should they seek 
market financing, the cost of capital will be much lower than it would 
have been at the beginning stage.
For instance, infrastructure projects require a large amount of capital. 
They are also characterised by long cycles and slow payback timelines. 
Development financial institutions can enter at the beginning stages, 
bringing investment from the private sector. Through their unique 
advantage in connecting government and markets, integrating various 
resources, providing long-term credit support to those with special needs, 
and playing a demonstration role for commercial finance, development 
finance institutions can achieve reasonable returns and sustainability.
Policy finance: Improve the export credit system 
and provide investment and financing support for 
Chinese enterprises ‘going global’
The export credit system is an important facilitator in the ‘going global’ 
of China’s products, services, technology and labour. It is also a vital 
component of China’s overseas investment and financing cooperation. 
Strictly speaking, to date, there has been no widely accepted international 
rules for export credit. France, Italy, Spain and the UK founded the Berne 
Union in 1934, which marked the beginning of international export credit 
coordination.7 In the 1970s, major developed countries began competing 
fiercely for export orders from developing countries as their demand for 
7  The Berne Union, also known as the International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers, 
was named after the location of its headquarters in Bern, Switzerland.
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capital goods grew. The chaotic situation and ever-increasing export credit 
subsidies led to the emergence of a so-called ‘gentlemen’s agreement’. 
To coordinate export credit policies among developed countries, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
developed the ‘Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits’ (the 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’) after rounds of negotiations. However, this is 
only an agreement among developed countries. It does not have the status 
of international covenants, nor is it legally binding as is international law.
The ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ has undergone constant revision since its 
promulgation. The Wallen Package adopted in 1987 was an important 
step in the process of phasing out interest rate subsidies. The package 
stipulated that the lowest interest rate of export credit provided to high-
income countries would not be set below the relevant commercial interest 
reference rate (CIRR). It also set a minimum quantitative requirement 
for the concessional level of aid credits. The Helsinki Package, introduced 
in 1991, was another important revision; it prohibited tied aid for 
wealthier developing countries and for projects that could be financed 
commercially. It also ended the bundling of export credit with the 
procurement of a country’s goods and services, clarified that loans from 
donor governments and their financial institutions should not favour 
domestic firms and products, and stated that procurement should be 
conducted by means of open and competitive bidding (OECD, 2011).
In the past, developed countries were the main providers of export 
credit. However, in recent years, China’s export credit has flourished 
and has taken over some of the market share previously occupied by 
the US and European countries. This has led to some controversy. The 
global proportion of China’s officially supported export credit rose from 
2 per cent in 2001 to 36 per cent in 2014, while that of the G7 declined 
from 91 per cent to 32 per cent. Instead of following the ‘gentlemen’s 
agreement’, which distinguishes strictly between concessional and non-
concessional loans, China has adopted a more flexible policy that allows 
for a mix and match between the two types of loans. Generally speaking, 
the terms and conditions of China’s export credits are more favourable 
than those stipulated in the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’, but less favourable 
than with aid loans. This has created considerable controversy. Since 2010, 
the US and European Union have frequently mentioned the international 
rules of export credit to China, accusing the latter of being too flexible 
with its export credit schemes and of not abiding by existing international 
standards. Under such circumstances, the clash between different export 
credit models has become increasingly acute.
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Based on the commercial viability of projects, the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ 
divides export credits into two groups: general officially supported export 
credits and tied aid. For the former, the core principle is ‘not too favourable’. 
In terms of interest rates, the CIRR (the benchmark interest rate of each 
country plus 100 basis points) has been adopted as the minimum interest 
rate of fixed rate loans. Specifically, for countries with low levels of interest 
rate liberalisation, the CIRRs are determined by external standards under 
the WTO framework.
Regarding repayment terms, the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ classifies 
countries into two categories according to their per capita income as 
estimated by the World Bank. For credit provided by high-income OECD 
countries, the term is five years, and this can be prolonged to 8.5 years 
after prior notification. For credit provided by all other countries, the 
maximum repayment term is 10 years.
Tied aid aims to provide support for countries or projects with little or no 
access to market financing. To minimise trade distortion, ‘the gentlemen’s 
agreement’ sets strict rules about the eligibility of countries and projects 
and the minimum levels of concessionality. The underlying principle is 
‘favourable enough’. In terms of eligibility, only countries with lower-
middle incomes or low-income levels qualify for tied aid. Meanwhile, 
commercially viable projects, whether public or private, are ineligible. In 
terms of concessionality levels, the minimum level for tied aid is set at no 
less than 35 per cent, and no less than 50 per cent for the ‘least developed 
countries’ (OECD, 2015).
In general, instead of classifying export credits according to a project’s 
commercial viability, China applies export credit schemes based on the 
project’s specific needs, often using a blend of concessional and non-
concessional loans. Subsequently, China’s non-concessional export credits 
are more favourable and its concessional export credits less favourable 
than those established in the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’. If China conforms 
to the agreement’s rules, the rapid development of export credit will 
be affected.
The ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ is not an international custom and it 
certainly does not reflect the new international pattern of export credit. 
First, the basic goal of the agreement was to coordinate competition 
among developed countries in ex-colonial regions and break free of the 
constraints imposed by the notion of colonial territories. This goal lacks 
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universality. Second, the agreement mainly targets the regulation of export 
credits from developed to developing countries; hence, the derivation of 
the phrase ‘aid loan’. However, investment and financing cooperation 
between China and developing countries falls within the scope of ‘South-
South Cooperation’, which stresses the mutually beneficial nature of the 
relationship. This is completely different from the original goal of the 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’. Finally, the division of export credits based on 
a project’s commercial viability is oversimplified. It fails to capture the 
diverse financing needs of developing countries. Therefore, China should 
propel reforms and improve international rules around export credit to 
provide investment and financing support for the export of its equipment, 
products and services.
China should also make full use of the communication platforms at 
various levels to create synergy for the establishment of new international 
rules on export credit. Specifically, China should make more emerging 
economies aware of the drawbacks of the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ and 
build a consensus through multilevel communication channels. This 
will improve coherence and coordination in the country’s dialogue with 
developed countries. Internally, China should also promote domestic 
reform of its export credit system, adjust the procedures of government 
concessional loans and preferential export buyer’s credit, and establish 
and improve the relevant management systems. In the meantime, to ease 
controversy, China could raise the concessionality level of its concessional 
loans by lowering the interest rate and extending the credit period. Further, 
measures should be taken to clarify the risk profile of commercial export 
credit vis-à-vis policy-based export credit to ensure capital recovery.
Commercial finance: Improve the overseas network 
of Chinese financial institutions and services
In recent years, the overseas activities of Chinese enterprises have 
taken diverse forms, such as cross-border M&As and equity swaps and 
establishment of overseas factories, research and development centres 
and industrial parks. This calls for more varied services from financial 
institutions. Apart from the traditional financial services, including 
financing, payment, settlement and bank guarantee, an increasing need 
exists for investment banking services such as M&A, equity investment, 
derivative transactions, investment consulting, account management, 
export credit and overseas investment insurance.
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Financial institutions should establish a network to share risks and benefits 
through alignment of financial services, connection of capital markets 
and financial infrastructures, and communication and collaboration of 
financial supervisory authorities. (Zhou, 2017). First, Chinese financial 
institutions should actively develop overseas operation networks. Financial 
institutions, with their overseas branches at the forefront, play a major 
role in facilitating financial interconnection. Currently, many developing 
and emerging economies rely heavily on financial institutions from 
developed countries for financial services. China’s financial institutions 
must develop and optimise their overseas operation networks, improve 
professional competence, expand the range of services they provide and 
initiate financial innovations to serve the needs of Chinese enterprises 
more effectively. They should provide effective service in investment and 
financing, financial consulting, insurance and risk management to help 
enterprises ‘go global’.
In the past decade, the global strategy of major international banks has 
undergone profound changes. Before the 2008 global financial crisis, 
these banks were in a race to open branches or gain market share through 
M&As outside their home countries, creating a highly globalised business 
network in the process. For example, the networks of HSBC, Citibank 
and Deutsche Bank are spread over 100 countries globally. More than 
half, perhaps even 70–80 per cent, of the revenue from a few major 
international banks came from foreign markets. However, in the wake 
of the 2008 global financial crisis, they made a major adjustment to their 
global strategy. To deal with the aftershock of the crisis, international 
banks scaled down foreign operations and shifted the focus—especially 
the focus of retail business—back to more familiar home markets. This 
contraction in the global business indicates a relative decline in the capital 
strength of these banks. This provides great opportunities for China’s 
financial institutions to develop their overseas operation network and 
achieve internationalisation.
In terms of geographical distribution, the branch offices of Chinese banks 
are concentrated mainly in Southeast Asian and West Asian countries. 
Their presence in Central Asian and Commonwealth of Independent 
States countries is less visible and lags far behind their major international 
competitors such as HSBC, Citibank and Standard Chartered. 
According to the authors’ survey, the 15 major Chinese banks (ICBC, 
Agricultural Bank of China, China Construction Bank, BOC, Bank of 
Communications, CDB, EIBC, China Minsheng Bank, Shanghai Pudong 
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Development Bank [SPDB], Guangdong Development Bank [now 
China Guangfa Bank], China Merchants Bank, China Everbright Bank, 
Ping An Bank, CITIC Bank and China Industrial Bank) have established 
220 overseas branches in over 50 countries and regions. Of these, 180 
branches belong to the top five banks (49 to the ICBC and 56 to the 
BOC). Most banks have plans for further expansion, which will lead to 
an additional 39 overseas branches in total (SPDB, the most ambitious, 
is preparing to open seven). These branches will be located mainly in 
Asia and Europe. Specifically, 16 will be in Asia (including Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, Macau Special Administrative Region 
and Taiwan), 13 in Europe, five in America, three in Africa and two in 
Oceania. Institutions like the CDB also plan to upgrade their country 
working groups into representative offices.
In addition to accelerating the overseas network expansion of Chinese 
financial institutions, emphasis should be placed on expanding the 
width and depth of their cross-border business and improving services. 
For instance, China should promote the exploration of cost-sharing 
mechanisms between banks and enterprises, encourage Chinese banks to 
provide preferential terms to major overseas projects and receive dividends 
when the projects begin to make profit. It should also improve hedging 
tools against currency exchange risk in long-term investments and lower 
the requirements for sovereign guarantees of project financing in host 
countries to an appropriate level. China can also relax the full collateral 
coverage requirement for financing guarantees to reduce the liquidity 
pressure on ‘going global’ enterprises.
Correspondent banking is an important component of the international 
payment system. Through correspondent banking services, the respondent 
bank can access overseas financial systems for products and services that 
may not be available in the bank’s own jurisdictions. Unfortunately, recent 
years have witnessed a decline in global correspondent banking business. 
While increased compliance costs due to tightened supervision is one 
reason behind this, the downsizing of financial institutions of developed 
countries also appears to be behind the decision of major transnational 
banks to reduce or terminate correspondent relationships. Their 
withdrawals have raised international concerns over potential financial 
exclusion in developing countries (Bank for International Settlements & 
World Bank, 2015).
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China should deal with the decline of correspondent banking from the 
aspect of both respondent and correspondent banks. Large correspondent 
banks are more likely to withdraw from countries with weak supervision, 
especially of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing. 
Therefore, those countries should strengthen their supervision capacity 
building. More importantly, the following measures can be taken. First, 
differentiated requirements for anti-money laundering and counter-
terrorism should be applied to prevent financial exclusion that could 
be caused by one-size-fits-all rules. Second, the regulators should 
adopt a pragmatic approach, consult fully with the private sector and 
key stakeholders in the process of policy design (especially guidelines 
and procedures) and observe the effects of policy through multiphase 
deployment. Third, information exchanges between financial institutions 
should be reinforced to reduce asymmetry and, thereby, improve 
supervisory effectiveness. Finally, information transparency in cross-
border capital flow should be improved.
Additionally, syndicated loans could play a more substantial role in meeting 
the financing needs of large enterprises and projects and diversifying 
risks. Syndicated lending is one of the most important forms of financing 
on the international financial market. It enables the sharing of risk and 
benefits among financial institutions. In the case of contract breach, 
lenders can come together to exert pressure on the borrower or determine 
appropriate solutions. According to statistics from Thomson Reuters, 
many major international projects and M&As are financed by syndicated 
loans. In 2014, global syndicated loans totalled US$4.7 trillion. With the 
rapid globalisation of Chinese enterprises, Chinese banks are becoming 
increasingly active in international syndicated lending. The BOC and 
ICBC are among the top 10 lending banks in Asia and the Pacific region. 
Nevertheless, international syndicated loan business is still at a developing 
stage in China and Chinese banks do not have an adequate sense of risk 
diversification. Further, China has yet to establish a standardised secondary 
platform for syndicated loan transfers. Channels of distribution, buy-back 
and securitisation remain underdeveloped (Rong, 2017).
China could take the following steps to make full use of syndicated loans 
in overseas investment and financing cooperation. First, more financial 
institutions should be engaged. Banks from developed countries with 
mature mechanisms can help share the capital burden and diversify risks. 
Financial institutions in host countries could help mitigate commercial 
and political risks. Domestic financial institutions could partner with each 
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other to avoid disorderly competition. Second, China should promote 
securitisation of syndicated loans to increase secondary market liquidity, 
free up more funds, increase the rate of return, and diversify and transfer 
credit risks in time. Finally, priority of claims in bankruptcy liquidations 
should be properly designed to reduce the risks.
It is worth mentioning that the financial supervisory authorities should 
seize the momentum of financial institutions’ overseas expansion 
and encourage them to facilitate ‘going global’ enterprises. First, the 
authorities should support expansion of financial institutions based 
on their functional expertise to achieve differentiated competition and 
create synergy for supporting the ‘going global’ of enterprises and the 
Belt and Road Initiative. Second, the authorities should raise awareness 
among Chinese financial institutions about risk factors such as the host 
country’s political and economic stability, degree of openness in the local 
financial market, legal and regulatory provisions, financial supervision, 
market size, client resources and credit environment. In this way, they 
will conduct proper due diligence and feasibility studies prior to making 
any commitment, avoid unnecessary risks, make wise decisions regarding 
the location of overseas units and ensure sustainable operation. Third, to 
fully mobilise resources through various channels, China should propel 
cooperation between Chinese financial institutions and their foreign peers, 
further open its domestic financial market and grant qualified foreign 
financial institutions permission to open branches in China. Fourth, 
China should strengthen communication and coordination between 
domestic and foreign financial supervisory bodies. A global tightening 
of supervisory standards in recent years, due to the implementation of 
various domestic and international programs, suggests that, for Chinese 
financial institutions, the likelihood to trigger regulatory action overseas is 
now higher than ever. Therefore, coordination between regulatory bodies 
is vital. It is also needed to clear regulatory obstacles hindering the overseas 
expansion of Chinese financial institutions.
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Host countries, multilateral development banks, 
capital markets of developed economies and 
international financial centres should play their role 
in overseas investment and financing cooperation
Domestic funds available for overseas investment and financing 
cooperation  are limited. A sizable amount of capital can be gained on 
the international market. Thus, China should make full use of various 
kinds of capital. The first of these is the host country’s financial resources. 
According to the World Bank, up until 2014, the gross savings of countries 
participating in the Belt and Road Initiative amounted to US$9 trillion. 
Credit loans in 70 per cent of the countries accounted for more than 
40  per cent of their GDP. The Sino-Central and Eastern European 
Financial Holdings Company Limited is a typical example of mobilising 
the host country’s financial resources (see Box 7-2).
Box 7-2: Sino-Central and Eastern European Financial 
Holding Company
On 24 november 2015, during the Fourth Summit of China and Central and Eastern 
European Countries, China proposed the establishment of a Sino-Central and Eastern 
European Financial Holding Company to support production capacity cooperation 
among member states . The holding company, which comprised China and all Central 
and Eastern European member states, was officially inaugurated in Latvia on 15 
november 2016 .
The holding company is an addition to the existing group of international multilateral 
financial institutions. Established by an intergovernmental agreement between China 
and Central and Eastern European countries, and operated by member state–
authorised financial institutions, the holding company aims to promote production 
capacity cooperation among the member states through commercialised multilateral 
financial cooperation. The company adopted a two-tier structure. At the upper tier is 
the policy-oriented holding company funded by government-authorised institutions . 
At the lower tier, multiple subplatforms of private equity, investment banking, leasing, 
insurance and other elements run on commercial principles .
The company enjoys the advantage of super-sovereign credits and the consequent 
reduced cost of financing. It can achieve an amplifying effect on government funds, 
using them as seed money to attract and channel social capital and capital from other 
sources through its commercial subplatforms . Meanwhile, the company will adopt 
corporate governance practices and commercial approaches . All member countries 
are shareholders . Together they participate in rulemaking and project selection based 
on commercial principles . The ICBC, CDB and EIBC were involved in the establishment 
of the holding company on behalf of China .
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China should also draw support from the expertise and capital of 
multilateral development banks such as the World Bank, IDB Bank, 
ADB, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and New Development Bank to 
promote successful implementation of cross-border projects. To date, 
China has invested a total of US$7 billion in co-financing programs with 
multilateral development institutions such as the IDB Bank, ADB and 
IFC (a member of the World Bank Group), and a further €250 million 
in the equity participation fund established by the EBRD. Through 
these co-investment schemes, China can effectively mobilise resources 
from multilateral development banks and other investors. In addition, 
given the extensive experience of multilateral development banks in risk 
management and their influence over and familiarity with host countries, 
joint investment with these institutions can help mitigate risks.
China’s financing model using public funds to leverage multisource capital 
has been emulated by some major international institutions. For instance, 
with the European Commission’s Fund for Strategic Investments providing 
first-loss protection, the Investment Plan (the so-called ‘Juncker Plan’) 
intends to trigger €315-billion worth of public and private investment. 
Similarly, World Bank Group programs such as the Managed Co-Lending 
Portfolio Program and Green Cornerstone Bond Fund provide first-loss 
coverage with public funds, thereby improving project risk ratings and 
enticing capital injections from institutional investors such as insurance 
companies, pension funds and sovereign wealth funds. At the 2016 
G20 Hangzhou Summit, multilateral development banks issued a joint 
declaration. They confirmed their commitment to support infrastructure 
investment; ensure the high quality and sustainability of projects; explore 
multipartite cooperation financing models; catalyse private financing; and 
address the risk elements facing private investors through risk guarantees, 
credit enhancements and increasing local currency financing.
China should make full use of international capital such as sovereign 
wealth funds and the capital market of developed economies. According 
to the World Bank, globally, US$8.55 trillion are placed in negative-
yielding bonds, US$24.5 trillion in low-yielding government bonds 
with a rate of return below 1 per cent, and a further US$8 trillion lies in 
cash. In other words, for the aforementioned three kinds of funds, over 
US$40 trillion is unused—this is a potential source of capital for higher 
yield investments in developing and emerging countries, if investment-
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grade assets are available. This measure could also provide China with risk 
management professionals and tools on the international financial market 
for its overseas investment and financing cooperation.
Finally, international financial centres such as Hong Kong and London 
should play to their advantages. Some regional and international financial 
centres (London, New York, Frankfurt and Singapore) are important 
platforms for international investment and financing. They have mature 
capital markets and a large number of institutional investors. Further, 
their connections to institutional investors worldwide would allow China 
to attract international capital and investors. China can enter cooperation 
agreements with financial centres with clearly defined capital contribution 
obligations. In this way, they can use Chinese funds to mobilise international 
capital, playing to the natural advantages of these financial hubs. 
In addition, China could turn overseas projects, including infrastructure 
projects, into financial products and investment opportunities and access 
global institutional investors through international financial centres to 
raise funds for these projects.
Taking Hong Kong as an example, in response to the urgent capital 
needs for infrastructure development in the Belt and Road countries, 
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority established the Infrastructure 
Financing Facilitation Office (IFFO) in July 2016 as a one-stop platform 
for facilitating infrastructure investments and financing. IFFO is running 
smoothly at present. Over 60 institutions, including financial institutions, 
banks, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and insurance companies, 
have joined as partners. Among these are the IFC, MIGA, ADB, EIBC, 
China-Africa Development Fund and Blackstone. Taking London as 
another example, the city boasts an abundance of innovative financial 
instruments such as investment guarantee funds and underpinnings and 
could provide Chinese enterprises with services not available elsewhere. 
Indeed, London is host to China’s first green asset–backed security, which 
went public in 2016.
Meanwhile, the clustering of major financial institutions and professional 
services firms in international financial centres creates extensive 
connections and world-leading expertise in areas such as trade finance, 
marine finance, insurance, financial operation and risk management. This 
can be used to China’s benefit, to prevent various risks associated with 
finance, environment, regulation and markets. Major financial centres are 
also important RMB trading centres and offshore RMB markets, offering 
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abundant RMB-related financial products. With the RMB’s increased 
use in investment and financing, these centres can provide easily accessed 
RMB services to investors worldwide.
Use multiple investment and financing models and 
make full use of equity investment
China should use all types of investments and financing tools, especially 
equity investment. Overseas investments create financial needs for 
infrastructure financing, trade financing, risk management in cross-border 
transactions, cross-border trade settlements and financial infrastructure. 
Therefore, a diverse set of financial instruments is needed, each playing to 
its own advantage and together creating synergy.
Meanwhile, a high demand exists for equity investment among enterprises 
investing overseas. Equity investment can serve as high-powered funds 
in overseas investment and financing cooperation. Generally speaking, 
equity investment can enhance the capital strength of projects and 
investing firms and leverage debt financing, such as loans. Moreover, 
equity investment can also provide greater control over investment and 
project operations. To tackle problems faced by many host countries of 
Chinese investment, such as high leverage ratios and limited access to 
foreign credit, the proportion of equity investment should be increased 
and various models such as direct, entrusted and joint investment should 
be used to make full use of equity funds and private equity investment. 
In this way, risks can be diversified, and the sustainable development of 
investment and financing achieved.
Simultaneously, equity funds can help enterprises mobilise Chinese 
resources, by combining direct investment with policy agendas such as 
economic structural adjustment, the ‘going global’ of technical standards, 
cooperation in equipment manufacturing and RMB internationalisation, 
to reap long-term rewards and improve the overall efficacy of overseas 
investment and financing projects. However, it is worth mentioning that 
despite the advantages listed above, the risks and uncertainties associated 
with equity investment are higher compared to other types of financing, 
such as loans. Therefore, proper measures should be established to control 
relevant risks.
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In conclusion, first, China should give full play to equity investment 
funds such as the Silk Road Fund, China-Africa Industrial Production 
Capacity Cooperation Fund, China-Latin America Industrial Production 
Capacity Cooperation Fund and overseas RMB funds. This will increase 
the proportion of equity investment; absorb capital, technology and 
experience from relevant countries; and enhance the overall benefit of 
projects. Second, allocation of resources should be made more efficient, 
and the interests of all parties should be maximised, rather than assuming 
that China is providing aid to economies in need. Third, the government 
should provide guidance and support for equity investments that produce 
public goods or have the feature of development finance projects. This 
will ensure their sustainability.
China should also pay special attention to the international coordination 
of rules regarding equity investment and actively participate in the 
making and improvement of these rules. For instance, at present, 
multilateral developmental institutions such as the World Bank have 
a co-investment policy that asserts co-investment is reserved only for the 
private sector, not for government-funded institutions. Such policies do 
not accord with the international community’s principle of mobilising 
all types of  resources for project construction, nor do they meet the 
actual needs of developing countries and emerging economies. Therefore, 
it is necessary to bring multilateral development institutions on board 
in terms of improving existing rules to foster win–win cooperation. 
Meanwhile, from the perspective of investment sustainability, China can 
play an active role in forming international rules in new and emerging 
areas such as environmental risk management and green finance. For 
instance, China has the largest green finance market. Many countries 
and international organisations have a strong intention to cooperate with 
China in establishing global green finance standards. A leadership role 
in the development of such standards could help promote China’s image 
among people in host countries and ensure the smooth and sustainable 
operation of investment projects.
Equity investment institutions have made useful attempts to connect 
capital and industry, improve market openness and promote the 
complementarity of production factors. The Silk Road Fund is a medium- 
to long-term development investment institution established to support 
the Belt and Road Initiative. As of May 2017, the fund had signed 15 
projects and pledged a total of US$6 billion in investment in Russia, 
Mongolia, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, West Asia, North 
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Africa and Europe. The projects cover infrastructure development, 
resource exploitation, industrial production and financial cooperation. 
The fund has also committed another US$2 billion to set up a sub-
fund for China–Kazakhstan industrial production capacity cooperation. 
So far, equity investment accounts for more than 70 per cent of the total 
investment of the Silk Road Fund. Apart from equity funds, the fund 
also combines several investment vehicles such as credits, loans and funds 
to meet differentiated financing demands. Meanwhile, the fund places 
much emphasis on serving China’s benefits in investment decision-
making. It plays an active role in promoting the engagement of Chinese 
enterprises in international production capacity cooperation, the ‘going 
global’ of China’s equipment manufacturing industry and the importation 
of advanced technologies.
Additionally, the overseas RMB fund established in 2017 is likely to 
play a vital role. The fund positions itself as a medium- to long-term 
financing platform with businesses ranging from overseas RMB loans 
and equity investments to cross-border guarantees. Overseas loan services 
consist of overseas project financing, acquisition loans and short-term 
bridge loans. Equity investment and cross-border guarantee services are 
mainly provided for overseas projects and participating enterprises. It is 
estimated that a  substantial proportion of RMB received by the fund’s 
client countries will be used for importing goods and services from China, 
thereby creating a virtuous cycle that serves the real economy in which the 
RMB recycles through a ‘capital outflow and trade inflow’ mechanism.
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